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1.1 Summary 
A combination of European administrators, an indigenous elite and colonialist discourse 
upheld colonial rule. The colonialist discourse that engulfed all colonies was extensive, 
drawing on both non-cultural explanations such as racism, and cultural such as Eurocentric 
universalism to justify colonialism. Resistance to colonialism therefore required an 
imaginative reconstruction and a transcendence of colonial discourse as well as resistance to 
its more physical and material legacies, also because the material and non-material elements 
of colonialism are mutually constitutive and interconnected. As Postcolonial theory further 
acknowledges, the legacy of colonialist discourse continued to influence the perceptions and 
self-image of both coloniser and colonised after actual colonialism had ended. 
    Although South Africa’s colonial period was in a sense unique because of the “internal” 
nature of its colonisation, until the late forties and even into the sixties the nature of 
exploitation of its indigenous population was relatively unexceptional compared to that of 
other African countries and colonies elsewhere. The combination of the decolonisation of 
most other colonies in the late fifties and sixties and the increasingly rigid nature of apartheid 
laws in South Africa changed this.  
    Black Consciousness was a response to the increasingly rigid nature of apartheid that 
according to Biko had caused the black1 defeatism, lack of pride and dependency upon white 
liberals that was evident in the lack of black liberation activity inside South Africa in the late 
sixties. Whereas Biko’s goal was a non-racial society, his solution was two-tiered, blacks 
having first to regain pride and confidence in themselves by acts of self-sufficiency, this being 
a pre-condition for a successful second tier, that of actual liberation and material and political 
improvements. After the elimination of apartheid, Biko’s Black Consciousness envisaged a 
non-racial society and an integration that fused the lifestyles of the various groups.  
    The ANC of Thabo Mbeki that achieved actual political power after the dismantling of 
apartheid saw things the other way round, striving to end apartheid whilst giving little thought 
to racialism until well into the nineties. Mbeki’s ANC thereby ended up with an “over-
racialised” view of South Africa, advocating an Africanism or Afrocentric universalism and 
group-orientated multiculturalism that has seen a resurgence of exclusionism.  Additionally, 
                                                 
1 BC used the term “black” as a non-essentialist construction synonymous with “the oppressed” (Africans, 
Coloureds and Indians). Other uses of black are, and have been, prevalent, even in South Africa where many 
whites used “black” as synonymous with “African”. I will use “black” in the way intended by Black 
Consciousness.  
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Mbeki combined an individualistic economic liberalism with that of centralist, top-down style 
leadership that was opposed to the communalistic mixed economy, bottom-up approach of 
Black Consciousness.  
    In reality the psychological aspects are interconnected with the political and economic. 
Only an integral solution that attempts to deal with all aspects and include some of the 
insights of both Bikoism and Mbekism will consequently be successful. Having accepted this, 
Biko seemingly understood the necessity of an integral solution better than Mbeki because of 
what he saw as the interconnectedness of psychological matters, social change and liberation. 
 
1.2 Introduction 
South Africa’s first proper democratic elections in 1994 were seen as a watershed in the 
history of the country. Centuries of colonialism and decades of apartheid were to be 
transformed into a truly democratic and non-racial society of equals. Separate development 
was to be replaced by that of a collective development without reference to race.  
    A little over a decade later the change that was hoped for by the majority who were 
disadvantaged under apartheid has not come about, the many post-1994 improvements 
notwithstanding. Whilst a relatively small black middle class has materialised, most blacks 
are as poor as under apartheid and black and white socialising is no more frequent than 
before. There are obvious reasons for this lack of equality and integration. Addressing the 
material concerns of the disadvantaged was and is a gruelling task, made worse by the fact 
that the coffers that the African National Congress (ANC) inherited were not bulging as 
expected, but virtually emptied by the apartheid regime’s increasingly desperate attempts to 
keep the apartheid state afloat. Additionally, the educational standards of many young blacks 
were hampered by the deliberately substandard Bantu-education and the subsequent refusal by 
many blacks to attend school and be educated to become second-rate citizens.  
    The question is consequently not whether or not the task of bringing about a non-racial 
South Africa is daunting, but what the best way of achieving it is. In other words, can the 
development that South Africa has made since 1994 be improved upon by employing another 
outlook than that of the present South African government. In the seventies, the Black 
Consciousness Movement (BCM) of Steve Biko had a different view of how to bring about 
true liberation. The movement saw dealing with the psychological aspects of apartheid such 
as inferiority complexes as vital, initially by way of black introspection; as well as promoting 
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equally distributed wealth and a people-centred leadership. The detention, banning, 
imprisonment and murder of the majority of its leaders stifled the impact of the movement, 
and the momentum of the liberation movement returned to the non-racialist ideology of the 
ANC and United Democratic Front (UDF) in the eighties. 
    In the post-apartheid era, Mandela’s reconciliatory approach was replaced by Mbeki’s 
focus on economic remedies, and programmes such as that of Black Economic Empowerment 
revealed an increasing willingness to devise methods to specifically deal with the 
disadvantaged black community. In additionally employing an increasingly Africanist 
rhetoric, Mbeki would seem to concede that non-racialism has not succeeded in South Africa 
today. But are his somewhat blurred and contradictory references to the concepts of “African” 
and “black”, seen as inclusive in some instances and exclusive in others, helpful in attaining a 
non-racial society that was the goal of the ANC as well as that of the BCM?  
    An important question is thus whether Mbekism deals adequately with the legacy of 
apartheid or if Black Consciousness can provide better or complementary solutions to some or 
all of these problems. The answering of this question that is attempted in this thesis is not only 
relevant to a narrow South African context, but also globally, as South Africa can be seen as 
an embodiment of the North-South conflict. Whether South Africa can solve its problems of 
race relations, economic differentiation or other matters discussed in this thesis is 
consequently of interest at the individual level (because of the pervasiveness of colonial 
discourse and the complexes that this produces), the nation level (because most other 
countries are multi-ethnic and multi-cultural) as well as at the international level (because of 
the interdependence of contemporary international society). If post-apartheid South Africa can 
succeed in transforming itself into an inclusive society of equals it can teach all societies a 
lesson by “provid[ing] evidence for the fact that heterogeneity does not preclude harmony” 
(Zegeye: 342). Biko acknowledged the representative nature of South Africa in stating that 
“South Africa is but a microcosm of the global confrontation between the Third World and 
the rich nations of the world” (Biko, 1996: 72), as does Mbeki in recognizing the need to “end 
apartheid globally” (Gumede: 197). 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The structure and theory of this thesis is meant to enable me to conclude on a sound and 
adequate basis where each part of the thesis informs the next chapter. Briefly discussing the 
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pre-colonial period in Africa is accordingly necessary to understand the impact of 
colonialism, the kind of society that inspired Africanists and the Negritude movement, and the 
Black Communalism espoused by Black Consciousness. Examining colonialism and its 
effects enables an understanding of racism and the inferiority and superiority complexes, the 
continuation of which explains the relevance of Postcolonial Theory. Postcolonial Theory is 
used to understand the psychological effects and ongoing legacy of colonialism that Black 
Consciousness claimed blacks had to be liberated from before they could successfully oppose 
the apartheid regime, psychologically as well as physically, and become truly human. An 
overview of South African history, focussing on the liberation struggle, is necessary to 
understand the specific nature of South Africa’s experience of colonialism and apartheid, as 
well as to understand the reasons for the emergence and demise in the late sixties and 
seventies of Black Consciousness. The success and failure of Thabo Mbeki’s South Africa 
and the ideology behind it will then be judged against that of Black Consciousness, as a 
philosophy as well as a set of more or less specific answers to the legacy of apartheid in an 
attempt to see whether the latter is still relevant in informing or challenging the former.  
 
1.4 Choice of theory 
I have chosen to use Postcolonial Theory because it questions the ideological assumptions of 
colonialism, acknowledges the psychological aspects hereof, and deems these problems to 
have continued in the postcolonial period. Postcolonial theory is applicable to post-apartheid 
South Africa because a) the apartheid period was legitimised by the theory of apartheid, 
specifically that of white superiority and separate development, b) apartheid had severe 
psychological consequences for all South Africans, black and white, in the inferiority and 
superiority complexes that it produced, and c) I believe these problems have not been solved 
with the demise of apartheid, making the theory’s focus on postcolonialism relevant. 
    An understanding of Racism as an ideology is equally necessary to understand South 
Africa, especially because the racism of apartheid was so explicit and formalised. 
Additionally, racism or a race-orientated discourse has survived in post-apartheid South 
Africa, and many South Africans, whites and blacks, continue to view South African society 
in a racial frame. 
    Black Consciousness is theoretically relevant because it attempts to solve the above listed 
problems: the psychological legacy of colonialism and/or apartheid and their potential 
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manifestation in postcoloniality, the problems of using essentialist categories of race, and 
applying theoretical non-racialism in a racially charged society. Black Consciousness is also 
relevant in present day South Africa because it has a different view on how a post-apartheid 
South Africa should deal with the legacy of apartheid, as well as how such a society is ideally 
constituted. I have chosen mainly to focus on Black Consciousness as Steve Biko saw and 
promoted it, thus the “Bikoism” of the title of this thesis, because as with other overarching 
movements, there were disagreements within the BCM of the seventies, for instance regarding 
the use of violence or whether one was to socialise with whites. Amongst the variety of 
standpoints to choose from within the BCM, I have chosen to mainly employ Biko’s for three 
reasons: a) Because Biko’s views are the most readily available and elaborated upon, b) that 
Biko’s views are usually those that are discussed when referring to Black Consciousness, and 
c) because I believe Biko’s views are the most advanced and useful, both regarding the period 
they were espoused and contemporary South Africa (Magubane: 123). 
    Postcolonial Theory and Black Consciousness have both been accused of focusing too 
heavily on the non-material and non-economic side of postcoloniality, criticism that will be 
discussed in regard to both Postcolonial Theory and Black Consciousness. This is also an 
overall problem in regard to the fields within which this thesis is written, namely Postcolonial 
Studies and Development Studies, in that the former focuses primarily on non-economic 
problems and the latter mainly on economic. One could therefore argue that one needs to 
combine the two if one is to solve the problems of developing countries such as South Africa, 
which would necessitate a more all-encompassing or integral2 practice.  
    Whereas the initial focus of this thesis will be on the non-material and non-economic 
aspects of postcoloniality, material and economic aspects will subsequently be discussed 
briefly with regard to colonialism and at greater length in relation to South Africa because of 
the interrelatedness of psychological liberation and equal opportunities in the economic 
sphere. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Integral is used here to mean something included as a part of an interconnected whole rather than a separate 
entity.  
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1.5 Objectives 
I will focus on three overall questions that I will attempt to answer in this thesis: 
- What are South Africa’s legacies of colonialism and apartheid, in other words what 
are the problems that need solving? 
- How can these legacies be reversed or transcended, in other words how can these 
problems be solved? Here the focus is specifically on the Black Consciousness 
movement of Steve Biko and the present policies of Thabo Mbeki.  
- In which ways can the Black Consciousness of Steve Biko inform or improve on the 
policies of Mbeki’s government? 
 
2.1 Pre-colonial Africa 
Before Africa was colonised, the continent was characterised by a large degree of pluralism 
and flexibility (Kaarsholm: 6). The continent consisted not of “closed reproducing entities, 
equipped with unique unchanging cultures” (Thomson: 11), but of more fluid units that would 
readily incorporate outsiders (even whites) into the community as long as they accepted its 
customs, and where the sense of obligation and solidarity went beyond that of the nuclear 
family. An example of such inclusiveness were the Xhosa who limited Xhosadom not along 
ethnic or geographical lines but along political. “All persons or groups who accepted the rule 
of the Tshawe [the paramount chief] … became Xhosa” (Thompson: 29).  
    Pre-colonial African societies were of a highly varied nature. They could be either stateless, 
state run or kingdoms, but most were founded on the principles of communalism in that they 
were self-governing, autonomous entities, and in that all members took part, directly or 
indirectly, in the daily running of the tribe (Mbah: Chapter 3).3 Land was held commonly and 
could not be bought or sold, although other things, such as cattle, were owned individually 
(Feinstein: 18). In those societies that were not stateless, the chiefs ran the daily affairs of the 
tribe together with one or more councils. These councils simultaneously informed the chief, 
checked his powers and made policy by reaching unanimous decisions. If unanimity was not 
reached, a village assembly would be called to debate the issue and majority ruling would 
now apply (Ayittey: 38-42). The chief would listen silently to all queries during such 
meetings and every male adult was free to criticise him. The role of the chief during such 
                                                 
3 Many “traditional African societies manifested ‘anarchic elements’ … founded on communalism”, although 
such communalism “was not an anarchist utopia” (Mbah: Chapter 3). 
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meetings was to sum up what had been said and attempt to “form some consensus among the 
diverse opinions” (Mandela, 1995: 24-25). Hence the chief did not rule or dictate but led by 
consensus. Many tribes, especially those that were stateless, had no central authority and no 
class system, and many of those that did could depose a chief that was thought to have abused 
his power (Ayittey: 39, 45-46). An overarching feature of pre-colonial Africa was that its 
societies were not designed to be the all-powerful entities that they are today, hence the 
abundance of confederation-type societies. One reason for this was that the villages and tribes 
commonly owned the land, a fact that undermined the basis for a market economy and a 
landed aristocracy (Cypher: 195-196), another that there was an abundance of available land 
to which dissatisfied individuals or groups could move. The creation of a market economy in 
Southern Africa was further undermined by the area lacking the “regular markets and trade 
fairs” that flourished elsewhere in Africa, as well as in medieval Europe, and thus the 
potential for continuous economic development (Feinstein: 20). 
    In many parts of Africa, especially in the British colonies where indirect rule was the norm, 
the indigenous system of government survived and was used by the colonial powers alongside 
the colonial system. This is one of the reasons why the structures of such political institutions 
still exist in Africa today, although mostly in a more fixed and static form, due to the colonial 
powers having rearranged the tribal landscape and employed chiefs as virtual colonial 
administrators that served as buffers between themselves and the masses (Ayittey: 81). British 
indirect rule in countries such as South Africa thereby reduced chiefs to “salaried officials, 
responsible to white magistrates” (Thompson: 77), “debased by the control of an 
unsympathetic white government” (Mandela, 1995: 4). Where there were elements of 
participatory democracy and a lack of rigid ethnicity in pre-colonial Africa, these were less 
likely to be found in post-independence Africa where only Botswana built its society and 
government on indigenous institutions, and where the rigidities of colonial “invented 
tradition” and centralised government became dominant (Ayittey: 12, 325).  
    While pre-colonial indigenous African systems had many appealing qualities, something 
that has been widely advocated, if not practised, by many post-independence African leaders 
and Africanists generally, they have some obvious weaknesses when attempting to build a 
centralised state around them. The fact that chieftaincy is mostly based on kinship, for 
instance, is problematic because of the exclusive nature of leadership that this entails, which 
is especially problematic in countries with ethnic antagonisms. Secondly, some of the customs 
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of indigenous African society might have been effective in relatively smaller-scale societies 
but are less likely to be so in the larger states of present day Africa. An example of this is that 
of consensus which in a large-scale modern African state would make the political process 
invariably slow, as well as prone to conformity and authoritarianism that could effectively 
silence dissent and result in uncontroversial and un-enlightened decisions. Ngugi, in claiming 
that Africa’s pre-colonial peasant cultures had “oppressive reactionary tendencies” that were 
“only slightly less grave than the racist colonial culture”4 might be overstating the case, but he 
nevertheless strikes a chord. 
    It is therefore important to realize that the relevance and usefulness of traditional or pre-
colonial African institutions and customs depend upon whether one views African culture, or 
any culture for that matter, as static, or whether African culture is deemed to have evolved 
and changed, to some extent because of outside influence and colonialism. Culture must be 
seen as dynamic, and pre-colonial African cultures seen to be historical manifestations that 
are relevant in their entirety only to that specific period of time. Otherwise, they are useless as 
sources of inspiration for contemporary societies.  
 
2.2 Colonialism 
Colonialism can be defined as the “settlement of territory, the exploitation or development of 
resources and the attempt to govern the indigenous inhabitants of occupied lands” (McLeod: 
8). Unlike the more overarching concept of imperialism, which can be defined as the 
legitimisation of “economic and military control of one nation by another” (McLeod: 7), 
colonialism implies actual settlement. Colonialism is thus a historically specific type of 
imperialism.  
    Although by the time sub-Saharan Africa was colonised European technology such as guns 
was superior to that of the indigenous population, this had not always been the case. Prior to 
Columbus discovering America in 1492, European nations were not technically or 
economically superior to other parts of the world, nor were they closer to creating capitalist or 
other modern forms of society. The virtual attainment of economic and technical hegemony 
that European nations achieved by way of the jump from feudalism to capitalism and the 
industrial revolution came about, amongst other things, because of the wealth gained from the 
colonies, initially in the Americas (Blaut: 51, 173). This surplus wealth boosted the European 
                                                 
4 Ngugi wa Thiong’o, ”Detained”, Heinemann, 1981, p. 106. 
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economy, enabled Europeans to outbid and undermine non-European competitors and was 
crucial in paying for the infrastructure necessary for the industrial revolution (Blaut: 204).  
    There was widespread resistance to colonisation in practically every African colony. 
Besides the fact that colonisers had superior weapons, however, that Africans were never able 
to create a united front against the colonisers, whereas the latter were able to use African 
allies or mercenaries in conquering new territory, was an important reason for the relative 
ease of the physical colonisation process. Most invading armies were thus “African in 
recruitment and only European in command” (Thompson: 71; Uzoigwe: 39; Ayittey: 83).  
    It was one thing to conquer Africa, but to keep it pacified demanded more than military 
control as the colonialist indigenous population hugely outnumbered the colonialist settlers. 
Well into the twentieth century, little more than a thousand administrators controlled the 43 
million people that comprised British tropical Africa (Meredith: 5). As a result, upholding 
colonial rule over such vast stretches of land and millions of colonial subjects had to be 
enforced by other means than militarily. This was principally done by creating an indigenous 
elite of functionaries and chiefs that would be “the muscle of imperialism” (Cypher: 78; 
Meredith: 6) and generate a buffer between the colonisers and colonised. By the thirties, most 
of the colonial states in Africa were thus “firmly entrenched”, and had “acquired a legitimacy 
in the eyes of their inhabitants”, especially the educated indigenous elites (Meredith: 4, 7).  
 
2.3 Colonialist discourse 
This firmly entrenched legitimacy that we may call colonialist discourse was the product of a 
series of not necessarily directly interconnected, but nevertheless fundamentally similar, 
assumptions about differences between the colonisers and the colonised that were used to 
justify colonialism to both parties.5 Whereas these assumptions changed over time, from 
focussing mainly on these differences being of a physical nature to them being explained as 
being mainly cultural and thereby reversible, on the whole they can be said to constitute a 
homogenous whole in being a claim to white, European superiority over their colonial 
subjects. The assumptions of colonialist discourse and its legitimising powers rested on ideas 
from a wide range of fields. 
                                                 
5 Though Westerners had represented non-European peoples long before actual colonisation (Mbembe: 175).  
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    Christianity legitimised conquest by referring the bible’s claim that Christ’s power 
extended “from sea to sea … unto the ends of the earth”6 (Mbembe: 227), whereas continued 
colonisation was legitimised by referring to the bible’s supposed subordination of black 
descendents of Adam (Miles: 25). Christianity accordingly played an important role in 
justifying colonialism, and in latter-day South Africa many churches generally accepted the 
ideology of apartheid as being in accordance with Christianity well into the nineteen eighties 
and nineties (Tutu: 145).  
    Literature and education as a whole was equally employed to justify colonialism. The ideas 
and culture of the colonialists were automatically deemed superior to those of the colonised 
and Africans were viewed from a European perspective that saw “African culture” as a 
contradiction in terms (Wendt: 2).  
    The study of history saw most changes as having originated in a Europe that was seen as 
the permanent centre of progress (Blaut: 7, 14). All proof of African know-how found upon 
arrival in Africa was consequently seen as having been the invention of non-Africans, 
colonialism thereby distorting and disregarding the past of the colonised (Mudimbe: 13). 
Colonialism was thus legitimised as being an inevitable progressive force, leaving non-
European modernisation impossible without European tutelage.  
    Whilst not disregarding such particular features, the most important legitimisation of 
colonialism were more all-encompassing ideologies such as universalism and racism that 
claimed theoretical proof of white Western superiority. Universalism and racism are 
complementary ideologies that were (are) used at different times to explain European 
superiority by cultural and non-cultural factors, racism being the primary non-cultural 
explanation and Western universalism the primary cultural.  
 
2.3.1 Racism 
Racism originated in enlightenment philosophy where science claimed to demonstrate the 
existence of distinct races, and culminated in the scientific racism of the late nineteenth 
century that saw the human species as “divided into permanent and discrete biological 
groups” (Miles: 40) where non-white “races” were subordinate to the white “race”. Racism is 
thus an assertion of racial supremacy and a denial of a common humanity, although racial 
categories that have historically been used to sub-divide the human species are largely social 
                                                 
6 Psalm 72, 8. 
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constructions, as opposed to natural, the fact that there is “more genetic variation within 
groups … than between them” disproving any such racist theory (Miles: 45, 89). 
    Racism can be seen as both an ideology and as “intentional practices and/or unintended 
processes or consequences” (Miles: 58). Some even define racism as “all processes that, 
intentionally or otherwise, result in the continued exclusion of a subordinate group”, or as an 
exclusively white phenomenon (Miles: 66, 74). These views, whilst apparently sound in 
circumstances where class and race are made to fully coincide such as under apartheid, are 
simplistic in societies where this is not the case because of their disregard for racism not 
targeted at blacks or committed by non-whites.  
Miles therefore ends up defining racism as an  
“ideology rather than a doctrine [that] includes within its scope relatively 
unstructured, incoherent and unsupported assertations, stereotypical ascriptions 
and symbolic representations; in short, beliefs that are consciously held but not 
logically structured” (Miles: 83). 
Racism is to be defined as an ideology “if it is to have any serious analytical value” (Miles: 
112). 
    The economic and political benefits that colonialism brought the European countries 
espousing racist ideology indicates that the fact that racism occurred at the same time as 
colonialism is not coincidental, but that racism was more or less consciously used to justify 
colonialism. That racist assumptions and theories were often based on speculative studies, 
such as those of German researcher von Soemmering, who in 1785 claimed that Africans had 
less intellectual potential than whites due to a smaller cranial capacity (Mungazi: 29), further 
illustrates this.  
    Due to racism’s increasing unpopularity after the Second World War in mainstream 
discourse, it having been discredited by Nazism, American segregation and apartheid, as well 
as its recurring classificatory fallacies, cultural arguments claiming Western superiority being 
due to cultural factors replaced racism’s non-cultural ones. Racist discourse was not 
altogether replaced by cultural arguments of European superiority as influential theories found 
as late as the sixties claiming the incapacity of abstract thought by non-Europeans and 
apartheid South Africa demonstrates (Blaut: 97).  
    “Ethnicity” is often preferred to “race” in contemporary discourse, however, although the 
borders that divided so-called distinct races tend to be indistinguishable from cultural or 
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ethnic borders, culture thereby being essentialised and cultural boundaries being understood 
as seemingly impenetrable (Baaz: 47, 49; Miles: 92). Whereas pre-colonial African groups or 
tribes were much less rigidly demarcated, colonial powers solidified them in a “divide and 
rule” strategy that was meant to undermine demands for independence (Halisi: 112). Ethnic 
groups also became political groups in the colonial era in response to amongst other things the 
arbitrarily drawn borders of colonialism and the disruption that these brought. They are 
therefore relatively recent inventions, formed no earlier than the late nineteenth century 
(Thomson: 62). African ethnic groups or tribes are in fact more akin to nations, apart from 
them lacking a state of their own, and “had they but been in Europe we would have called 
them nationalities”  (Kaarsholm: 137). Ethnic groups served social and political purposes 
during the colonial era and continue to do so today, not unlike that of present day interest 
groups or nineteenth century European nationalisms. 
    The nation state and nationalist ideology were developed “hand in hand” with racism in its 
initial European context, and both advocates of racism and (some advocates of) nationalism 
draw upon supposed biological differences to separate themselves from other nationalities and 
races  (Miles: 45, 145). Hence both racism and nationalism are exclusionary in nature.  
Nationalism had an important role in bringing about a unified resistance to colonialism in a 
non-European context, as opposed to the fragmentary nature of resistance prior to national 
movements such as the ANC, UNIP (in Zambia) and KANU (in Kenya), but nationalism’s 
“potential essentialising of culture” is nevertheless problematic in postcolonial nations 
(Moore-Gilbert: 65), as is the class-like ethnic competition for the power of national 
government. National unity was more or less easily conjured up during the liberation 
struggles, but was much harder to sustain once the common enemy of the colonial power was 
gone, although some African politicians, Mugabe springs to mind, continue to claim an 
enemy in the former colonising nations. Even though national unity was meant to forge a 
feeling of togetherness, ethnic “nationalities” continuously threaten to disrupt national unity 
and the stability of many African states.  
    South Africa is an example of a country with a seemingly more inclusive nationalism, that 
of the “Rainbow Nation” and the “New South Africa”, though continuous white racism and a 
recent upsurge in black South African xenophobia towards black Africans from Western and 
Southern Africa (Butler: 43) seems to disprove the inclusive nature of South African 
nationalism. The fact that the modernistic project of South African nation building has had to 
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take place during an era and in conditions unlike that of most other nations, seemingly split 
between a “post-modern” nation and a modern, or even pre-modern one, is perhaps an 
additional hindrance to an inclusive South African nationalism (Herwitz: 175). 
    Where all more or less arbitrary group formations such as ethnic groups, nations and, as we 
will later see, the definition of “blackness” that the Black Consciousness Movement 
employed are in a sense problematic, especially if they are exclusionary on the basis of race, 
to attempt to transcend groups such as class or nation prematurely, without an understanding 
of group solidarity on a higher level, can be equally problematic because it “play[s] straight 
into the hands of the oppressor” (Moore-Gilbert: 198).  
 
2.3.2 Universalism 
As with racism, universalism emerged with enlightenment thinking, brought about to counter 
the relativistic tendencies of the late renaissance (Skelton: 194). This doctrine of “Western 
rationality” was widely used to explain European exceptionalism in place of racial superiority 
(Blaut: 104). Not perceived as being inferior in a biological sense as in racist discourse, non-
Europeans were seen in this Eurocentric universalism7 as having the potential of reaching the 
stage of a Western rationality that was deemed superior to that of non-Europeans, although 
they had no part in defining this rationality.  
    Eurocentric universalism has been rightfully criticised as being particularistic. Postcolonial 
writers such as Frantz Fanon did not see much advantage in employing Eurocentric 
universalism instead of racism. He saw “Western bourgeois ideology” as particularistic 
racism dressed up as universalism, where the black “subhuman” is urged to rise to the level of 
Western humanity (Fanon, 2004: 110). Cultural relativism also emerged in opposition to 
universalism, often seeing universalism as synonymous with foundationalism, i.e. that we 
have “unmediated and infallible access to reality” (Browning: 138; Skelton: 194). 
Indispensable though this criticism of Eurocentric universalism has been, it easily slips into a 
relativism that is equally problematic. A relativist criticism of universalism that seeks to 
eliminate the racist outlook that colonialism engendered is in fact self-defeating, as the 
immoral nature of racism is “difficult to sustain if one has a relativist ideology” (Renteln: 63). 
Moreover, the “birthright of freedom” that was the cry of independence movements 
                                                 
7 I refer here to Eurocentric universalism as the “universalism” espoused by enlightenment philosophers and 
others that was subsequently used to justify European superiority and colonialism. This is done to distinguish it 
from what I refer to as “true” universalism. 
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throughout the colonial world is untenable without presupposing an essential human nature 
(Miles: 13). 
    The question of whether true universalism is possible, or whether it is always some 
particularism dressed up as universally applicable standards is thus highly relevant in a 
postcolonial context. It is true that Eurocentric universalism universalised its own 
particularism. Europeans were equated with universal man in the renaissance and earlier 
(Mungazi: 13), and this trend continued via colonialism’s civilising mission to the present. 
That Europeans attempted to monopolise universalism and use it as a strategy of imperial 
control does not prove that all attempts at universalism are particularistic, however. Claiming 
that because Eurocentric universalism is particularistic, then all attempts at universalism are 
equally so is throwing out the baby with the bathwater. The difference between Western 
universalism and “true” universalism is that for Eurocentric universalism, the truth is already 
known and located in Western culture. Proponents of true universalism, on the other hand, 
have learnt from Postmodernism’s and Postcolonial theory’s criticism of Eurocentric 
universalism that truth is contextual, intercultural and not transparent. Theories that espouse 
cultural equality such as multiculturalism are therefore misguided attempts at disavowing 
Eurocentrism, because equality should be attempted at the individual level not at group level. 
Otherwise one is only one step away from a cultural essentialism not unlike that of racialism 
where the integrity of each culture “must be preserved” (Skelton: 147), blind of what Homi 
Bhabha calls “borderline temporalities” or hybridity, in other words the heterogeneous nature 
of all cultures (Bennett: 32). And equally important for countries with histories of interethnic 
strife and uneven power relations such as South Africa, multiculturalism is divisive in that it 
ends up highlighting differences instead of commonalities (Baines: 14). 
    Postcolonial theorists such as Edward Said and Fanon recognise that true universalism can 
exist when true postcoloniality, the recognition of the relativity of different cultures and their 
mutual enrichment, come about, and when humanism is used to assert true universality 
(Fanon, 1967b: 92; Kennedy: 34). This presupposes acknowledging that universalism only 
makes sense when it recognises the fallibility of human sensation or knowledge and that we 
as a consequence of this may have to move through the particular to reach the universal. 
Universalism and relativism can thus be seen as co-dependent, as “each person is an 
individual, but to know this you must appreciate the larger human family” (Browning: 137).  
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2.3.3 Culture 
If colonialist discourse was to lay claim to a European sense of superiority towards non-
Europeans, then colonial control had to be extended to the level of culture to be fully effective 
and for European culture be seen as universal.  
    An example of this is capitalism, today seen as universally applicable in a development 
context through such widely accepted discourses as Good Governance. Whereas both Adam 
Smith and some present-day adherents see capitalism as “an inherent part of human nature”, it 
is more likely to be simply a “symptom of the abstractification and alienation inherent in the 
social character of modern [Western] man” (Fromm, 2002: 144), making capitalism’s “drive 
to boundless acquisition” a cultural manifestation, not a universal one (Skelton: 15).  
    Communism is equally problematic. The Communist Manifesto’s claim that “workers have 
nothing to lose but their chains” is “a profound psychological error”, as they also have to lose 
or discard the complexes and irrational needs that they harboured when wearing the chains. 
Hence Marxism’s claim that “emancipation from exploitation” would automatically produce 
free human beings is plainly false as “moral change” is equally necessary (Fromm, 2002: 
257), as is Marx’s view of colonialism as being a precondition for the liberation of non-
Western societies (Loomba: 22).  
    Technology is also culturally imbedded, historically associated with the West and 
Westerners, and used to assert cultural superiority over non-Westerners, especially Africans 
(Blaut: 109; Gordimer: 191). That many Africans, and the Negritude movement specifically, 
felt it necessary to stress their “humanistic cultures” in opposition to Western technological 
superiority, is consequently because of resentment of the (perceived) lack of technical 
proficiency in these cultures.  
    European psychologists seeing non-Europeans as being “deficient in cognitive ability” 
(Blaut: 99) made mainstream psychology equally problematic. This is particularly so because 
the founder of modern psychology, Freud, rested his conception of normative behaviour on a 
binary position between Western and non-Western cultures and saw the “primitivism” of non-
European cultures as akin to the psychological set-up of the European child (Gikandi: 181). 
Whilst Fanon thus believed that it was acceptable that Freud, Jung and other psychoanalysts 
based their research only on whites, he saw it as problematic that they made universal 
arguments from this research (Gibson: 48). Yet not all psychologists were Eurocentric. 
Fromm, for instance, saw normality from a universal perspective. His concept of sanity was 
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different from that of most Western psychologists and sociologists who, according to Fromm, 
“equate sanity with conformity … [and] reject the idea of absolute norms existing outside 
culture” (Fromm, 2002: xv), making mainstream psychology “apologist for the status quo” 
(Fromm, 2002: 71).   
    As we can see, much of what we presently regard as culture was “produced by the colonial 
encounter”, which emphasises the universalising and racist effects of colonialism and explains 
its continuing effects to the present (Gikandi: 194). Resistance against colonialism therefore 
required more than physical resistance, it required “an entire imaginative reconstruction” 
(Lonsdale: 292) of the self and transcendence of colonialist discourse.  
 
2.4 The material impact of colonialism  
On the other hand it is important not to overestimate the non-material impacts of colonialism, 
as many Africans, especially in an overtly repressive system such as that of apartheid South 
Africa, submitted to the colonial system because of its physical as well as its psychological 
powers of repression. 
    Although I have mostly described the non-material aspects of colonialism in this chapter, it 
is important to acknowledge the interconnectedness between this and colonial discourse, as 
they are mutually constitutive. The material impact of colonialism was severe, not only in 
robbing Africa of a large part of the continents most able-bodied men and women who were 
sold as slaves, but also the extraction of its resources and the arresting of its political 
development. These factors obviously helped substantiate the claims of colonial discourse, 
“proving” the inferiority of the colonised. Lewis Nkosi substantiates this, in claiming that   
“the aggressiveness with which Africans tend to assert the worthiness of their 
humanistic cultures in comparison to Europe’s is intended primarily to conceal [a] 
deep feeling of resentment that their cultures lacked an aggressive technological 
thrust” (Gordimer: 192). 
    The interplay between material and non-material aspects of colonialism is not only relevant 
in the past tense, however, but also in a postcolonial situation, as the socio-economic 
inequities brought about by colonialism still inform and perpetuate white superiority and 
black inferiority complexes. 
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2.5 Neo-Colonialism 
The deeply embedded nature of colonialist discourse in the colonial period meant that the 
psychological transcendence of colonialism was not simple and straightforward. Much of the 
complexes and tendencies of the colonial period continued after the de-colonisation period, in 
Africa as well as the West, proving the need for psychological liberation on top of the (partial) 
physical liberation achieved at independence.  
    Post-independence African rulers, most of whom had Western university degrees, might 
have condemned the West publicly but they “secretly admired it”, denigrating African history, 
culture and indigenous institutions in much the same way as had the colonialists (Ayittey: 
110), eagerly modernising their countries along Western lines. Along with the “obsession 
with grandeur” that most of these leaders showed, this demonstrated both a lack of 
psychological liberation from colonial discourse and an inferiority complex  (Ayittey: 112). 
Kenya’s former president Moi’s claim (in 1991) that Kenya was “at least 200 years behind the 
West” (Ayittey: 319) exemplifies this. Moreover, many of these leaders were seemingly as 
elitist as the colonisers, dismantling “little of the oppressive colonial administrative 
machinery” and employing “the same instruments of coercion and tyranny that colonialists 
had widely used” (Ayittey: 102). The “second” liberation of Africa in the nineties was equally 
elite-managed (Ayittey: 321). The power of these post-independence elites was enhanced by 
using ethnicity to “divide and rule” in much the same way as the colonisers, and used to loot 
their countries, treating public resources as private funds to be stashed away in foreign bank 
accounts.  
    Even so, such elites are only intermediaries “whose strings are pulled by the … powerful 
and faceless system of capitalism, operating in its global mode as imperialism” (Williams: 
96). Whereas colonial domination was upheld by direct rule, neo-colonialism is upheld by a 
dual system of “trade negotiations, aid conditionalities, debt management and concessions, 
and so forth” (Baaz: 33), which depends upon the African countries themselves “voluntarily” 
adapting Western systems of government and economics, and a continued belief in 
dichotomies such as African irrationality and passivity opposed to Western rationality and 
innovation. Such dichotomies were central in legitimising colonialism and held up as a reason 
for Western development and African underdevelopment, but can also be seen in the 
continuing impact of colonialist discourse in the aid world (Baaz: 45, 120). This line of 
thought, where Western culture ought to become that of the world and modernisation is 
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equated to that of Westernisation, or what Claude Ake refers to as “universalising the Western 
model” (Ake, 1993: 239), has its roots in colonialist discourse and the Rostowian 
modernisation theories of the fifties. It presently continues in the claim of the Good 
Governance paradigm that a liberal market economy is the only plausible model on which to 
base a successful society (Mbembe: 7). An example of the continuing effects of such 
Eurocentric universalism is the Aid Industry’s continual representation of and speaking for 
their African aid recipients (Veltmeyer: 132, 137), regardless of the present partnership 
discourse of such organisations, as well as the view of Western superiority held by many 
individual development workers (Baaz: 39).8  
    Legacies of colonialism have evidently continued beyond the actual colonial period and 
continue to inform contemporary discourse and politics. To fully understand the impact this 
legacy has on present-day people, European as well as non-European, as well as transcend it, 
consequently calls for a coherent theoretical understanding of the nature of colonialist 
discourse that acknowledges the consequences of this fact.   
 
3.1 Postcolonialism 
The field of postcolonialism concerns itself primarily with links and continuities between the 
imperial, colonial past and the postcolonial present of both former colonised and former 
colonising societies. In seeking to contest present-day legacies of colonial domination, 
postcolonialism explores how colonial discourse was an important weapon by which colonial 
powers controlled colonised peoples, as described in the previous chapter, and questions the 
Eurocentric universality of colonial discourse. Generally, postcolonialism is thus an attempt 
to explain and try to break with the colonialist discourse and neo-colonialism that informs the 
present postcolonial situation.  
 
3.1.1 Fanon 
Frantz Fanon was an important forerunner of the work of Edward Said, Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak and Homi Bhabha, the so-called “holy trinity” of postcolonialism, as well as being an 
important figure in his own right (Moore-Gilbert: 16).  
                                                 
8 Baaz’ study of development workers in Tanzania reveals a discourse of evolutionary development amongst 
them, not unlike that of colonial discourse, where Europeans are seen as belonging “to a higher level of 
development” (Baaz: 39), leading them not to expect too much of the African recipients because of their alleged 
“backward position on the evolutionary ladder” (Baaz: 42).  
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    Fanon despised the Eurocentric, “hypocritical”, “pseudo-universalism” of European 
humanism (Posnock: 328; Gibson: 181) and believed that the colonised should “rise above 
this absurd drama that others have staged around [them]” (Gibson: 180). Fanon nevertheless 
retained a humanist outlook, believing “that the individual should … take on the universality 
inherent in the human condition” (Fanon, 1967: 19), although true universalism could only 
exist when true postcoloniality and the appreciation and recognition of the relativity of 
different cultures and their interdependence came about (Fanon, 1967b: 92).  
    By advocating a universal humanity, Fanon disagreed with the racial focus of the 
essentialised blackness that many of his contemporaries, particularly those of the Negritude 
movement, advocated. Whereas he agreed with Negritude’s attempts to eliminate 
psychological problems by advocating cultural pride, self-belief and self-consciousness, he 
saw Negritude’s essentialism as an inversion of colonialism that was ultimately incapable of 
leading to true liberation. Nevertheless, Fanon also rejected a non-racial approach that 
“pretends that racism doesn’t exist and ignores its denigrating and derisive psychological 
effects” (Gibson: 18). For Fanon, the lack of recognition of the equal worth of blacks that 
racism implied necessitated initial withdrawal from false non-racialism.  
    Although necessary, psychological remedies such as Black Consciousness are not sufficient 
by themselves and must be accompanied by physical struggle (Gibson: 39). Liberation must 
ultimately be achieved by force because it rids the colonised of the remainder of their 
inferiority complexes by shattering the image of the superior and invincible coloniser (Fanon, 
2004: 51, 115). Fanon’s endorsement of violent resistance has been controversial and heavily 
criticised (Gibson: 104), although in fairness Fanon had qualifications about violent 
resistance, saying it must be “clearly without barbarity” and carried out by “self-controlled 
people” (Gibson: 124). 
    Independence for Fanon was not an end but a beginning which ought to lead via a 
humanistic nationalism accompanied by social and political consciousness (Fanon, 2004: 144) 
to a humanist internationalism that was meant to transcend the potential “regional, racial, and 
ethnic politics” (Gibson: 162) nationalism can easily lead to. Fanon was well aware that 
independence could easily fail to significantly benefit the population as a whole. He had 
witnessed the initial euphoria, but subsequent disappointing performances, of most post-
independence African states where many of the leaders ended up betraying the masses 
(Fanon, 2004: 35). For Fanon, the elites had become a caricature of Europe, viewing the 
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masses in the same way as the colonialists (Fanon, 2004: 65), disregarding local history 
(Fanon, 2004: 68) and generally prolonging the heritage of colonial thinking and institutions 
(Fanon, 2004: 120). The elites had become neo-colonial managers for Western interests, the 
nation a conveyor belt for Western capitalism (Fanon, 2004: 100, 102).  
 
3.1.2 Said 
Whereas Fanon dealt mainly with the psychological problems of the colonised under 
colonialism and beyond, Said reflects on the coloniser’s legitimisation of colonialism. In 
Orientalism, Said attempted to reveal how the West’s representation of the non-Western 
world and the material and political subordination of the latter by the former was 
interconnected (Moore-Gilbert: 38). According to Said, Orientalism is “a Western style for 
dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient” (Said: 3) that is wide-ranging 
in that it is a “distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, 
sociological, historical, and philosophical texts …” (Said: 12). European culture was defined 
by “setting itself off against the Orient” (Said: 3), whereby Orientalism played an important 
role in claiming Western cultural superiority and the inferiority of other cultures.  
    Said has been criticised for exaggerating the powerfulness of the West, seeing non-
Westerners as virtually powerless (Kennedy: 30), although he has granted the latter more 
agency in later works (Moore-Gilbert: 64). Another thing that one could similarly criticise is 
his tendency to see the West as an oppressive whole, bereft of internal diversity.  
 
3.1.3 Bhabha 
Bhabha deals with what he sees as the absurdity of the concept of homogenous cultures. For 
him, “cultures are never unitary in themselves, nor simply dualistic in the relation of Self and 
Other” (Bhabha: 52), and he sees the increasing importance of migration as undermining and 
invalidating clearly defined groups such as “nation”, “ethnicity” and “race” because the 
migrant exemplifies the non-pureness and hybridity of cultures that claim to be homogenous 
(McLeod: 218). Bhabha thus challenges Fanon and Said, attempting to merge Fanon’s focus 
on the colonised with Said’s focus on the coloniser, but unlike Said’s initial belief in the all-
powerful nature of the colonialist he sees their constant stereotypification of the colonised as 
proof of the insecurity and unstableness of colonial discourse (Moore-Gilbert: 118).  
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Bhabha’s concept of hybridity seems less obviously applicable to a South African apartheid 
context than to other colonial and postcolonial countries, as the rigidity of apartheid left less 
space for fluid identities or ambivalences. South Africans might further be wary of too much 
celebration of cultural and ethnic differences, as this is reminiscent of apartheid’s focus on 
differences instead of likenesses (Zeleza, 2003: 282). Additionally, one might question the 
concept of hybridity because in focusing on the space between cultures, one inadvertently 
defends a belief in concrete cultural boundaries and “common cultural conditions” (Selden: 
232). Even so, Bhabha’s understanding of the nature of hybridity points towards an ongoing 
fusion of so-called “homogenous” cultures that questions the multiculturalist approach of 
countries like South Africa. 
 
3.1.4 Spivak 
Unlike (the early) Said and Bhabha, Spivak focuses on counter-discourse and differences 
amongst colonial manifestations (Moore-Gilbert: 75), and whereas arguing that the 
“subaltern”9 cannot speak for himself or herself in earlier work seemingly contradicts such a 
stance, she revokes this in her more recent work. Spivak believes, along with Fanon and the 
later Said, that even though the reversing of colonial discourse, exemplified by Negritude, is a 
necessary step, it must be transcended. Otherwise one remains within the logic of colonial 
discourse (Moore-Gilbert: 85). Spivak’s concept of “strategic essentialism” is used to explain 
the need for this necessary step towards liberation that Achebe calls “anti-racist-racism” 
(Moore-Gilbert: 179). According to Spivak the distinction between “deploying” and 
“activating” essentialism and “falling into” or “lapsing into” essentialism is an important one 
(Selden: 238).  
 
3.2 Criticism of postcolonialism 
Postcolonialism has generally been criticised for being too dependent upon postmodernism, 
because postmodernism’s fragmentary logic and focus on multiple truths disregards historical 
dynamics and agency (Loomba: 240), and for disregarding non-colonial history (Loomba: 13, 
17). In fact, in claiming all grand narratives to be dead, postmodernism ended up supporting 
the status quo by leaving neo-colonial global capitalism, human rights and Western 
democracy unchallenged, and as a result many African scholars, particularly those living on 
                                                 
9 Marginalized citizen belonging to a lower class. 
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the continent, have been hostile to what they see as postcolonialism’s flirtation with 
postmodernism (Zeleza, 2003: 229).  
    While such criticism is valid to a degree, especially when bearing in mind the obvious 
differences between postcolonial theorists, it is incorrect to think of postmodernism and 
postcolonialism as being synonymous. Whereas postmodernism in challenging grand 
narratives such as that of colonialism refuses to replace them with anything remotely concrete 
(apart from the grand narrative of postmodernism), postcolonialism’s challenge of the grand 
narrative of colonialism can be done “while embracing the ‘ethical universal’ and in the name 
of humanism” (Ashcroft: 123), as Fanon did. To be able to achieve its goals, 
postcolonialism’s criticism of cultural domination must also be complemented by an equal 
criticism of political and economic dominance, as well as by greater understanding of the 
importance of the agency of those who attempt to defeat neo-colonialism, something that 
Said, Bhabha and Spivak have attended to in more recent work (Zeleza, 2003: 272; Moore-
Gilbert: 154, 161).  
    One way of solving this is by employing a larger degree of interdisciplinary work between 
postcolonial studies and more materially focused fields such as development studies, as 
suggested by Stuart Hall (Moore-Gilbert: 186). This would enable studies that focused on the 
whole reality of people in the developing countries by acknowledging the link between 
identity and economics in for instance aid organisations. In these organisations “identities [for 
example of an active donor-Self and a passive partner] inform the distribution of economic 
resources and the organisation of the economic sphere”, which in turn feeds a discourse of aid 
dependence that ends up leading to a “restrictive policy when it comes to financial support” 
(Baaz: 13).  
    Until now, mainly non-interdisciplinary solutions have been attempted where one has 
attempted to separate, or at least not integrate, the different parts of the problem and their 
respective fields in trying to find solutions to solving them. This is what Ngugi refers to when 
claiming that “for resistance [to imperialism] to be successful, it has to be waged at all levels: 
… economic, political, cultural and psychological” (Ngugi in Williams: 163). An 
understanding of imperialism, colonialism and postcolonialism must also be gained at all 
these levels to be useful.  
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4.1 South African history 
South Africa would seem to epitomize a country where a multitude of explanations have been 
given to justify the imposition of first colonialism and secondly apartheid. On the other hand, 
South Africa is generally seen as different from the rest of Africa because of its large group of 
white settlers, especially the Afrikaners who had severed all ties to the “mother country”, as 
well as the distinctiveness of its historical experience. Much of what is argued in the previous 
chapters might therefore seem not to apply to South Africa. The historical overview that 
follows is, amongst other things, meant to illustrate South Africa’s similarities with other 
African colonial histories, especially before the sixties or at least before 1948, and the 
dissimilarities to other African countries that apartheid brought about later. It is also meant to 
focus more specifically on the history of the liberation struggle to show the different 
approaches to this at different moments in history, as well as amongst different movements, 
something that will be elaborated upon in the next chapter relating to the Black Consciousness 
Movement. It therefore follows that this chapter does not attempt to give a comprehensive 
historical overview, but to describe the historical occurrences and their impact in relation to 
the questions I attempt to answer in this thesis. 
 
4.1.1 South Africa before apartheid 
Whereas apartheid certainly structured and enhanced the rigid nature of the repression of 
blacks in South Africa, removing all the meagre rights that blacks had enjoyed up until the 
forties and fifties, it was what Mandela refers to as “a new term but an old idea” (Mandela, 
1995: 127). Apartheid, based on scientific racism of Victorian Britain (Butler: 31), was 
accordingly more a question of filling in gaps in an already racist environment than a totally 
new way of thinking. What was new was the totality of the ideology. Forcing Africans to 
carry passes and town segregation was used in Kimberly during the 1870s (Thompson: 118) 
and a 1921 official commission argued that Africans should only be allowed into towns to 
work (Ramphele, 1991: 5), foreshadowing apartheid’s later refinements and country-wide use 
of these tools; regulations that gave white workers a “monopoly of skilled operations” were 
passed as early as 1911 (Thompson: 167); and the Land Bill or Land Act was introduced in 
1913 that designated racial land zones and evicted blacks from their land, forcing them to 
seek work in the mines and white farms (Woods, 1987: 18; Gumede: 6).  
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4.1.2 Similarities to other African countries 
Even though South Africa was not nominally a colony after 1910, becoming a British 
dominion that year and an independent republic in 1961, for blacks this merely changed the 
form of colonialism, not the feeling or reality of being colonised. In 1948 South Africa’s 
racial policy was different “in detail rather than essence” from other countries under European 
rule in Africa (Meredith: 117), and segregation and racist assumptions that were similar to 
that of South Africa were widespread in the Caribbean and the United States (Cole: 585), as 
well as throughout most of Asia (Thompson: 155; Freund: 528). Racial hierarchies were the 
norm in most colonies (Seidman: 423), illustrated by the fact that legal segregation, including 
separate townships, was enforced by law in most countries in Southern and Eastern Africa, as 
well as in parts of Western Africa, until independence (Conhaire; 393; Goldthorpe: 3; Freund: 
527). Kenya, for instance, had laws “restricting … where Africans could live”, including 
segregated townships not unlike those of apartheid South Africa, Nairobi being “designed 
with an exclusive European sector, controlled by racial exclusion clauses, an Asian bazaar, 
and an African location” (Elkins: 152; Christopher: 106).  
    In fact D.F. Malan, Prime Minister of the first apartheid government, “applauded [British 
colonial] Kenya’s use of force and arbitrary rule, and saw it as a model for his own apartheid 
regime” (Elkins: 119). Another example of such racial hierarchy is that of Congolese children 
who were belatedly permitted to enter secondary schools in 1950 that had until then been 
reserved for white pupils, Africans still being barred from higher education such as medicine 
(Meredith: 97). Much of South Africa’s growth was (and to a degree still is) furthermore 
based on primary products such as gold and diamonds, not unlike that of other African 
countries (Butler: 49). 
    Until the sixties, South Africa was therefore in many respects unexceptional compared to 
the rest of pre-independence Africa although South Africa’s segregation was seen as more 
“inflexible” than elsewhere. White supremacy and the exclusion of Africans from 
participation in formal political activity was the norm in colonial Africa, although this was to 
change in the sixties with most African countries achieving independence10 and South Africa 
intensifying the apartheid project, leaving South Africa increasingly distinctive from other 
                                                 
10 With the notable exception of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Mozambique and Angola, these countries forming a buffer 
of white supremist states between South Africa and the independent states.  
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countries.11 South Africa was in fact “popular abroad” when the Nationalist Party introduced 
apartheid in 1948 because, amongst other things, of its involvement on the side of the allies in 
the Second World War, General Smuts’ reputation and involvement in world politics, and its 
achievements in sports  (Woods, 1986: 129-130). 
    With the growing number of African countries achieving independence in the sixties, the 
South African government had to react lest this “domino effect” was to reach South Africa. 
The idea of distinct ethnic “homelands” and “separate development” in South Africa was thus 
partially inspired by these instances of independence (Butler: 19), although the implicit aim of 
separate development was to keep power in the hands of the white minority.  
    One of the main reasons for the intensification of an already racist South African system 
was the recession caused by the depression in the twenties and thirties that predominantly 
affected Afrikaner poor whites. Having been “swept off their farms” by the depression, they 
faced competition from blacks in the cities where they came in numbers to seek employment. 
This situation was part of the reason for the intensification of discriminatory laws in the mid-
thirties that would further intensify with the election of a Nationalist Afrikaner government in 
1948 (Gumede: 8, 12).  
 
4.1.3 Apartheid 
From 1948 and onwards the intensification of so-called petty apartheid, such as “whites only” 
notices appearing in “every conceivable place” (Thompson: 197), began in earnest. During 
Verwoerd’s premiership from the late fifties to the mid-sixties it was ensured that apartheid 
segregated every area of life in South Africa, racial polarisation being practically complete in 
the late sixties throughout South African society (Juckes: 127).  
    Four ideas were central to apartheid: That the population comprised four “racial groups”,12 
that the white race was entitled to absolute control over the state, that white interests prevailed 
over the interests of all other races, and that whites comprised one nation whereas blacks 
comprised several (Thompson: 190). The diversity and multitude of laws that were used to 
                                                 
11 Ironically, many of the post-independence African countries soon became practically as repressive and 
undemocratic as apartheid South Africa, according to Ayittey (Ayittey: xix, 131). “The dismantling of apartheid 
[furthermore resembled] … the decolonisation process in various parts of the continent”, South Africa thus 
having to “face many of the same political and development challenges experienced elsewhere in post-colonial 
Africa” (Zeleza, 2004: 10; Ayittey: 279). 
12 White, Native (later Bantu and African), Indian and Coloured were the four racial categories used in apartheid 
South Africa. 
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enforce the apartheid state’s vision of separateness and black subjugation was simply mind-
boggling.  
    Laws that ensured segregation included the Population Registration Act that classified and 
registered all South Africans into one of the four “races”; the Group Areas Act that enforced 
racial segregation, thereby criminalizing inter-racial neighbourhoods and causing mass 
exoduses of mainly blacks from previously mixed areas;13 the Immorality Act that 
criminalized inter-race sex and marriage; and the Pass Laws that enabled the police to arrest 
any black failing to produce his or her pass book. A concrete example of the severe effects of 
these laws can be seen in the fact that between 1948 to 1980 “yearly arrests [on charges of 
breaching the Pass Laws] averaged 368,000” (Woods, 1987b: 117, 184; Cole: 586).  
    The powers of the Nationalist government to arrest virtually anyone questioning the status 
quo was ensured by the powers of laws such as the Suppression of Communism Act that 
declared anyone a Communist who sought to change the race laws (Woods, 1987b: 56; 
Gumede: 19), and the Terrorism Act that “permitted indefinite detention without trial” (Cole: 
586). Laws were passed governing what could be published in newspapers, empowering the 
government to close down these without court proceedings or to jail or ban14 any editor 
without explanation (Woods, 1987b: 168). These laws also declared any attempt or suggestion 
that apartheid could or should be replaced by a one man, one vote system encompassing the 
whole of South Africa’s population a criminal offence.  
    The Bantu Education Act attempted to stop teachers from “transmitting dangerous, alien 
ideas to their African students” (Thompson: 196) by moving the control of the education of 
blacks from the more liberal mission schools to central government. Bantu education further 
legitimised apartheid, its deliberately substandard levels of education making the perceived 
inferior nature of Africans a self-fulfilling prophecy. As Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd 
asked rhetorically in a speech in 1966, “would it be right for the Bantu [Africans] to become 
the dominating group while they were unable to direct and develop the stage of Western 
civilisation which this country has achieved?” (Botha: 131).  
                                                 
13 “More than 3.5 million people were forcibly removed … between 1960 and 1985” (Ramphele, 1991: 3). 
14 Being “banned” in apartheid South Africa was a severe restriction upon ones freedom. Steve Biko’s ban meant 
that he was banned from all the organisations he was working for, restricted to a specific magisterial district, was 
forbidden to speak to more than one person at a time apart from his immediate family, that it was illegal to quote 
anything he had said or written, that he was not allowed to leave South Africa and that he was continuously 
under surveillance and frequently visited by the security police (Bernstein: Chapter II; Woods, 1987: 61). 
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    The final nail in the coffin of black influence in South Africa was the homelands policy 
which created nine mostly scattered so-called autonomous African regions on thirteen per 
cent of the most arid of South Africa’s territory, whereas “white South Africa” included the 
best agricultural and mineral land, as well as all the major cities (Woods, 1987b: 167). 
Verwoerd’s official reasoning behind this was that he wanted to develop “them [Africans] 
along their own lines using their own traditional communities and tribal chieftains” (Botha: 
63), whereas the policy in reality made Africans strangers in their own country and denied 
them a common humanity with whites.  
    These laws were heavy-handedly enforced by an army and police force that were heavily 
funded, as well as given increasingly draconian laws to work under, allowing an atmosphere 
of impunity to prevail, shown in the widespread use of torture by the police forces (Tutu: 94). 
Successive governments furthermore laboured to create a consensus of blacks that accepted 
the status quo, which is why the creation of the Bantustans or so-called homelands and Bantu 
education was seen as important (Lobban: 2).  
    Despite of the fact that evidence contradicted this, most South African whites claimed at 
least outwardly that apartheid was a free and fair system. Minister of Justice (and later Prime 
Minister) John Vorster claimed in 1964 that the South African state was “a democratic state 
[that] … has two important characteristics, namely periodic free elections … and a free, 
independent judiciary” (Botha: 199). Others were more explicit about the need for 
segregation. Donald Woods recalls his solution to the “racial question” at the age of eighteen 
(in 1952) being to “[send the Africans] back to the reserves, where they belong. They’re 
happier there. It’s no good educating them and bringing them to the cities. It’s either send 
them back to the reserves or shoot them – it’s them or us” (Woods, 2000: 157; Woods, 1980: 
59).  
 
4.1.4 The liberation struggle before Soweto 
This was the everyday environment of intolerance, racial bigotry and totalitarian-like laws 
that blacks had to live in. Many blacks succumbed to the totality of apartheid’s powers, 
psychologically as well as physically. Many others chose to struggle against the apartheid 
state in an attempt to bring about a society that would empower the majority of South 
Africans that were disenfranchised under apartheid. Until the late sixties, the only 
organisations that had any real impact on South African society were the ANC and its 
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Africanist counterpart, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), formed by ex-members of the 
ANC in 1959. 
    The history of the ANC until the mid to late forties, known as the organisation’s “Christian 
Liberal phase”, was one of attempting to create sympathy and white support for the injustices 
of the apartheid state’s policies towards Africans. The language of its campaigns was 
moderate and their ideas were those of Western liberal thinking. The ANC did not agitate for 
full African enfranchisement or majority rule, fearing that this would alienate white liberals, 
but for qualified enfranchisement and gradual inclusion (Thompson: 175; MacDonald: 97, 
101; Gumede: 4-5). This changed with the formation of the ANC’s Youth League (ANCYL) 
in 1944 and the league’s virtual control of the ANC by the late forties. ANCYL called for 
more radical forms of protest such as strikes and civil disobedience, for full enfranchisement 
of blacks and “true democracy”,15 as well as belatedly for collaboration with other “oppressed 
communities”, namely Indians and Coloureds (Davenport: 364).16  
    In 1948 the ANC still had fewer than six thousand members (Thompson: 182), and as least 
outwardly and visibly the organisation was still no more radical than allowing for the 
potentiality of gradualism. Accordingly, Mandela could suggest in 1960 that democracy could 
“be achieved through gradual reforms” (Mandela, 1995: 297). Having admitted the limited 
effects of its disobedience campaigns,17 or at least that the protest form had outlived its 
purpose and usefulness (Thompson: 211), the ANC turned towards violent forms of struggle 
by creating Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), “The Spear of the Nation”, in 1961. After the Rivonia 
Trial in 1964, however, most of Umkhonto’s “underground machinery had been destroyed”, 
practically all of “the ANC’s senior leaders” were “in jail or in exile” (Mandela, 1995: 521; 
Davies: 288; Davis: 22) and the ANC as a whole had been “crushed and humiliated” 
(Hadland: 33). Perhaps only literally a few active members of the ANC, the South African 
Communist Party (SACP) and Umkhonto were present inside South Africa, along with a 
small number of sympathisers (Hadland: 30), but communication links had been broken and 
“between 1963 and 1976 no armed actions by [the ANC] took place at all inside South 
Africa” (Davis: 22; Hadland: 33).  
                                                 
15 See ANC Youth League Basic Policy Document, 1948. 
16 Mandela still argued in 1951 that Africans “should go it alone” (Gumede: 19).  
17 Whereas the disobedience campaigns might not have achieved their primary goal, i.e. to undermine or end 
apartheid, they did generate mass support for the ANC, the membership of the organisation rising in a few 
months in the early fifties from 7,000 to over 100,000 (Davies: 286).  
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    The PAC fared no better. It was founded in 1959 as a Pan-Africanist organisation, meant to 
counter what the organisation saw as the growing influence of whites and communists18 in the 
ANC (Woods, 1987: 21; Schuster: 31). Although the PAC was rightly seen as exclusivist and 
racialist, its first president and co-founder Robert Sobukwe in defining the PAC as different 
from the ANC because the PAC “claim Africa for the Africans; the ANC claim South Africa 
for all” (Davies: 299), did not continue to hold the extreme views of many of the PAC’s other 
members, but came to hold humanist views that whites could become genuine Africans in a 
post-apartheid South Africa where colour was to be irrelevant (Thompson: 210; Gerhart: 195; 
Frederickson: 312). The PAC became known primarily for organising the protest march that 
led to the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, though the organisation had little time to create a 
large following before it was banned along with the ANC in 1960, shortly after Sharpeville, 
most of its leaders subsequently being arrested (Thompson: 210). According to Sobukwe, the 
PAC’s “undoing has not been in its ideology but in its reckless rush to confrontation at a time 
when circumstances did not favor a black victory” (Gerhart: 285). Its military wing, Poqo 
(“pure” in Xhosa), was thus involved in direct attempts at killing whites and was generally 
more brutal than Umkhonto (Lobban: 208). Poqo was “destroyed” in 1963 by police arresting 
thousands of its supporters (Schuster: 38) and the ensuing legal assault (Lobban: 208), 
although it later resurfaced as the Azanian19 People’s Liberation Army (APLA), and the PAC 
as a whole was “virtually defunct by the late ‘70s” (Frederickson: 310). 
    The ANC and PAC “slipped into obscurity, suppressed by parents too frightened to tell 
their children” of the organisations, amongst other things because of the heavy penalties that 
were given to anyone found to be associated with them, and because informers were ready to 
tell of anybody showing affinity toward them (Schuster: 38). The organisations reassembled 
in exile, becoming increasingly centralist (Gumede: 24-25), and a slump in liberation 
movement presence and activity inside South Africa followed until the coming about of the 
Black Consciousness Movement in the late sixties. 
    Black Consciousness “seized a generation of youngsters who knew little of the ANC”, who 
were “virtually unknown in the townships” in the early seventies (Schuster: 54, 56), and who 
                                                 
18 Although the PAC was itself later to embrace Maoism, and now advocates an “Africanist Socialist 
Democracy”.  
19 The name “Azania” was originally proposed as an alternate name for South Africa at the All-African People’s 
Conference in 1958 by Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, and was subsequently used in the Azanian 
People's Manifesto drawn up in 1959 by the PAC. In 1965 the PAC adopted the name for South Africa. The 
BCM also consistently used it instead of “South Africa”. 
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could therefore not compete with the Black Consciousness Movement inside South Africa. 
The youth of Soweto that were to have such a huge initial impact on South African liberation 
politics in the mid-seventies were thus mainly influenced by Black Consciousness (see 
chapter 5).  
 
4.1.5 Soweto 
The years before the Soweto uprising were the “high noon of apartheid”20 (Lobban: 1). 
Because of the virtual annihilation of the liberation movements inside the country, most 
blacks believed that challenging the apartheid state successfully was impossible (Mandela, 
1995: 154; Juckes: 115). Most whites, on the other hand, seemed unaware of the degree of 
discontent among blacks (Lobban: 102) as this mostly revealed itself in the townships towards 
spouses or fellow township-residents, well away from the gaze of the vast majority of whites. 
Even court convictions of blacks who during their court cases alleged having been tortured, 
made little impression on most whites (Lobban: 258). As illustrated by the Vorster quote in 
chapter 4.2.1, the apartheid state to some degree seemed to believe in their own rhetoric of 
South Africa being a democratic state with mainly happy citizens, the odd discontented black 
aside. The Soweto uprisings were to change all that, undermining the belief held by whites 
that blacks were mainly content by revealing the “legitimate grievances” of the black masses 
(Lobban: 142), leading to a fragmentation of white consensus (Lobban: 261) that had hitherto 
been fundamentally solid, and virtually overhauling government authority in the townships. 
Where only a few years previously there had been virtually none, a culture of protest 
including thousands of black South African activists grew throughout South Africa as the 
result of a newfound belief in the vulnerability of the apartheid state in those attempting to 
overthrow it. This new belief was instilled mainly by the Soweto uprising (Lobban: 141; 
Thompson: 228).  
    The students of Soweto were dissatisfied with their conditions long before the 16th of June 
1976, the day of the demonstration that started the uprising (Lobban: 229). Poor educational 
standards, inadequately trained and authoritarian teachers, as well as the appalling general 
standard of living in townships such as Soweto were as much the reasons for the 
                                                 
20 Apart from the lack of liberation movement activity inside South Africa, the sixties were a decade of state 
repression as well as of black economic improvement because of “unprecedented economic growth”, “relatively 
low” black unemployment and economic stability. The seventies, however, became a period of recession in 
South Africa as elsewhere, amongst other things because of increasing oil prices and falling gold prices  
(Worden: 128-129, 134).  
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demonstration (Schuster: 84) as the teaching of subjects in Afrikaans that was the pretence. 
The demonstration of 15,000 students (Juckes: 148) was meant to be peaceful, but after a 
disproportionate use of violence by the police, including firing on the unarmed students, the 
deployment of thousands of heavily armoured police and helicopters dropping teargas on the 
township,21 hundreds ended up dead22 and hundreds more wounded during the three days that 
the initial rioting lasted (Schuster: 68, 76). The uprising that had started in Soweto quickly 
spread to other townships and took on a larger scope, as the initial more or less disorganised 
outbreaks of violence against state symbols turned into organised demonstrations, stay-aways 
and strikes in the months after the initial demonstration. These events were to re-ignite the 
liberation struggle and create a revolutionary spirit inside the country (Schuster: 81, 83).  
    The repressive measures that the government took against the demonstrators and in the 
townships, where whole sections of townships were sectioned of and the police detained and 
maltreated suspected participants (Schuster: 105), proved to many that armed struggle was the 
only viable way of confronting and bringing down the apartheid government. Another effect 
of the uprising was consequently to prompt thousands of young men and women to leave the 
country and join the liberation movements in exile, which in turn helped to re-ignite the 
movements. Especially the ANC benefited from this, the number of ANC exiles swelling 
from 1000 in 1975 to 9000 in 1980, these new recruits infusing the organisation with Black 
Consciousness traits such as internal democracy and discouragement of leadership cultism 
(Lobban: 193-94; Gumede: 26). 
 
4.1.6 Post-Soweto 
Whereas the ANC struggled more or less unsuccessfully to have much of a military or 
political impact inside South Africa until the early or mid-eighties, it gathered prestige outside 
the country. This was largely due to the successful lobbying of Oliver Tambo and Thabo 
Mbeki, amongst others, the ANC beginning to be seen as the “authentic voice of the South 
African majority” (Berman: 120; Hadland: 45). The demise of the Black Consciousness 
Movement after Biko’s death in 1977, caused by the arrest and detention of its members, 
divisions over the direction of the movement and successful ANC and white liberal attempts 
                                                 
21 Prime Minister Vorster said on the 18th of June 1976 that, “orders have been given to maintain order at all 
costs” (Rambally: 100). 
22 Estimates of he death toll for the duration of the uprising differ, some claiming between 500 and 700 activists 
had died by 1977, up to 4000 having been injured (Schuster: 129; Davenport: 453) and others that over 1000 
were killed (Gumede: 26).  
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to smother the movement by cutting off its funds (Pityana, 1992: 141; Hirschmann: 16, 19; 
Davis: 33), meant that the ANC could slowly start to regain its position as the main liberation 
organisation inside South Africa.  
    The ANC’s newfound influence changed the ideological outlook of the liberation 
movement as a whole from the “going it alone” of Black Consciousness to one of non-
racialism in the early eighties (MacDonald: 92; Lobban: 249). The ANC had deliberately 
distinguished itself from the then powerful adversary of Black Consciousness in the late 
seventies by “[emphasizing] non-racialism to contrast themselves with BC” (MacDonald: 
115). Previously the ANC had been more openly Africanist, in 1959 defining the “South 
African revolution” as that of “the African people” (Davies: 284), only allowing non-Africans 
to join the organisation in exile in 1969 (Schuster: 192), and barring whites from serving on 
the ANC executive (Mandela, 1995:325), though not that of Umkhonto. Combined with later 
statements advocating the “primacy of South African blacks” in the liberation struggle, as 
well as remarks by ANC President Oliver Tambo that “power to the people means, in fact, 
power to the black people” in 1971, this did not help make the ANC’s non-racialist stance 
clear (Mathebe: 160).  
    Nevertheless, it was another organisation, the non-racial United Democratic Front (UDF), 
formed as an umbrella organisation of 575 organisations in 1983 and with the support of 2 
million people, that together with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
was to revitalize the cause of liberation inside South Africa in the mid-eighties by instigating 
numerous strikes and boycotts, as well as bringing about virtual civil government collapse in 
many townships (Thompson: 228-229; Worden: 144; Worden: 147).23 The membership of the 
UDF included former Black Consciousness activists as well as members of the ANC, the 
latter needing to compliment its largely unsuccessful military campaign24 with that of a non-
violent, above ground campaign. Both the ANC and the BCM had previously called for “the 
formation of a united front”, but it was the speech by Reverend Alan Boesak (who had a 
BCM background) that succeeded in creating enough interest to enable the creation of such a 
broad front (Frederickson: 306; Seekings: 46). 
                                                 
23 Although in some instances, local grievances were the reason for such actions, the UDF ending up “trailing 
behind the masses (Worden: 147).  
24 Umkhonto was in fact deemed a “total failure” in achieving its objectives. It did not impact the economy, scare 
away foreign investors or provoke any (positive) reaction from the white electorate (Meredith: 127). By the late 
eighties and early nineties, even the ANC began to see the armed struggle as going nowhere (Gumede: 38), 
Umkhonto leader Chris Hani admitting in 1990 that defeating apartheid militarily “would have taken a very, very 
long time” (Heribert: Chapter 2).  
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    Practically the whole of the UDF’s leadership along with many junior members were 
detained in 1986, and the UDF as a whole was banned in 1988 as the apartheid government 
increased its intimidation of liberation activists. In detaining such a wide range of UDF-
members, the government “inadvertently ‘conscientized’ a number of people who had little 
previous connection with the revolt” (Schuster: 304), causing the range of South Africans to 
acknowledge the illegitimacy and brutality of the apartheid government to significantly 
widen. The UDF-led revolt thus became nationwide, in mobilising “every level of black 
society” as well as a significant part of white society, in a way that no such campaign had 
been before (Schuster: 346). The UDF disbanded in 1991, concrete negotiations between the 
liberation movements and the National Party having been secured.  
    Apart from the internal pressure applied by the UDF, there was a range of other factors that 
contributed to the downfall of apartheid. The costs of upholding apartheid, especially its 
homelands and three parliamentary chambers;25 the shortage of skilled labour due to job 
reservation and Bantu education; the “unsoundness” of the economy caused by recession, 
inflation, payment due on long-term loans26 and overspending on military and security 
equipment; the loss of income due to increasing sanctions;27 the disappearance of a buffer of 
forthcoming white-controlled neighbours; and the growing numbers of whites favouring 
change (Thompson: 211, 222, 241; Mathebe: 74; Meredith: 435; Gumede: 29). In attempting 
to maintain the status quo of apartheid, the policies of hard-line Nationalists were devastating 
the South African economy for the state as well as for private capital. An influential group of 
white South Africans, mainly businessmen, therefore began discussions with the ANC, 
something that the ANC and the Nationalist government had attempted several times during 
the eighties, though largely without success. The ANC also had reason to start discussions 
with the apartheid government. The fall of the Soviet Union took away most of the funding of 
its military campaign, as well as invalidating the apartheid government’s argument that the 
ANC were a “Trojan horse” for “Soviet interests” (Meredith: 435).  
                                                 
25 The apartheid government had introduced a new parliamentary system in 1984 with three uniracial chambers 
(with whites, Coloureds and Indians, respectively). This parliamentary system was meant to give apartheid a 
degree of legitimacy, which it failed to do because it still divided South Africa along racial lines, excluded the 
African majority from influence and retained white supremacy (Thompson: 225).  
26 The IMF and World Bank lent the apartheid government $200 million between 1951 and 1967, continuing 
loans into the eighties, thus effectively neutralising sanctions. The US congress prohibited further loans in 1983, 
although the IMF continued to give the apartheid regime financial advise on how to liberalise its economy in the 
nineties (Bond, 2003: 143; Bond, 2001: 422-423).   
27 The impact of sanctions should not be overestimated, however. South African polical scientist Deon 
Geldenhuys claims he “could not find any direct, positive correlation between reform in South Africa and 
disinvestment from abroad” (Heribert: Chapter 2). 
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    Frederik De Klerk became President because he was deemed to be much more of a 
pragmatist than the ailing P.W. Botha. The pragmatic part of the Afrikaans community had 
finally understood that apartheid had outlived itself (Kunnie: 66), proven by the successful 
outcome of the referendum De Klerk held in 1992 to give himself a mandate for negotiations 
with the ANC over the creation of a new constitution. The Nationalist government’s idea was 
to sell post-apartheid capitalism to black leaders as a mutually beneficial solution and hang on 
to as much power for the white community as possible, attempting amongst other things to 
secure an alliance with Bantustan leaders to (Gumede: 30). Both the government and most of 
the liberation movement were thus ready to discuss the dismantling of apartheid, although the 
road to the election process of 1994 was not a simple or straightforward one. The unbanning 
of liberation movements, release of prisoners and lifting of the State of Emergency (imposed 
in 1985) in 1990 by De Klerk was an important positive gesture, however, and although 
temporary setbacks, such as outbreaks of violence, De Klerk pushing for safeguards of the 
existing racial order such as a two-phase transition towards multi-racial democracy and a 
rotating presidency against the will of the ANC and the ANC temporarily withdrawing from 
the process, compromises were found and consensus was reached, allowing South Africa’s 
first election of universal suffrage to commence on the 26th of April 1994 (Butler: 25).  
    The election was a momentous occasion for most South Africans. It was the “final 
vindication as people of worth” of black South Africans (Woods, 2000: 176), the ANC 
winning nearly three-fourths of the electorate, well over half the seats in parliament, and the 
Presidency and Vice-Presidency. Blacks as well as whites emerged from the voting booths 
transfigured (Tutu: 5), but it did not mean the achievement of full liberation for black nor 
white in any fully meaningful sense of the word. As Mandela reminded everyone, South 
Africans had “merely achieved the freedom to be free, the right not to be oppressed” 
(Mandela, 1995: 751). The conditioning of apartheid ideology that still affected “every 
institution, every aspect of life” (Tutu: 203) was much harder to remove than the actual 
system itself. The successful removal of this conditioning would depend on the activities of 
future governments, as well as those of ordinary South African citizens, black and white.  
 
4.1.7 Post-1994 
The problems that the ANC inherited from the previous government were both psychological 
and material or economic. When the ANC took office, they discovered that the resources 
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available to them, the abundance of which their election campaign had been based upon, were 
fewer than they had thought; “the coffers were nearly empty” (Meredith: 649; Herwitz: 189). 
Furthermore, the vast majority of sizable businesses were owned by whites, echoing the motto 
of other colonial white communities in Africa: “give them the parliaments and keep the 
banks” (Meredith: 436). As for practical solutions to necessary reforms of South Africa’s 
democracy and industry, as well as the economic, social and psychological ills of its black 
inhabitants, the ANC had none, naively believing that removing apartheid would “in itself put 
an end to black economic deprivation” and psychological deficiencies (Gumede: 67; Maloka: 
89). 
    The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was an attempt to deal with the 
psychological part of the equation, in effect being an expression of mass therapy and what its 
Chairman Desmond Tutu called “restorative justice … in the spirit of ubuntu”28 (Tutu: 51). 
Tutu characterised the TRC as “a compromise between the extreme of Nuremberg trials and 
blanket amnesty or national amnesia” (Schuster: 405), only those perpetrators who gave a full 
disclosure of the human rights abuses they had committed receiving full amnesty (Meredith: 
654).  Some criticised the TRC for letting off criminals without punishment (Hunter-Gault: 
25), and many whites choose not to give evidence, apparently seeing reconciliation as an 
entitlement and not something to be achieved. Others claimed that the TRC was part of a 
process that allowed post-apartheid “normality” to set in too quickly (Schuster: 407). Tutu 
countered that the “therapeutic” nature of the TRC was meant to promote “national unity” and 
“reconciliation”, not achieve it (Tutu: 33, 126).  
    The TRC did not focus solely on the human rights abuses committed by the apartheid 
government, but also on those of the liberation movements. That the ANC tried to prevent the 
parts of the report mentioning its human rights abuses from being published, such as the 
“necklacing”29 of rival Black Consciousness supporters or killings of civilians, led Tutu to 
warn against “allowing new censors to replace the old” (Woods, 2000: 194-195; Tutu: 119).  
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Ubuntu involves communality and interdependence (Posel: 313), as well as a “consciousness of belonging 
together”, “collectivity, unity and group solidarity” (Lodge: 231). In using ubuntu in connection with the TRC’s 
unravelling of the evils of apartheid, it is implied that the solution to this problem cannot be solved without 
recognising the intertwined humanity of perpetrators and victims (Tutu: 35).  
29 Placing a tire filled with petrol around the victims neck and setting fire to it. 
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4.1.8 The present 
Nevertheless, the present material conditions were the main problem that needed remedying 
in most (black) people’s minds, being a significant potential cause for unrest. Whereas there 
are signs of a growing black middle class, albeit a small one, the economy is still 
“overwhelmingly” dominated by whites (Butler: 63) and inequality is still “determined by the 
race geography of the past”, something that has not changed significantly, the overwhelming 
majority of the poor still being blacks (Pityana, 2007).  Street riots, such as those in mid-2005, 
are evidence of growing dissatisfaction and impatience with the lack of, or increasing cost of, 
necessary services such as water and electricity,30 and the general insufficient rate of change 
(Hunter-Gault: 30). Maybe the reconciliatory policies of the Mandela administration or 
Mbeki’s neo-liberalism have not been seen to change the legacy of apartheid at an acceptable 
pace.  
    The overall economy might have recovered from the slump of the eighties and nineties, 
showing small but steady levels of growth (Butler: 48; Hunter-Gault: 49), but South African 
income inequality, already higher than almost everywhere else in the world, is deepening, 
towns and cities remain segregated now by economics and not by law, unemployment is high, 
and education standards amongst blacks are still poor  (Netshitezhe: 15; Butler: 63, 66-67, 
135-36).31 Even so, the focus of the South African government has been on achieving 
economic growth, as it has in much of Africa since the eighties, not on eradicating income 
inequality. South Africa has far better economic capacities than the rest of Africa, for whilst 
most African countries are dependent upon imports for the running of their economies, South 
Africa is not (Kunnie: 113), its economy being larger than that of Southern Africa combined 
(Butler: 47). Nevertheless, economic theories that see greater income equality as necessary to 
achieve growth, and poverty and inequality further hampering this because of insufficient 
educational standards, malnutrition etc. (Cypher: 174-75; Martinussen, 2002: 38), have 
obviously not won the day.  
    In this climate of economic ascendancy for some blacks and stagnancy or descent for the 
majority, one finds a contradictory combination of strengthening Africanist tendencies within 
the ANC government (Baines: 13) paired with a combination of negative, nationalistic 
                                                 
30 More than 10 million people have had their water cut of, the same number having had their electricity 
disconnected, according to government surveys (Bond, 2004).  
31 South Africa is ranked 121st by the UNDP’s 2006 Human Development Index, 172nd by the CIA’s World 
Factbook’s index on unemployment and as the country with the eighth most unequal society in 2003 (Gini index 
from the 2003 Human Development Indicators).  
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xenophobic responses to the millions of immigrants of East and West African descent by the 
general public, on top of aggressive policing and restrictive and rigid immigration laws passed 
by the ANC government (Butler: 43, 155; Cole: 605).  
 
4.2 Is South Africa neo-colonial? 
According to left-leaning academics such as Julian Kunnie, South Africa is thus a neo-
colonial society (Kunnie: 70-71; Herwitz: 190-191). He believes that the emulation of 
America’s attempt to dismantle institutional and general racism by constitutionally outlawing 
it, not fundamentally redressing historical injustices, will lead to (and has led to) American 
conditions of “extraction of wealth for minority whites and Black elites and the continued 
exploitation of poor Black people … and all working-class women and men” (Kunnie: 82-83). 
He also believes that the ANC government, in adopting neo-liberal policies that facilitate such 
a situation, are “essentially servicing the needs of Western capital and imperialism” (Kunnie: 
93). This tendency is further seen in South Africa’s aligning itself with Western countries and 
not those of developing countries in forums such as the WTO or sub-imperialist attempts to 
enrol other African countries in free market organisations such as The New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) (Saul, 2005: 251-252). Without fundamental reforms of the 
system, as well as of the overall ideology of the ANC government, attempts at dismantling the 
racist legacies of apartheid such as Black Economic Empowerment end up enabling only a 
few blacks to join a “non-racial” middle-class by enriching them, leaving the majority of 
blacks poor (Kunnie: 101).  
    Whereas the Mandela and Mbeki administrations may not realistically have been able to 
redress the imbalances of apartheid in the little over a decade available to them, one might at 
least side with Kunnie in questioning whether the present neo-liberal economic policies are 
part of the solution or part of the problem, no matter how much Mbeki claims social 
transformation to be one of his primary goals. One example of this is that the welfare system, 
although seen as “ambitious” and providing “a bulwark against poverty”, only covers South 
African children below the age of fourteen32 and pensioners (Butler: 73; Gumede: 119), 
although the constitution guarantees the right to social security for all in need of it.33 
Furthermore, privatisation and growth-fixated neo-liberal policies have not proven at all 
                                                 
32 “Strategic Plan 2006/7 – 2009/10”, Department of Social Development, page 37. 
33 Section 27 of the South African Constitution states, “everyone has the right to have access to … social 
security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance”. 
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successful in furthering development or achieving social transformation or economic equality 
in other African countries in the eighties and nineties (Gumede: 108; Cypher: 518-520; 
Madeley: 58; Saul, 2005: 207).  
    Others disagree, claiming that it is unfair to blame the government for all of the ills of 
present-day South Africa, listing the achievements of the South African government at its 
people in redressing the all-encompassing legacy of apartheid,34 and claiming that a stable 
economic framework is necessary for eradicating poverty (Manuel: 5). Future under-
performance in addressing poverty should therefore be unnecessary given that the government 
seemingly has the resources to close the gaps between the rich and poor, having allegedly 
achieved macroeconomic stability (Ramphele, 2005; Gumede: 99). 
 
5.1 Black Consciousness 
The most obvious historical contender to the hegemony of the ANC in recent South African 
liberation politics was the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). The BCM not only 
challenged the political outlook of the ANC, but was also an important influence on the 
liberation movement as a whole at a crucial point in time. Unlike the promotion of immediate 
political liberation and non-racialism of the ANC, Black Consciousness advocated a two-
tiered approach of initial psychological liberation and black self-sufficiency that would enable 
black confidence and true liberation and integration. When looking at the policies in present 
day South Africa it is obvious that there are significant differences in the policies that Steve 
Biko and Black Consciousness wished to implement in a post-apartheid society, as well as the 
type of leadership they advocated, and those of Mbeki’s South Africa. In wanting to consider 
alternatives to the present ideological and political implementation, the BCM is therefore the 
most obvious placer to look.  
 
5.1.1 History 
Apart from being ideologically different from the ANC, Black Consciousness was also, as 
most political organisations, a reflection of the period of time into which it was born. The 
                                                 
34 Netshitenzhe speaks of a “marked decline in poverty” (Netshitenzhe: 12), Ramphele lists the “solid 
constitutional foundations, … strong independent judiciary, …the TRC, … stable macro-economic[s], … a 
strong civil society, … building on our African heritage” and the peaceful democratic “orderly changing of the 
guard” in 1994 and 1999 (Ramphele, 2003) and Finance Minister Trevor Manuel speaks of social improvements, 
“sound management of public finances” and having “created the conditions for rapid economic growth” 
(Manuel: 4) as success stories. 
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ANC-led liberation movement had up until the sixties mostly pursued a programme of 
multiracial cooperation, the moderate liberal programme of the thirties and forties 
subsequently modified in the fifties to accommodate more radical forms of protest. Whilst this 
had been possible up until the early sixties, although perhaps not particularly effective, the 
interracial polarisation of the sixties and seventies made such cooperation virtually impossible 
(Juckes: 128, 135; Pityana, 1992: 50). Black Consciousness was therefore not only 
ideologically different from the non-racial ANC or the Africanist PAC, but also different in 
terms of the conditions that it faced. This was further reflected in the fact that most of the 
leaders of the South African Students’ Organisation (SASO)35 and the BCM as a whole were 
“products of the locations and townships” (Pityana, 1992: 114) and consequently influenced 
by the “working-class attitude and experience” in the townships (Pityana, 1992: 31). They 
thus suffered denigration and self-doubt that many of the leaders of the ANC never had to 
endure, as they “grew up as members of a proud peasant class in the Eastern Cape” and 
therefore “never had to doubt their own worth as human beings in spite of the racism around 
them” (Ramphele, 1995: 184). According to Black Consciousness, the tactics of the ANC and 
PAC had failed because they failed to take into account the all-pervasive black inferiority and 
white paternalism (Worden: 132; Frederickson: 302).36 
    Black Consciousness evolved as a philosophy in South Africa in the late sixties, 
transcending its initial student-orientated beginnings at an executive meeting of SASO in 
1970 where Black Consciousness was discussed and seen as important for the entire black 
community, not only for students (Woods, 1987: 158), reflecting that “Black Consciousness 
philosophy sought … to … fuse intellectuals and masses” (Pityana, 1992: 101). The 
launching of the Black People’s Convention (BPC) “to expand the work of Black 
Consciousness beyond the student and youth groups of SASO” and get the masses involved 
(Pityana, 1992: 52; Woods, 1987: 118), and the Black Community Programmes37 (BCP) “to 
give practical effect to the philosophy of self-reliance” (Ramphele, 1995: 94) in the early 
                                                 
35 The South African Students’ Organisation was an all-black (“blacks” in a BC-context being those oppressed 
by the apartheid government; Africans, Indians and Coloureds, and not an essentialist racial determinant) student 
organisation, formed in 1968 against the background of NUSAS, the national multi-racial students movement, 
being insensitive to black opinion. SASO was the earliest concrete manifestation of South African Black 
Consciousness, and thus the first of an array of organisations forming the Black Consciousness Movement.  
36 Two examples of such complexes are Tutu describing how he automatically doubted the capabilities of black 
Nigerian pilots because they were black (Tutu: 204) and Woods how he was surprised when coming across 
assertive and intelligent blacks (Woods, 1987: 68). 
37 The Black Community Programmes covered the fields of health, education, leadership training, publications, 
home industries and childcare (Pityana, 1992: 157).  
Bikoism or Mbekism – the role of Black Consciousness in Mbeki’s South Africa 
 42 
seventies furthered this process, launching educational programmes that introduced the 
message of self-reliance and Black Consciousness to high-school students and township 
youths throughout the country (Schuster: 53; Pityana, 1992: 215).38 The BCM was also 
influential because of its “strategic use of the media” which was part of the reason why the 
BCM and Steve Biko became recognised as “a key political voice” by “members of the 
international community” that subsequently began consulting Biko on issues regarding South 
Africa (Pityana, 1992: 59, 128).  
    While the BCM had initially been left alone because the apartheid government saw its 
proclamation of “going it alone” as in accordance with apartheid’s separate development 
philosophy, they soon found out that the organisations of the BCM were a dangerous 
challenge to apartheid and began intensifying repressive measures against its members. 
Gaining new members for the organisations, especially the outwardly political BPC, 
consequently proved difficult (Pityana, 1992: 126), leaders of SASO, BPC and BCP routinely 
being banned, their replacements also banned (Pityana, 1992: 45), and judges convicting 
Black Consciousness members for little more than “white fear of black ideas” (Lobban: 260).  
    In late 1977 all BCM organisations were banned. This, combined with the murder of Biko, 
created divisions in an organisation already at odds and a split into a multiracial and an 
exclusivist camp, the former seeing Black Consciousness more as a means and the latter more 
as an end (Pityana, 1992: 141; Juckes: 156; Magubane: 157). Many ended up joining the 
ANC and PAC in exile, although the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA) and 
the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) were formed in exile and inside South Africa 
respectively to replace the banned BPC, BCP and SASO. The two were distinct organisations, 
AZAPO embracing a PAC-like Africanism,39 but both espoused a Soviet-style Marxist 
rhetoric that saw class and race as interconnected, and they eventually merged after their 
unbanning in 1990 (Davenport: 494; Maaba: 433, 436; Zabalaza, 2006: 23). Ironically, the 
                                                 
38 Other Black Consciousness-affiliated organisations or programmes of the seventies included the Black Allied 
Workers’ Union, the Black Workers’ Project, the Black Theology Project, the Black Parents’ Association, the 
Black Women’s Federation, the South African Students’ Movement, the National Youth Organisation that was 
affiliated to the programmes for leadership development run by SASO and the BPC, the Zimele Trust, the Home 
Education Service Project and the Union of Black Journalists. Furthermore, Black Consciousness was active in 
the spheres of culture and the arts (Davies: 302-308; Gerhart: 312; Magubane: 138, 141). 
39 “Draft position paper on the ideologies of Pan Africanism and Black Consciousness as they have developed in 
occupied Azania (i.e. South Africa)”, Frank Talk, Volume 3, 1989/90, pp. 89-91, (Published by the Natal Region 
of AZAPO). 
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BCM had turned from the anti-class focus and “new left”40 democratic socialism of Biko 
(Pityana, 1992: 102) to a class-focused Marxism41 akin to that of the more SACP-influenced 
parts of the ANC at a time when ANC-moderates such as Mbeki were detaching themselves 
from Marxism (Gumede: 38).42  
    With AZAPO and the BCMA, the BCM had been “reduced to near rhetoric and 
sloganeering” and a trivialisation of and deviation from the philosophy of the movement 
according to Saths Cooper, a former publicity secretary of the BPC and president of AZAPO 
(Nyeke: 158; Frederickson: 310). Former South African Students’ Representatives Council 
(SSRC) treasurer Selby Semela further described it as a “dead weight” of “isolated groups of 
radical cheerleaders” who were incapable of originality (Semela: 13, 15), and who had learnt 
all the wrong lessons from the Soweto uprising (Zabalaza, 2006: 23).  
    The BCM had never really recovered from the mass-bannings, imprisonments and torturing 
of its main leaders. This along with the fact that the ANC took successful steps to prevent 
international funding or recognition of BCM-organisations and to “re-educate” BCM activists 
sent to Robben Island, leading to most of the remaining principal figures, as well as a majority 
of its foot soldiers, joining the ANC and Umkhonto, meant a “return to dominance” of the 
ANC and of non-racialist ideology (Frederickson: 310; Hirschmann: 16-17; Pityana, 1992: 
142). In addition, white liberals, revengeful of what they saw as the painful rejection of them 
by the BCM and the belittlement of their role in the anti-apartheid struggle, also played an 
important role in “stifling the movement” by using their “access to financial resources and 
their influence over the media, academia, and publishing houses, both internally and 
internationally” to stop donors supporting the BCM (Hirschmann: 19; Pityana, 1992: 228). 
    Nevertheless, the principle of a unitary liberation movement that Biko had promoted  
(Woods, 1987: 119, 403; Pityana, 1992: 66) was an influential contributory factor “to the 
                                                 
40 The “rejection by young people of the decadent values of the passing generation” of the New Left during the 
sixties and seventies, as well as its unprecedented “challenge to authority” and dogmatic, centralist politics 
(Pityana in Halisi: 120) struck a chord with Biko and the BCM.  
41 This turn to Marxism and class-based analysis of South African society was partially an answer to the 
apartheid government’s attempt to create a black middle class and thus divide blacks along class lines. Already 
the 1976 SASO Congress attacked such middle class blacks for aligning themselves “with imperialism” and 
concluding that the BCM needed to “look at our struggle … also in terms of class interests” (Davies: 307).  
42 The early South African left of the nineteen-tens and early nineteen-twenties that provided the foundation of 
(the predecessor to) the SACP were ironically more influenced by the anarchism of Bakunin than by Marx, as 
was common with most of the radical, non-social democratic left at the time. That this is a little-known fact is 
mainly due to the history of such anarchist movements being “buried under subsequent defeats and political 
orthodoxies”, to a large degree resulting from the ascendance of the Marxism of Communist parties such as the 
SACP after the Russian Revolution (Van der Walt, 2004: 67-70, 84). 
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success of the United Democratic Front” (Works: 777), and the BCM was an important 
contributor in its own right, especially to the psychological side of the liberation movement as 
a whole. The legacy of Black Consciousness was felt throughout South African liberation 
politics and spanned the whole political spectrum, the legacy of the movement being 
significantly more than that of the small and relatively insignificant movements who claim 
affinity to Steve Biko and Black Consciousness that remained, such as AZAPO and the 
Socialist Party of Azania (Pityana, 1992: 3, 10). The “combination of PAC Africanism and 
orthodox socialist theory” that these parties espoused did not prove to be popular with the 
masses in post-apartheid elections (Davenport: 494) that left them virtually without 
representation in parliament and influence, as well as divided by internal divisions and 
leadership struggles.43  
    Perhaps this is why AZAPO President Mosibudi Mangena, a founder member of Black 
Consciousness, national organiser of the BPC and the first Black Consciousness activist to be 
sent to Robben Island (Pityana, 1992: 126; Magubane: 135, 142), accepted first the post of 
Deputy Minister of Education in 2001 and later that of Minister of Science and Technology in 
2004. Although Mangena described the move as one of preparing AZAPO “to be SA’s 
alternative” to the ANC government, insisting that “the party [AZAPO] will continue to exist 
as an independent party with socialist principles”,44 his appointment in 2001 led to him being 
called a “sell-out” by the PAC and many top AZAPO members to leave the party because of 
what they saw as a betrayal of the policies of AZAPO.45  
 
 
 
                                                 
43 AZAPO, having seen only the defeats and not the gains in the compromise that led to liberation, boycotted the 
1994-elections, only amassing 27,000 votes and gaining one parliamentary seat in the 1999 general elections and 
39,000 votes in retaining this seat in 2004. Another party claiming BCM-affiliations, the Socialist Party of 
Azania (SOPA) formed in 1998, has no parliamentary presence after having only received 9,000 votes in 1999 
and less than 15,000 votes in 2004.  
44 ”Plucky Azapo aims to profit from mayhem in corridors of power”, Business Day 27th of October 2005; “PAC 
criticises Mangena post”, Die Burger 25th of January 2001. 
45 “PAC slams 'sell-out' Mangena for accepting Cabinet post”, SABC News 25th of January 2001. Mangena 
implicitly accepted GEAR by joining the government and voting in favour of NEPAD, “a continental version of 
Gear … which we totally oppose”, in parliament, according to Kedibone Melema, outgoing spokesman for 
Azapo, (“13 top Azapo members quit”, News 24 16th of August 2002). That AZAPO states in its 2002 Policy 
Positions that an “AZAPO GOVERNMENT will … pursue and uphold an economic policy where the objective will 
be to attain control of the means of production” (“Azanian People’s Organisation Policy Positions”, 2002, p. 6) 
underlines the confusing political trajectory of the party. AZAPO’s highest decision-making organ, the standing 
committee nevertheless backed Mangena’s appointment (“Azapo man ‘humbled’ by top job”, News 24 24th of 
January 2001).  
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5.1.2 Steve Biko 
Steve Biko was born in 1946, thus spending all his conscious life under apartheid rule. Biko 
grew up in the Ginsberg Location near King Williams Town, “a closely knit community of 
about eight-hundred families, every four families sharing communal taps and toilets” 
(Pityana, 1992: 18). Being a successful student, he received a scholarship to attend Lovedale, 
from where he was expelled, though innocent of his alleged crimes, finishing his secondary 
education at a Catholic boarding school. At university he studied medicine at the University 
of Natal from 1966 and law from 1973 through the University of South Africa (UNISA), a 
correspondence university where other notables have studied,46 completing neither degree.  
    Having initially worked and subsequently broken with the National Union of South African 
Students (NUSAS) to help form SASO in 1968, Biko began working for the BCP in 1972 but 
was banned in 1973, although he remained thoroughly active within the movement, amongst 
many other things helping to form the Zimele Trust Fund47 in 1975. Biko was the “father of 
the Black Consciousness Movement”, as well as its “main thinker” and “key catalyst” (Tutu 
in Biko: vi; Maaba: 432; Switzer: 188) although he deliberately “managed not to be 
dominant” (Pityana, 1992: 30) to enable others to assume responsibility and discourage a 
personality cult (Woods, 1987: 33).  
    Biko’s general fearlessness in openly opposing the authorities such as during the SASO-
BPC trial48 in 1976, his “unhesitant response to insult” and his disregarding of his banning 
were probably contributing factors to his early death. On the other hand, showing that he was 
not afraid of the authorities was also an important contributing factor in fostering the culture 
of fearlessness that helped end apartheid (Pityana, 1992: 47, 256). Repeatedly detained 
without charge for months at a time, facing long periods of solitary confinement on several 
occasions (Biko, 1996: 1; Bernstein: Chapter II), he was detained for the last time in August 
1977, having been stopped at a security Police roadblock. He died in police custody in 
September, having been tortured and severely beaten. An inquest into his death beginning in 
November 1977 failed to blame anyone for his death (Woods, 1987: 353), and although the 
perpetrators eventually came forward during the TRC, they were refused amnesty (Tutu: 51).  
                                                 
46 Nelson Mandela, for instance, finished his degree at UNISA (Mandela, 1995: 79), as did Robert Sobukwe 
(Woods, 1987: 81). 
47 A fund that financed as well as gave educational and emotional support to former political prisoners, mainly 
ANC and PAC members.  
48 In the 1976 SASO-BPC trial, the apartheid government prosecuted and convicted nine members of the BCM 
for “subversion by intent”, in effect placing their thought and that of Black Consciousness on trial. Steve Biko 
was “summoned by the defence team to give evidence” (Woods, 1987: 149; Lobban: 76). 
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    Coming from “a tradition that embraced [both] traditional African values and western 
ways” (Magubane: 121), Biko “was not convinced by what he saw as [the] exclusive 
Africanism” of the PAC, though the loyalty of the politicised in his family was to this 
organisation (Pityana, 1992: 21), and was not “sympathetic to the [non-racialism of the] 
ANC” either (Pityana, 2007). The radicalism of his youthful writings in the early seventies 
lessened in those of 1976 and 1977, showing a change of emphasis and admittance that some 
of the earlier writings had been “overkill” and “written in the heat of the moment” (Woods, 
1987: 62). His early writings focused on the tactical black withdrawal from integrated 
organisations, his later writings on bringing about a new non-racial society with increased 
attention to “those whites of good will” being able to participate in the struggle for liberation 
(Mpumlwana in Biko: xiii), reflecting the two-tiered strategy of Black Consciousness of 
consciousness first, political action thereafter. 
 
5.1.3 Influences upon Black Consciousness 
Although the BCM was a reaction to a specific situation and a specific period in time, the 
“high noon” of apartheid, the movement was inspired by South African as well as foreign 
ideas. But simply claiming that its ideology was imported or copied is assigning “too little 
significance to the life experiences and political intuition of the movement’s founders” 
(Gerhart: 273). On the one hand one can see Black Consciousness as a “continuation of earlier 
traditions”, its members coming from diverse political backgrounds such as the ANC, PAC 
and the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM)49, as well as from the Progressive and 
Liberal parties50 (Pityana, 1992: 101, 185; Davies: 304; Halisi: 128). On the other, Black 
Consciousness is also clearly inspired by foreign movements and individuals, although such 
internal and external influences are not necessarily strictly separate or unconnected. 
                                                 
49 The relatively small Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM), formed in 1943, called for non-European 
(black) unity as opposed to the African unity of the PAC or the non-racialism of the ANC, the aim of the 
organisation being “the liquidation of the National Oppression of the Non-Europeans in South Africa”. NEUM 
criticised the ANC’s non-racialism for “reproducing the theory of four nations in South Africa”  (Davies: 311-
313), but “was unable to fill the vacuum created by the repression of the other liberation organizations”, ending 
up “split by ideological division” (Worden: 130).  
50 The Liberal Party, formed in 1954, was initially a gradualist party that attempted to win over white voters to a 
qualified franchise. The party was radicalised in the late fifties, the Progressive Party, formed in 1959, taking 
over the gradualism of the Liberal Party, the latter now calling for one man one vote and supporting the ANC’s 
call for boycotts on South Africa. The Liberal Party dissolved in 1968 (Davies: 378-379), never having won any 
seats in parliament. The Progressives in many consecutive elections won only the lone seat of Helen Suzman 
until taking over the role of official opposition from the United party in the seventies and eighties, though never 
winning over 26 seats out of a total of 165 in 1981. 
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    The Africanism of Anton Lembede51 was thus inspired by Garveyism52 (Mandela, 1995: 
111) and akin to Negritude. As the BCM was to rediscover nearly three decades later, 
Lembede saw the inferiority complex as “the greatest barrier to liberation”, Africans having to 
“improve their self-image” and self-reliantly embrace their past before being able to 
successfully challenge apartheid (Mandela, 1995: 115, 119; Gerhart: 58, 272). Aspects of 
Lembede’s ANCYL thereby “precipitated the emergence of Black Consciousness” (Pityana, 
1992: 119), Biko seeing it as “the first real signs that … Black Consciousness was slowly 
manifesting itself” (Biko, 1996: 67). Unlike the BCM, however, Lembede saw non-European 
unity as a “fantastic dream” (Gerhart: 76), believing instead in an essentialist, exclusivist 
African “God-given blackness” that was to unite Africans in a common nationalism (Gerhart: 
58, 60), an argument similar to that of Sobukwe in the fifties that Africans would have to 
reject their inferiority to end white domination (Gerhart: 187).  
    The ideologies of post-independence African leaders were also an influence on Black 
Consciousness, especially Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, who’s African Socialism or Ujamaa and 
self-reliance was similar to the Black Communalism and ubuntu that Black Consciousness 
advocated (Pityana, 1992: 154-155) in its claim that socialism was inherent in traditional 
African values such as the extended family and the “co-operative nature of village 
communities” (Thomson: 38-39, 51). As Barney Pityana, former President of SASO, stated in 
1971: “Black man you are on your own. Like Nyerere we must minimize reliance on external 
aid” (Gerhart: 274). Nyerere was the most influential African thinker of his time, his concept 
of self-reliance manifesting itself concretely in Ujamaa’s self-sufficient socialist villages that 
sought to “integrate the logic of economic efficiency with the goal of social equality”, as well 
at that of rural African mutuality with modern production methods (Thomson: 53). Unlike 
many other post-independence leaders, he shied away from extravagance and prevented “the 
growth of a privileged elite” (Meredith: 250), insisting on the elite being “part of the society 
which [they] are changing”, success only being possible if “they work from a position within 
… society … [and] identify themselves with the uneducated” (Nyerere, 1974: 8). Yet by the 
end of the seventies, it was clear that Nyerere’s increasingly undemocratic and centralist 
                                                 
51 Lembede was founding president of the ANC Youth League between 1944 and his untimely death in 1947 at 
the age of 33. 
52 The “Garveyism” of Marcus Garvey was introduced to South Africa in the twenties, preaching Pan-
Africanism, African exclusivism, and prophetic Christianity. According to Vinson, Garveyism “pervaded black 
South African politics generally”, including the ANC, and was “central to the transnational … black political 
consciousness … in interwar South Africa” (Vinson: 282, 303). 
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system was not economically viable. Ujamaa “degenerated into [undemocratic] state control 
over the peasants” (Mbah: Chapter 5) where peasants continued to produce for their own 
subsistence because of government price controls; administrative errors, corruption and 
coercion further hampering the project. Although he had produced results in education, health 
and social services, these were mainly financed by foreign aid (Saul, 2005: 151; Meredith: 
256-259; Thomson: 54-55). According to some economists, positive lessons can be drawn 
from Nyerere’s Tanzania (Saul, 2005: 36), such as the “remarkably stable and equitable 
society” he managed to create in a country with a vast ethnic and religious diversity 
(Thomson: 50, 55), a focus on rural, agricultural development as opposed to the traditional 
draining of rural wealth, as well as the basic contention that alternatives to a global capitalism 
detrimental to Africa should be sought.  
    A severe critic of the betrayal of the first generation of African leaders, Fanon was another 
important influence on Black Consciousness (Pityana, 1992: 29). Even though “proto-
Fanonism” was to found in South Africa before Fanon, Fanon’s desire to break the 
psychological shackles of colonial discourse, his universalist and humanist rejection of 
Africanist Negritude, his rejection of “gradualist solutions”, his “mistrust of bourgeois blacks 
anxious to step into the shoes of the exploiter” and his rejection of the influence of white 
liberalism was to influence Black Consciousness (Gerhart: 275; Halisi: 119). That Fanon 
acknowledged that democracy in most post-independence African countries ended up 
becoming a “strategy for power, not a vehicle for popular empowerment” (Ake, 1993: 240) 
and broke with Marxist orthodoxy, adopting a more decentralised and democratic socialism 
(Gibson: 201-202; Fanon, 2004: 130-131; Mbah: Chapter 3) can also be seen to have 
influenced the movement. Unlike Fanon, Biko disregarded Fanon’s call for a “cleansing 
effect” of violence in the liberation struggle, although this stance was predicated on the 
actions on the apartheid government, as well as probably being employed as an act of self-
defence against apartheid’s law, and not all inside the BCM agreed with Biko’s non-violent 
position (Biko, 1996: 149; Woods, 1987: 127; Semela: 13).  
    In finding societies and situations that they could compare themselves with and learn from, 
Black Consciousness proponents looked not only to Africa but also towards America. The 
influence of the American “black power” movement can be seen in the belief in the “closing 
of ranks before entering open society” that Black Consciousness espoused, and in that 
comparisons between Afro-American and South African approaches to their respective racist 
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experiences were “popular exercises at SASO leadership training seminars” (Gerhart: 276; 
Pityana, 1992: 27). Many proponents of Black Consciousness also copied black American 
slang such as “hi” and “guys” and used “black power” terminology such as the term “black” 
instead of “non-white” (Biko, 1996: 48; Schuster: 53; Woods, 1987: 72; Gerhart: 275-277). 
Even so, the obvious differences between the struggle of a black American minority group 
and the black majority in South Africa were acknowledged, the BCM adopting selectively and 
reinterpreting ideas to “fit South African conditions” (Frederickson: 298).  
    Pedagogically, the methodology of Paolo Freire in “Pedagogy of the oppressed” was an 
inspiration, workshops and training courses being held on Freire’s methods of education and 
conscientisation during the early seventies (Pityana, 1992: 27, 35, 155). Non-hierarchical 
participatory development or education has a history in South Africa, captured in the South 
African terms “uglolana”, meaning “sharpening each other”, and “uakana”, meaning “to build 
each other” (Rahman, 2004: 17). Freire’s non-hierarchical pedagogy was therefore readily 
applicable to the South African context, as was his acknowledgement of the oppressed being 
“fearful of freedom” because they have “internalized the image of the oppressor” (Freire: 29), 
of the futility of the gradualism and white (oppressor) ownership of the struggle sought by 
white “liberals” (Freire: 26, 36) and of the dehumanisation of oppressor and oppressed alike 
(Freire: 29). His insistence that only “true reflection” can lead to action that can eradicate both 
the consciousness of the oppressed and the oppressor, that “the oppressed must see examples 
of oppressor vulnerability” for this to happen and that the oppressed must actively participate 
“in the act of liberation” unless he is to end up an “object” that “can be manipulated”  (Freire: 
37, 46-48) similarly influenced the practice of the movement.  
 
5.1.4 Definition of Black Consciousness 
Having accounted for the history of South African Black Consciousness and what inspired the 
movement we now turn towards the philosophy itself. Black Consciousness was “an attitude 
of mind and a way of life” (Biko, 1996: 91) focussing on “the cultural and political revival of 
an oppressed people” (Woods, 1987: 116). According to Biko, “the type of black man we 
have today [in the early seventies] … accepts what he regards as [his] ‘inevitable position’” 
(Biko, 1996: 28), rejecting his own humanity by attaching “the meaning white to all that is 
good” (Biko, 1996: 100), believing “the myth that Black is an alienation from the normal 
which is white” (Rambally: 120), white standards thus being “the yardstick by which even 
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black people judge each other” (Biko, 1996: 30). “The most potent weapon in the hands of the 
oppressor” being “the mind of the oppressed” (Biko, 1996: 69), Black Consciousness meant 
to enable blacks to fight this defeatism, develop hope, and build up their humanity (Woods, 
1987: 174) by infusing them with “pride and dignity”, reminding them of their “complicity in 
… allowing [themselves] to be misused” and urging them to be their own “authorities rather 
than wait to be interpreted by others” by demonstrating “the lie that black is an aberration 
from the ‘normal’ which is white” (Biko, 1996: 29, 49, 52). Black Consciousness “no longer 
seek[s] to reform the system because so doing implies acceptance of the major points around 
which the system revolves” (Biko, 1996: 49), turning instead to “black communalism as its 
economic policy” (Rambally: 122), whilst at the same time conceding that “racial integration 
requires economic integration” (Biko, 1972: 66). 
    Liberation was important because blacks “cannot be conscious … and yet remain in 
bondage” (Biko, 1996: 49), which explains why political and cultural struggle are 
interconnected (Pityana, 1992: 185), liberation not simply being about freedom from material 
conditions, but about “liberation … first from psychological oppression … and secondly from 
physical oppression”.53 If liberation was seen as being simply about material conditions, 
alliances with other groups seeking liberation such as liberals or communists were possible, 
but “the moment [liberation] was conceived as a kind of therapy, a cure for alienation, it 
excluded such alliances” (Chipkin, 2002: 572).  
    Both the non-racial and multi-racialist politics of the ANC and the separatist and 
confrontational politics of the PAC were rejected (Frederickson: 300). According to Bennie 
Khoapa, “there is a third choice [besides integration and separation] – pluralism, and beyond 
that a fourth – transformation … at this moment … we can neither integrate nor separate” 
(Khoapa in Biko, 1972: 63). “While as a matter of principle”, Biko rejected “separation in a 
normal society”, he claimed that South Africa was “far from a normal society” (Biko, 1996: 
12), equality having to obliterate white superiority and black inferiority for non-racialism to 
be of any use. Nevertheless, non-racialism was the BCM’s target for a future South Africa 
(Biko, 1996: 139; Woods, 1986: 183), Black Consciousness deemed to be “irrelevant in a 
colourless and non-exploitative egalitarian society” (Biko, 1996: 87). 
 
 
                                                 
53 SASO Newsletter, August 1971, page 10. 
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5.1.5 The South African “liberal” 
The first group targeted by the BCM were the white “liberals”. The power of accommodative 
and moderate views on top of the negligible action taken towards apartheid in the sixties, by 
white liberals as well as by black homeland politicians, was seen as the primary objects for 
initial improvement. For whilst it was acknowledged that liberals were in fact friends and not 
enemies, the real enemies being the apartheid government and its supporters, their influence 
over blacks in the absence of ANC or PAC involvement in the late sixties and early seventies 
was seen as detrimental to the cause of liberation.  
    The multiracial nature and white liberalism of NUSAS attracted many black students on 
account of it being one of the few legal anti-apartheid groups in the early sixties (Juckes: 
117). But Biko’s experiences with NUSAS made him see the integration possible at its 
meetings as “a one-way course” where blacks were meant to assimilate “white (liberal) values 
and attitudes”, whites always knowing better how blacks should respond to apartheid (Biko, 
1996: 20) and accordingly assuming the role of spokesman for the blacks. The mere 
confidence-boosting of blacks associating “with whites who seem to treat us as equals” (Biko, 
1996: 23) was seen an illusory integration, as was what Biko saw as liberals soothing their 
conscience by socialising with a few “intelligent and articulate” blacks with whom “total 
identification … is impossible” (Biko, 1996: 22, 65). Integration was not to be enforced 
according to the Black Consciousness, but would follow “automatically when the doors to 
prejudice are closed through the attainment of a just and free society”.54   
    That all whites were seen as having been born into privilege and had a lot to lose if 
apartheid was overthrown  (Biko, 1996: 50, 66) was seen as a contributing factor to the 
moderation of liberals. Liberals were holding back the struggle “offering a formula too gentle, 
too inadequate for our struggle”, according to Biko, whereas the homeland politicians and 
other leaders accommodating the apartheid government and having “enjoyed a decade of 
legitimacy” were simply “labelled stooges and sellouts [sic]” (Woods, 1987: 63; Juckes: 140). 
The latter were a clear example of the liberation struggle not simply being between blacks and 
whites but between those who “maintained the oppressive status quo and those who wished to 
change society into a non-racial democracy” (Juckes: 157). They had the doubtful honour of 
being seen as the embodiment of “non-whites”, the derogatory Black Consciousness term for 
unenlightened blacks (Biko, 1996: 48; Magubane: 114). Such “colourless white lackeys” who 
                                                 
54 SASO Newsletter, August 1971, page 11. 
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“propped up the system” were considered having “lost the right to [be] part of the black 
world” (Biko, 1996: 78). Not all liberals were therefore necessarily white (Pityana, 1992: 
251). 
    An example of white liberal ideology was that of the South African Progressive Party who, 
although accepting a future “South Africa as a unified, multi-racial state … with equal 
opportunities for all”, based its outlines for this future South Africa on “a qualified vote … 
based on educational and economic qualifications” (Botha: 46).55 “Simple majoritarianism” 
was seen as problematic in a “deeply divided society” such as South Africa (van Zyl Slabbert: 
133), the Progressives rejecting “the concept of black majority rule just as … the concept of 
white majority rule” (Midlane: 379)56 and thereby essentially wishing to retain “all the 
essential structures and institutions of capitalist exploitation in South Africa” (Davies: 148).57 
Former member of the Progressives, Jan Botha, argued that the necessity for such moderate 
measures lay in “the difference in the standards of civilisation of the various racial groups in 
the country” (Botha: 256). The Progressives and other white liberals were thus not working 
for true integration but for black assimilation into white society,58 and some liberals, such as 
Donald Woods, once a member of the Progressives, ended up admitting the futility of such 
moderate South African liberalism (Woods, 1987: 370-71). 
    The attack on the liberals was in effect an attack on the particular South African brand of 
liberalism and “the gradualist approach that they supported” (Juckes: 130) and not an attack 
on all whites or liberalism as such (Magubane: 119), it being acknowledged that “useful 
coalitions between blacks and whites [could] be formed” (Biko in Woods, 1987: 123) once 
the removal of white liberal influence had taken place. An example of the anti-liberal stance 
of Biko and others being more tactical than racist (Biko, 1972: 63), and of the waning focus 
on white liberals because of the strengthening of the liberation movement in the seventies, 
was seen in Biko’s friendship with Donald Woods59 and in the fact that “not one white 
present” at Biko’s funeral, attended by thousands and lasting several hours, “was made to feel 
                                                 
55 Although most Progressives such as van Zyl Slabbert had disavowed qualified franchise by the late seventies, 
they kept on arguing for the need for some sort of “minority veto”  (van Zyl Slabbert: 151-153). 
56 Progressives leader Colin Eglin, quoted from the Sunday Times, 30 October 1977. 
57 Although “an oversimplification”, according to Midlane, some Nationalists as well as radicals saw the 
Progressives as being little more than “the mouthpiece of the Anglo-American Corporation” (Midlane: 378-379). 
In fact many employees of Anglo-American doubled as Progressive MP’s, the corporation virtually keeping the 
party going by large donations (Davies: 67, 146). 
58 SASO Newsletter, August 1971, page 11. 
59 Some members of the BCM resented this friendship (Woods, 1987: 2), however, showing that some of the 
nuances of the Black Consciousness philosophy were lost on some of its adherents (Ramphele, 1995: 65). 
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unwelcome” (Woods, 1986: 182), the message of the speeches held at the funeral consistently 
promoting “a non-racial, non-ethnic society” (Woods, 1986: 183). As the BCM became 
stronger and more confident during the seventies, white liberalism no longer being a threat to 
the liberation movement, they could be “invited to participate, as a minor but welcome ally” 
(Pityana, 1992: 235), the “debate on the merits and demerits of separatism [having] exhausted 
itself” (Rambally: 108). If they wanted to help bring apartheid to an end, however, whites 
ought to concern themselves with realising and dealing with the fact “that they themselves are 
oppressed” and fighting for justice and against “white racism” in their “white world” (Biko, 
1996: 23, 25, 65; Pityana, 1992: 233; Magubane: 122). 
 
5.1.6 Blackness and whiteness 
A non-racial approach to a racially charged situation such as that of apartheid South Africa, 
often “absorbed unreflectively” by an ANC hoping racialism would simply “wither away” 
(MacDonald: 111),60 is akin to pretending that racism does not exist, ignoring “its denigrating 
psychological effects” (Gibson: 18). Centuries of “negative stereotyping of Africans” had 
“inhibited a desire to embrace a black identity” (Berman: 118), but unlike many other 
colonies, especially those of France and Spain where a certain amount of assimilation into 
white culture was possible, South African blacks had never aspired to be white.  Whiteness in 
South Africa was “associated with police brutality and intimidation” (Biko, 1996: 76); though 
this did not necessarily mean that blacks did not feel inferior to white South Africans.  
    Although charged with being racialist (Woods, 1987b: 250), the BCM in fact “evolved as a 
counter-ethnicity movement” to the tribalisation politics of the apartheid government’s 
ethnically divisive homelands and Bantu education policies (Pityana, 1992: 103; Halisi: 113). 
Moreover, the social construction of groups such as “blacks” to counter this61 has its 
precedents as well as latter-day adherents. Hannah Arendt in claiming that one must “defend 
oneself as a Jew” if attacked as one (Browning: 11) and Spivak in coining the term “strategic 
essentialism” wherein she distinguishes between “deploying” or “activating” essentialism and 
                                                 
60 According to MacDonald, “The ANC’s reasoning verged on the circular: non-racial institutions would dispel 
racialism by ignoring race officially and ignoring race officially would prove that racialism had been dispelled” 
(MacDonald: 112). 
61 Biko believed that “any group of people who identify as a unit through shared interests and aspirations 
necessarily need to protect those interests they share” (Biko, 1972: 8), that blacks were “collectively segregated 
against”, and that responding, “as a group” was therefore as natural as workers uniting in trade unions (Biko, 
1996: 25). 
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“falling into” or “lapsing into” it (Selden: 238), are examples of a similar line of thought.62 
The latter effectively describes the difference between the essentialism of Negritude, 
Lembede or the PAC and the strategic essentialism of the definition of blackness employed by 
Biko and Black Consciousness.63 Appealing to “blackness” can consequently easily be 
construed as acceptance of colonialist discourse, only turning it on its head as with Negritude 
and Africanism. Black Consciousness escapes falling into this category precisely because of 
its non-essentialist or strategic essentialist use of the term black, not defining an impenetrable 
and non-interchangeable group based along racial lines, but a constructed and interchangeable 
one based on consciousness (Pityana, 1992: 105). “Black” is seen as a state of mind or “a 
reflection of a mental attitude”, not a matter of pigmentation, and “blacks” seen as “those who 
are by law or tradition politically, economically and socially discriminated against as a group 
in the South African society” (Biko, 1996: 48). A non-conscious African, Indian or Coloured 
is by the same logic not a black but a “non-white”. In transcending the groups that the 
apartheid government had defined, as well as the concept of “non-white” that saw whiteness 
as the norm to be emulated, adherents of Black Consciousness were defining themselves, and 
doing so positively, as well as uniting the previously fragmented and divided black liberation 
movement (Thompson: 171). Whites are excluded from this equation because of their 
privileges accrued from and complicity in apartheid, embeddedness in racist64 ideology and 
because their inclusion could potentially undermine black unity (Pityana, 1992: 105).65  
    One might speculate upon whether such exclusion is to be applied to all whites, only to 
South African whites steeped in apartheid ideology, or whether there are degrees to such 
exclusion. If all whites are to be excluded the argument is essentialist, if exclusion is to be 
qualified as the second and third points argue, it is not. The necessity of a strong and coherent 
strategic essentialism, reflecting the disunity and weakness of the liberation struggle in the 
late sixties and early seventies, meant that Biko and others were inclined to overstate their 
                                                 
62 Aboriginal Australian author Mudrooroo is essentially making the same point in claiming that it is necessary 
“that we struggle … [as] the one mob of the colonisers, though we knew that before we had been many and are 
still many” (Mudrooroo: 2).  
63 Although not all Black Consciousness advocates understood the finer points of such “strategic essentialism”, 
some seeing ”Negritude [as] a vital force of the liberation movement” (SASO Newsletter, June 1971, page 19). 
64 Biko sees racism as “discrimination by a group against another for the purposes of subjugation” (Biko, 1996: 
25). Unlike Miles’ definition (Miles: 83 or chapter 2.3.1), Biko’s is similar to that of Carmichael and the Black 
Power movement in America, and would be seen by Miles as a conceptual inflation of the term (Miles: 66-67). 
65 SASO Newsletter, August 1971, page 10. 
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case (Woods, 1987: 62),66 the strengthening of the liberation movement subsequently 
allowing a more differentiated view to present itself. If a more differentiated view had not 
come about, the early more radical statements of Biko and Black Consciousness would have 
been in danger of emulating the stereotypical and uniform image of South African blacks, as 
well as homogenising whites, although from a position of relative weakness, not from the 
strength of the apartheid instigators.  
    Whiteness and the notions of superiority and paternalism that go with it must be dealt with 
as much as the connotations of inferiority that go with blackness if a society not based on 
notions of racial superiority and inferiority is to prevail. This is especially so because the 
underlying structures of white South African superiority, as well as white supremist feelings, 
have not fully disappeared (Hadland: xi; Woods, 2000: 217; Butler: 63). As Said 
acknowledges, it was in fact the difference or “Otherness” of blacks that enabled the different 
European nationalities to construct “whiteness” as a unifying category. Apartheid, as well as 
the similar notions of empire or colonial superiority, therefore “messes with the identity of 
both colonizer and the colonized” (Gikandi: 31, 109) and accordingly, this feeling of racial 
and cultural togetherness between whites must be broken. Perhaps initially by bringing about 
a common national consciousness as Fanon favoured (Fanon, 2004: 144) together with 
breaking up the social and residential patterns that ensure that “the social lives of Black and 
White South Africans still rarely cross” (Butler: 136), because as Black Consciousness 
maintained, “a nation [and thus any common nationalism] presupposes a voluntary and 
unified political cooperation of all the social groups within the state” (Biko, 1972: 13). 
    Otherwise many whites might well end up with one of two views of their whiteness, both 
of them racially or culturally essentialist: either a view described in the sixties by Lewis Nkosi 
as being “greatly disproportionate to the individual achievement of … white persons”, making 
it “possible for an ignorant backwoodsman in Alabama or some pathetic tramp in Trafalgar 
Square to assume, almost automatically, his superiority over any black man (Gordimer: 191), 
or a view only marginally different where obvious black achievers are given the status of 
“honorary whites”, the rest being treated as those blacks described by Nkosi.  
 
                                                 
66 Statements such as “personal contact with Whites … must be discouraged” (SASO Newsletter, August 1971, 
page 10) certainly seem excessive when seen against later more accommodating views on contact with whites. 
As mentioned previously, this change of emphasis might reflect the waning influence of white liberals and the 
equally strengthening of the black liberation movements.  
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5.1.7 Goals  
The goal of the BCM was a non-racial, non-exploitative and non-exclusive society (Biko, 
1996: 85, 139) with a “one man, one vote” type democracy and “no reference to colour” 
(Biko, 1996: 123), specific minority rights being discouraged because they implied 
“recognition of portions of the community on a race basis” (Biko, 1996: 149). Self-
sufficiency or withdrawal from white society was “not an end in itself” (Biko, 1996: 16) but 
rather a means to nurture black confidence, self-reliance and self-respect, without which 
political confrontation towards apartheid and future true integration was believed to be 
impossible: 
“Once the various groups … have asserted themselves to the point that mutual 
respect has to be shown then you have the ingredients for a true and meaningful 
integration … out of this mutual respect … there will obviously arise a genuine 
fusion of the life-styles of the various groups. This is true integration” (Biko, 
1996: 21).  
    On the other hand Biko warned that “the isolation of the black intelligentsia from the rest of 
society” (Biko, 1996: 18), “ill distribution of wealth” and “a mere change of face of those in 
governing positions”, making only “a few blacks [filter] through to the bourgeoisie” (Biko, 
1996: 149), would make any political freedom meaningless unless it was complemented by 
material and non-centralist democratic progress and the eradication of respective black and 
white complexes, as well as black dependency on whites.  
    Instead, the BCM advocated a Nyerere-inspired Black Communalism that was meant to be 
a “modified version of traditional African economic life which is geared to meet the demands 
of a highly industrialized and modern economy” (Rambally: 122).67 Black Communalism 
implied, amongst other things, the state owning the land, village cooperatives, state 
involvement as well as private initiatives and ownership on a communitarian basis in industry 
and commerce, foreign investment being discouraged, a minimum wage, state control of 
                                                 
67 Ndebele for instance acknowledged that  “blacks must set about destroying the old and static customs and 
traditions that have over the past decades made Africa the world’s human zoo and museum of human evolution 
… almost all the so-called tribal customs must be destroyed”, and that “customs and traditions are man-made, 
[and] therefore … can be changed according to whether man continues to find value in them” (Ndebele in Biko, 
1972: 26). Biko, on the other hand, concludes that certain overarching elements of traditional African culture, 
such as that the “community orientated” African culture, are preferential to “the individualism which is the 
hallmark of the capitalist approach” (Biko, 1996: 42). 
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imports and exports (Rambally: 123-125), observance of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, state-run health services and free and compulsory elementary education.68 
    The society Biko envisaged was not to be a carbon copy of the African Socialism that some 
of the post-independence African leaders advocated, Biko acknowledging the “plasticity” and 
lack of any “ultimate definition” of African Socialism (Woods, 1987: 184). The BCM 
advocated a “mixed economy”, not a socialist one, as well as encouraging some private 
undertakings that were to be complemented by worker protection “against exploitation” 
(Davies: 306; Pityana, 1992: 155; Rambally: 122-125). Biko thereby refused to “accept the 
dilemma of capitalism versus communism”, both “capitalist type of enterprises” and the 
Soviet model clearly being rejected (Woods, 1987: 122, 140; Halisi: 114) as they both were 
seen as specific cultural manifestations that deemed colonialism to be necessary. The political 
aspects of the Black Consciousness philosophy are not as detailed as the psychological and 
cultural, in part because a future South African society was to be formed in discussion with all 
relevant parties so as to form an inclusive synthesis of views (Woods, 1987: 184).  
    The means to the downfall of apartheid, as well as the successful transcendence of its 
effects that was seen as equally necessary for true integration and the eradication of such 
complexes, was to focus upon many different areas such as those of economic relations, 
education and theology (Works: 777), all areas that were tainted by apartheid conditioning. 
Overall, the means to be employed in overturning apartheid were to be non-violent, according 
to Biko, not by way of an armed struggle that was to be left to the ANC and PAC (Biko, 
1996: 134, 136; Davis: 25), “too many residues of hate into the reconstruction period” and 
“too many postrevolutionary problems” being the outcome of a violent approach (Woods, 
1987: 84). As a result, any advocacy of the “military option” or “armed combat” was strongly 
discouraged, those who persisted being expelled from the movement (Magubane: 118). This 
did not necessarily preclude taking up arms in the future as non-violence was also a tactical 
standpoint, Biko and others fearing that by openly advocating violence they would jeopardise 
the aboveground nature of the BCM (Woods, 1987: 127; Frederickson: 307), smothering the 
movement before it became strong enough to have an impact.69 The peaceful nature of the 
BCM therefore also depended on the future actions of the apartheid government (Biko, 1996: 
                                                 
68 Minutes of the Black People’s Convention 13th to 16th of December 1975, p. 15-17. 
69 Biko had perhaps heeded the advice of Sobukwe (in 1959), who, as previously mentioned diagnosed the 
downfall of the PAC as having been caused not by “its ideology but in its reckless rush to confrontation at a time 
when circumstances did not favor a black victory” (Gerhart: 285; Juckes: 121). 
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149) whose violent and uncompromising response to the Soweto uprisings can be seen to 
have brought about a “collapse of the BCM’s work-within-the-system approach” (Davis: 27).  
 
5.1.8 Influence 
The influence of the BCM can be seen as comprising two layers or parts. One part included 
influence on South African liberation as a whole, the other influence in achieving the specific 
goals it set out to realize (one of them obviously being liberation). The two parts were also 
interrelated and overlapping, the role of Black Consciousness being complimentary to that of 
the ANC and other liberation movements. Examples of this are the ANC’s military wing 
being dormant until the Soweto uprisings that reinvigorated its campaign with an infusion of 
ideas and thousands of new recruits for its military, as well as Biko’s attempt to unite the 
liberation movements that was a contributing factor to the formation of the UDF (Pityana, 
1992: 66, 101).  
    The idea that the philosophy of Black Consciousness should “develop from psychological 
unity to political unity” was forged in the mid-seventies (Pityana, 1992: 53; Woods, 1987: 
119), the movement being involved in discussions with the ANC and PAC about unifying the 
liberation movements (Biko, 1996: xii; Pityana, 1992: 54; Woods, 2000: 208) and Biko 
openly stating that he would “like to see groups like the ANC, PAC and the Black 
Consciousness Movement deciding to form one liberation group” (Biko, 1996: 148). Contact 
between the liberation movements and the idea of an all-embracing liberation group had been 
proceeding before this point in time and continued after it, however. Pityana had a history of 
ANC involvement and Winnie Mandela, “one of the few members of the ANC’s top echelon 
to embrace Black Consciousness”, had met on several occasions with Biko (Magubane: 145; 
Sampson: 274).  
    Meetings between the BCM and the ANC were continued in the late seventies, some of 
which included Thabo Mbeki in his role as ANC political secretary (Magubane: 155), as were 
calls for a united front by AZAPO in the early eighties (Seeking: 44). Biko’s “influence on 
the shift in resistance politics” towards the unity principle that he promoted, on top of the 
organisational skills that the BCM taught in workshops and leadership courses, therefore 
contributed significantly “to the success of the United Democratic Front” (Works: 777; 
Magubane: 158).  
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    These achievements notwithstanding, the major achievement of the Black Consciousness 
ideology was the extent to which it successfully helped to “diminish the element of fear in the 
minds of black people” who, prior to the manifestation of Black Consciousness in the late 
sixties were “terribly scared of involvement in politics” (Biko, 1996: 145). Black 
Consciousness produced self-confident blacks (Hirschmann: 8; Gerhart: 315) that Woods 
called “the sort of personality … that blacks had been needing in South Africa for three 
hundred years” (Woods, 1987: 53). The statements of many others, including Mandela 
speaking of a “different breed” of “brave” BCM-prisoners (Mandela, 1995: 576-577) and a 
Sowetan High School Principal claiming in 1972 that, “as little as ten years ago young blacks 
tried to emulate whites … now they have absorbed the Black is beautiful concept” (Juckes: 
148) further substantiates this.  
    This new self-confidence was an important element in the re-invigoration of the liberation 
struggle as a whole, as not only those involved in the BCM were affected by the philosophy 
of Black Consciousness, but blacks “in all walks of life”, including a majority of Africans of 
high school age in the mid-seventies (Switzer: 208, 211). The movement also influenced a 
small but influential number of whites, changing the political direction of a whole generation 
of white students by radicalising NUSAS, the student body running courses on Africanisation 
by the late seventies (Pityana, 1992: 234) and its president Eddie Webster arguing that whites 
had to make white society more receptive to change as well as work “towards a 
transformation of their own culture in an African context” (Lobban: 91). 
    As well as being spread by word of mouth, meetings, courses and the like in the townships, 
on university campuses and in high schools, the ideas of the BCM were spread to “the wider 
white liberal community and to middle-class Africans” by way of liberal newspapers, 
especially the Daily Dispatch of editor Donald Woods (Switzer: 186), as well as to a mostly 
black readership by Black Consciousness publications such as “Black review”, “Black 
Viewpoint” and the “SASO Newsletter” which, despite government attempts to disrupt them 
had sold in excess of 12,000 copies by mid-1973 (Switzer: 188).The fact that statements made 
by BCM members on trial in the 1976 SASO/BPC trial was given “wide coverage inside and 
outside South Africa” (Switzer: 207), was a further example of Black Consciousness and the 
BCM receiving attention well beyond that of its relatively limited resources and active 
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membership.70 Biko’s testimony at the trial could extraordinarily be quoted, something that 
was otherwise forbidden for a banned person, enabling his ideas to be further spread and him 
to be praised in the townships as “the authentic voice of the people” (Juckes: 147).  
    The “boisterous conduct” of the accused at the SASO-BPC trial was also an important 
contributing factor to the Soweto uprisings reviving of the liberation struggle, as was Black 
Consciousness as a whole (Davenport: 437; Woods, 1987: 119; Hirschmann: 8). Black 
Consciousness was the primary influence upon the youth involved in the planning and 
implementation of the uprising, its philosophy promoted by schoolteacher and clergy BCM 
members and in BCM programmes (Pityana, 1992: 164; Hirschmann: 9; Schuster: 54), and 
the South African Students’ Movement (SASM), members of which formed the Soweto 
Students’ Representative Council (SSRC) responsible for planning the June 16 demonstration 
that initiated the uprising, were a “direct outcome” of such BCM leadership training 
programmes. The SSRC had “roots and support” in the BCM and was virtually seen as its 
“youth contingent” (Lobban: 226; Juckes: 148; Kunnie: 34; Zwitzer: 207), Tsietsi Mashinini, 
SASM’s president being heavily influenced by Black Consciousness philosophy (Schuster: 
61). 
    Finally, many with Black Consciousness backgrounds hold or have held important 
positions in contemporary South Africa. Examples of this are Barney Pityana, Vice 
Chancellor and Principal of the University of South Africa; Mamphela Ramphele, having 
formerly served as one of the Managing Directors of the World Bank and Vice-Chancellor of 
the University of Cape Town, now holds a position as the executive chairperson of Circle 
Capital Ventures, a venture capital company that embraces black economic empowerment; 
Cyril Ramaphosa, former Secretary General of the ANC; Jay Naidoo, former Government 
Minister and member of the ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC); Frank Chikane, 
member of the ANC’s NEC and former Director General to the office of President Mbeki; 
Patrick “Terror” Lekota, member of the ANC’s NEC and Minister of Defence; Nkosazana 
Clarice Dlamini-Zuma, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Mosibudi Mangena, AZAPO President 
                                                 
70 SASO was estimated to have had between 4000 and 8000 members in 1972 and the BPC roughly the same 
number (Juckes: 141; Hirschmann: 7). There was a “remarkable growth in membership” of the BPC in the mid-
seventies according to the movement, however, the attendance of its National Congress in December 1975 
showing the BPC’s “huge following within the black community” (Rambally: 119). Like most black movements, 
the BCM operated under police harassment, barriers of organising in the homelands, lack of funds and general 
repression of apartheid South Africa. The support of the BCM was thus more “than mere formal membership 
statistics suggested” (Gerhart: 293; Hirschmann: 7) and its influence extended “far beyond the membership of its 
own organisations” (Davies: 305).  
Bikoism or Mbekism – the role of Black Consciousness in Mbeki’s South Africa 
 61 
and Minister of Science and Technology; Joel Netshitenzhe, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
of the Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) and Mbeki’s “policy 
czar” (Gumede: 315); Charles Nqakula, Minister of Safety and Security and Mojanku Gumbi, 
member of AZAPO and one of Mbeki’s key presidential advisors.  
    Having a Black Consciousness background is no guarantee for the pursuing of Black 
Consciousness goals in 2007, however. This is proven by the ANC affiliation and the implicit 
acceptance of such government policies as the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
strategy (GEAR) by many of those mentioned above, especially ministers such as AZAPO 
President Mosibudi Mangena, as well as others such as Ramphele, who claims that “GEAR 
… was the best economic policy choice we could make” (Ramphele, 2005). 
 
5.1.9 Criticism 
Throughout its history, Black Consciousness and the BCM have been roundly criticised for 
various reasons. The claims by liberals that Black Consciousness was racist or by the ANC 
that it neglected the armed struggle by building clinics and focusing on consciousness instead 
of destroying “the one and only source of our misery and oppression, namely white 
domination” (Davis: 31) are evidently inaccurate, but other critique is more debatable. 
    Some saw the BCM’s lack of a concrete outline for a future South African society, for 
instance, as “[sidestepping] the whole question of what in fact its goals were” (Semela: 13) or 
“overlook[ing] the laying down of a firm basis of principle”.71 This was particularly obvious 
in what was seen as the movement’s initial lack of any “economic perspective on the nature of 
exploitation”, although this also “reflected the censorship of Marxist literature at the tribal 
universities” as well as an unwillingness to adopt “white ideologies” such as communism 
(Heribert: Chapter 5). The problematic nature of such an omission becomes apparent when 
attempting to align the BCM’s Black Communalism with a concrete political programme. 
Even so, the fact that the ANC have not pursued the ideals of the Freedom Charter upon 
liberation might validate Biko’s position of leaving part of such a discussion open to 
wholesale bargaining (Woods, 1987: 184), as one might claim that having only a vague 
strategy was what undermined the ANC’s position, enabling it to excessively compromise its 
previously held position.72  
                                                 
71 Amandla-Matla, Newsletter of the African National Congress, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1976, page 5. 
72 The Freedom Charter was itself somewhat unclear on the implementation of specific policies in regard to post-
apartheid aims. 
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    The notion of a communalism of “community orientated action” opposed to individualism 
can be equally problematic, unless it is understood that there is no necessary dichotomy 
between individualism and communalism and that the former is in fact a necessary component 
of the latter, unless we are to end in what Ngugi called the “oppressive reactionary 
tendencies” of African pre-colonial peasant cultures. This is especially so in a South Africa 
where group identity was formalised and is still only one step away from cultural 
essentialism. The BCM in fact seemed to understand this problematic element of the 
traditional African communalism that it advocated, it clearly being meant to be a “modified 
version” where “the sacred value of the human individual [is to be the basis] for the existence 
of communities”.73 
    Others saw the “internal differences amongst blacks”, such as that of class, but also 
between men and women, as well as between cities and rural areas, being neglected by the 
movement seeing all blacks as equally oppressed (Pityana, 1992: 171). This is not altogether 
true, Ndebele for instance conceding in Black Viewpoint that “there are social divisions 
amongst the blacks … between rural and urban blacks”, and that when “a black middle class 
… was formed … class divisions were [also] formed among the blacks” (Ndebele in Biko, 
1972: 16, 21). That the movement was seemingly dominated by educated, bourgeois males 
who, to paraphrase Spivak, “speak” for the non-elite, non-male native population, can be said 
to apply equally to the ANC and PAC, thus not being a problem specifically related to the 
BCM (Pityana, 1992: 223), the BCM in fact acknowledging the “danger of the intellectual 
groups succeeding in creating a reality that would only be available to themselves” 
(Rambally: 108). 
    The BCM has also been criticised for being organisationally weak; especially for not 
succeeding in building a broad based organisation that could have taken advantage of the 
Soweto uprisings, something that many believed was due to it not being based sufficiently on 
the working classes (Frederickson: 309). Yet the BCM did attempt to build its own union in 
the seventies, the Black Allied Workers’ Union, amongst an array of other BCM-affiliated 
organisations, though the union never became a “significant force” and split into two in 1979 
(Davies: 305; Magubane: 137). Perhaps the main reason for such organisational weakness was 
that the BCM had too short a time to build a strong base, as well as its unwillingness to 
centralise along the lines of the ANC, instead turning the ANC-in-exile’s Leninist-inspired 
                                                 
73 Minutes of the Black People’s Convention 8th of July to 10th of July 1972, p. 11. 
Bikoism or Mbekism – the role of Black Consciousness in Mbeki’s South Africa 
 63 
vanguard centralism on its head (Semela: 13). Marxists conversely “often claimed to be 
annoyed by the BCM’s refusal to behave like a vanguard party” (Halisi: 116). Another reason 
for the BCM’s organisational weakness was state repression. The ANC was allowed to grow 
for decades without facing the type of harassment, bannings and imprisonment that the BCM 
faced early on, allowing it to re-emerge in the eighties. Perhaps it was therefore more 
surprising that the ANC, having a functioning military wing in Umkhonto and “urging them 
to fight on” (Ranuga: 190), failed to provide the youths of Soweto with weapons or 
assistance. 
    Finally, the distinction between the non-essentialist political use of “black”, and the more 
essentialist cultural use of “African”, where “African” is used to signify an indigenous culture 
in opposition to Western culture (Biko, 1996: 40-44, 70, 95) that was seemingly to be 
promoted as a desired national culture (Biko, 1996: 24, 69; Magubane: 85) is problematic. 
This is because it excludes Coloureds and Indians (and whites) from having a cultural part or 
stake in the liberation struggle, thereby impeding the attempt to bring about a common 
national consciousness. In seeing cultures as mutually impressionable and not solid and 
impenetrable, and in claiming that modern African culture “has used concepts from the white 
world to expand on inherent cultural characteristics” and that Western culture “has changed 
our outlook almost dramatically”, Biko seems to refute any claims to essentialism, however. 
The African cultural adaptation of Western cultural traits is seen by Biko as being 
problematic, but only as long as it meant a one-way flow where Africans were “required to fit 
in” and assimilate “standards we are not responsible for”, colonialism devouring the native 
culture (Biko, 1996: 45-46). His desire to see African culture promoted must therefore also be 
seen against the background of its denigration, African culture being negatively stereotyped in 
schools, generally presented as arrested and barbarous, and Africans allegedly having 
“nothing to boast of except lions, sex and drink” (Biko, 1996: 29, 70, 95). The emphasizing of 
African culture is consequently a means towards the end of “true integration” which will 
come about with “the fusion of the life-styles of the various groups” (Biko, 1996: 21), a sort 
of pre-Bhaba hybridity, not by multiculturalist group identities. 
 
5.1.10 Relevance today 
To be able to determine whether Black Consciousness is relevant today, an analysis of the 
way South Africa has fared under the Mbeki administration is necessary, something that will 
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be attempted in the next chapter. Nevertheless, it is possible to suggest some overarching 
areas in which Black Consciousness can still inform or develop present day South Africa. 
    Biko, by pointing out that any “change in color of the occupier does not necessarily change 
the system” (Woods, 1987: 122) and thus that true liberation requires social change, is 
alluding to the same neo-colonial tendencies that Fanon warned of. The relevance of Black 
Consciousness in a social context is therefore to be judged on whether South Africa has 
achieved real social change, as well as on the quality of Black Consciousness’ social and 
political alternatives to Mbekism.  
    According to Ramphele, although Biko “would be proud of what South Africa has been 
able to achieve … he would be saddened by where we have fallen short: … in the area of 
tackling HIV/Aids, [and] in the area of tackling the inequalities in our society” (Ramphele, 
2002). Another area in which Black Consciousness is seemingly still relevant is in that of self-
worth. Black Consciousness argued that blacks were killing and destroying themselves by 
proxy, in other words blaming themselves for their misery, not their oppressors, and that all 
South Africans needed to be freed from the conditioning of apartheid. When Pityana now 
claims that there is a “major breakdown of [contemporary South African] society” where too 
many have “lost that essence of humanity” (Pityana, 2007), he is simultaneously claiming that 
such reclaiming of humanity and de-conditioning has not been achieved.  
    Black Consciousness is furthermore relevant because is confronts what Works calls a 
“central paradox facing contemporary South African society: that of endorsing cultural 
differences while embracing a cohesive national culture”. According to Works, “Biko claimed 
that the paradox could only be solved if national bodies were unitary, not divided by race” 
(Works: 777), whereas the ANC has historically continued to define South Africa along 
ethnical lines, embracing their own particular brand of multiracialism or multiculturalism.74 
    An additional problem is that of a culturally embedded capitalism and its global extension 
globalisation that some see as having colonial or neo-colonial connotations and as being 
detrimental to Africa’s development. The question is whether Mandela and Mbeki’s claim 
that capitalism is the only viable system (Gumede: 89, 91) helps consolidate its hegemonic 
status and consequently Western imperialism, and whether African elites are accordingly 
                                                 
74 Group rights were advocated as early as 1948 by the ANC and the Freedom Charter has a clause stating, “all 
national groups should enjoy equal rights”. Mbeki’s definition of such group rights is to equate them to ethnic 
groups (Gumede: 43). Furthermore, the “right of self-determination of any community sharing a common 
cultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way” stated in section 
235 in the South African Constitution is equally focused on securing group rights.  
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simply “conveyor belts for Western capitalism”? In attempting to suggest a different path than 
that of capitalism, Black Consciousness is interesting, if for no other reason than by 
challenging the intellectual hegemony of capitalism, a new understanding of capitalist society 
that shows some of its morally objectionable aspects can be found that goes beyond realism’s 
“self-fulfilling prophecy of doom”. Understanding and challenging society is after all the first 
step towards changing it.  
    Finally, the fact that Black Consciousness establishes that the material as well as the 
cultural and psychological wrongs of colonialism/apartheid is to be eradicated makes it an 
integral approach to solving South Africa’s problems that encompasses the non-economic, 
psychological solutions as well as the economic. Until now mostly non-integrated change has 
been sought,75 but according to Fromm “one cannot separate the change in our industrial and 
political organization from that of the structure of our educational and cultural life”, because  
“no serious attempt for change and reconstruction will succeed if it is not undertaken in all 
those spheres simultaneously” (Fromm, 2002: 342; Gran: 2). That the ANC government has 
mainly dealt with redressing the material legacy of apartheid through programmes such as 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), and that even this has been done in an un-integral 
way, means that it fails to deal with the fundamental negative psychological legacies of 
apartheid. 
 
6.1 Thabo Mbeki’s South Africa 
Thabo Mbeki had been a highly influential figure inside the ANC as well as nationally for 
some time before assuming the presidency of South Africa. Although the change of the 
presidency from Mandela to Mbeki officially happened in 1999, Mbeki assumed many of the 
powers of the presidency years earlier. Whereas Mandela sought “reconciliation, compromise 
and new symbols of unity” (Gumede: 56), Mbeki is a more technocratic, “hands-on” type of 
politician that sees reconciliation as being impossible without changing society, but he lacks 
the common touch of Mandela.  
    Perceived changes of personality, style and politics aside, and they are not insignificant; the 
policies that they pursued were coordinated and similar. Mandela and Mbeki instigated the 
                                                 
75 By for instance dissociating crime from poverty or psychological complexes, or privatisation of South Africa’s 
water systems, and the subsequent increased prices of water, from health issues. The 2001 cholera outbreak, 
where people had to drink cholera-infected water because they could not afford to buy water (Nowicki, 2004), is 
an example of such interconnectedness. 
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change in policy from the nationalisation programme of the Freedom Charter76 towards 
economic conservatism and neo-liberalism in the early nineties together, to a degree acting on 
the advice of the Chinese and Vietnamese governments who had made similar changes in 
policy at that time, seemingly proving the uselessness of going against a neo-liberal 
hegemony that was partially caused by the recession of the early nineties (Gumede: 68, 70, 
81; Robins: 3). Mandela accordingly told the American Joint Houses of Congress in 1994 
“the free market was a ‘magical elixir’ that would produce freedom and equality for all” 
(Saul, 2005: 205). 
 
6.2 Short biography of Thabo Mbeki 
Thabo Mbeki was born in 1942, his father Govan being a prominent figure in the ANC and 
the SACP. Mbeki grew up as a member of the “liberation aristocracy” (Jacobs: 6), attending 
Lovedale in 1955, joining ANCYL and the SACP, and becoming a leading member of the 
latter before falling out with SACP leader Joe Slovo in the seventies and renouncing 
communism in the mid-eighties.77 Mbeki was sent into exile in 1962, studying economics at 
Sussex University until 1968, after which he was sent to the Soviet Union for military training 
in 1969. He was elected to the ANC’s NEC in 1975, becoming Oliver Tambo’s understudy 
and closest advisor and taking over many of Tambo’s duties after the former suffered a stroke 
in 1989. This led many to see Mbeki’s ascent to the top of the ANC as favouritism (Gumede: 
37). Mbeki’s pragmatism, moderation and intelligence were, along with Mandela’s ditto, 
central to the willingness of De Klerk’s National Party to discuss and eventually reform South 
Africa (Jacobs: 9). Mbeki is “respected rather than loved” (Lodge: 241), although considered 
one of the “most important leaders of his generation”, a “spokesman for the developing 
world” as well as a “key political partner” of the USA (Jacobs: 5).  
 
6.2.1 Style of leadership and democratic credentials 
Mbeki has an “elitist, top-down” and “managerial style” of leadership (Jacobs: 267; Hadland: 
94) that is much less open to criticism than his predecessors Tambo and Mandela. Junior 
                                                 
76 The change from nationalisation to neo-liberalism was initiated at the top of the ANC. Mayibuye, an ANC-
published newsletter, however, spoke for much of the ANC in 1990 prior to the u-turn of the party leadership by 
stressing the need to “campaign against privatisation”. The implications of privatisation were seen in Mayibuye 
to be that “many will lose their jobs”, “the poorer sections of our community will suffer” and “a new democratic 
government will not have aces to resources to implement its policies”. Mayibuye, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1990, pp. 26-28. 
77 In 1984 Mbeki declared, “The ANC is not a socialist party. It has never pretended to be one” (Mbeki, 1984: 
609).  
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members of the ANC dared to criticise or reprimand the latter two but not Mbeki, who is 
almost never challenged by those inside the ANC (Gumede: 296-297). There are different 
cultures and traditions within the ANC that explain such different approaches to leadership: 
The intellectual and centrist “exiles”, the consensually minded “elders”, the South African 
and grassroots-based (trade unions and civic groups) “inziles”78 and the disciplinarian former 
Umkhonto soldiers (Gumede: 32, 40). The internal differences in the ANC can largely be seen 
to be along these lines. The secrecy, centralised control and intolerance of dissent that the 
exiles, most of whom have been trained “in the radical Leninist school of thought that gives 
primacy to the role of a vanguard party” (Jacobs: 20), had adopted for security reasons won 
the day in the ANC, especially after Mbeki became president (Saul, 2005: 234).  
    Mbeki based his leadership of the ANC and South Africa on “the three Cs: control, 
coordination and centralisation” (Gumede: 129). Examples of this are Mbeki denouncing the 
TRC-report without having read it (Gumede: 64; Meredith: 659), lengthening the period 
between party conferences to five years79 (Gumede: 131) and increasingly forming policy 
centrally as well as externally with Western consultants (Gumede: 135). Lack of transparency, 
lack of criticism, the prevalence of “yes-men and –women” inside the ANC combined with 
persecution and harassment of those who dare to disagree (Gumede: 294-295; Bond, 2004), as 
well as Mbeki’s “you are with us or against us” attitude (Gumede: 167) are further examples 
of this.  
    This inflexibility is offset by his tendency to change his rhetoric according to the audience 
he addresses, Mbeki at one time or other having championed ideologies such a communism, 
liberalism and Africanism (Saul, 2005: 249; Hadland: 130). All this is harmful to the 
democratic nature of the ANC as well as to the nation. The outspoken criticism by such 
bodies as ANCYL, and to a lesser degree the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), has previously been subdued (Gumede: 
297, 299; Basedau: 95), although there has recently been an increasingly vocal criticism of 
government policies and unprecedented voicing of differences of opinion inside the tripartite 
alliance.80 Outside the ANC criticism is more openly voiced, opposition groups for instance 
claiming that the ANC is “building the foundations of a new authoritarianism” (Butler: 119) 
                                                 
78 The “inziles” were the ANC’s internal wing, as opposed to the “exiles”. 
79 Most other parties hold party conferences annually or at least bi-annually.  
80 “Vavi: We’ll take over the ANC”, Mail & Guardian 9th of March 2007; “ANC under pressure to tilt left”, Mail 
& Guardian 26th of April 2007;  “Cosatu speaks for the ANC”, Mail & Guardian 2nd of March 2007. 
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and the media portraying Mbeki as an “arch-manipulator” (Jacobs: 12). Some of this criticism 
seems to come from whites disgruntled with the fact that South Africa has a black 
government, however, enabling Mbeki to dismiss them as having “an European mindset” 
(Jacobs: 12).  
    Others compare Mbeki with post-independence African heads of state such as Nkrumah 
and Mugabe who came to adopt what Fanon warned against, namely liberation movements 
going from being all-encompassing organisations to pursuing the interests of narrow groups 
by patronage, awarding blind loyalty and stamping out dissent by intimidation or by calling 
critics imperialists or reactionaries. Even so, most see claims that South Africa is akin to a 
one-party state or that corruption is pervasive as incorrect, levels of corruption for instance 
being significantly lower than they were under apartheid (Gumede: 236, 238).81 Hence what is 
worth criticising is not the level of corruption or patronage or the regimentation of views in 
South Africa, but that these tendencies seem to be growing under the leadership of the ANC 
(Woods, 2000: 216),82 seen in occurrences such as the apartheid-era-like use of intelligence 
agents to intimidate dissenters (Gumede: 299).  
    In this respect it is a democratic problem that South Africans who do not wish to have their 
views represented by Mbeki’s elitist neo-liberalism have virtually nowhere to go,83 unless 
they are to believe that the ANC will carry out the policies of the left-leaning Policy 
Discussion Documents (PDD)84 or embrace the more or less openly Marxist views of the 
                                                 
81 South Africa is ranked 51st by Transparency International’s 2006 Corruption Perception Index. 
82 For instance because of what Ramphele calls the “patronage” and “politisation of appointments at many levels 
of our civil service”; “In no state to help the nation grow”, Business Day, 10th of April 2007. 
83 The main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, recommends economic policies not unlike those of 
Mbeki’s ANC such as “sensible streamlining of government departments”, opening the door and smoothing the 
path “for foreign investors” (p.2) and “lower corporate tax rates” (p.6) in its alternative 2007 budget (“Budgeting 
for Growth, Jobs and Opportunity, the Democratic Alliance’s Alternative Budget 2007”). The only other large 
party, Inkatha, maintains, “the IFP’s socially responsible free market policies are substantially represented in the 
government’s [GEAR] programme”. Some smaller parties, however, such as the United Democratic Movement 
(lead by Bantu Holomisa, former Transkei leader and ANC deputy minister), believe that “blindly imitating neo-
liberal policies … is damaging our economy” (UDM Manifesto 2004, p. 7).  
84 The Policy Discussion Documents (PDD) represents a significant jump to the left compared to previous ANC-
policy. The documents recommend “considerable room to debate the appropriate framework for macro-
economic policy”, including a review of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution strategy (GEAR) (PDD, 
Economic Transformation p.3, 17), as well as increased social spending. That “economic transformation requires 
a stable macro-economic environment” is still recognised, however (PDD, Economic Transformation p.17), 
although the PDD’s are seen by some as a “move toward social democracy”; “South Africa circa 2010”, Mail & 
Guardian 22nd of March 2007. Whether these discussion documents will become ANC policy will be decided at 
a national policy conference in late June 2007 from which recommendations will form the basis of a larger 
debate at the national conference of the ANC in December 2007. 
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miniscule opposition parties available who do not embrace ANC-like liberalism.85 As far as 
the PDD’s are concerned, firstly its core ambitions are not different from the present ones: to 
retain control over every part of South Africa, secondly it is always wiser to judge any party 
on the merit of its actual policy and achievements rather than on its promises.  
    The forming of a new party, representing the largely voiceless poor masses that are no 
longer sufficiently represented by the ANC (Gumede: 252), is thus important to present South 
Africans with a truly representative democratic choice, unless one-party-ism disguised as a 
multi-party-ism of multiple parties, one economic policy, is to abound, something growing 
voter alienation indicates could already be happening (Gumede: 253). Sustainable democracy 
and voter participation depends upon a choice of alternative policies, not merely that of 
alternative parties or governments if it is to retain legitimacy.  
    This is especially true in Africa where many opposition parties have sought mainly the 
power of the presidency, not a change of policy.86 Such a tendency can also be seen amongst 
South Africa’s opposition parties,87 and could ultimately lead to the absence of democratic 
legitimacy and growing voter alienation. That growing voter alienation might show not only 
discontent with the government and lack of a credible opposition, but with a democratic 
system that is seen as elite-driven, makes it a threat to South African democracy. Poor South 
Africans see democracy as being tied to economic advancement and redistribution of wealth 
(Butler: 165), and perhaps voter alienation is therefore not caused by de-politicisation as such 
but by a wish to embrace a more participatory bottom-up approach to politics that goes 
beyond voting every four years but sees such participation as “an essential part of the process 
of getting the economic agenda right”(Ake, 1993: 241-242). It is the outcome of this, along 
with the question of voter involvement in South Africa’s democracy, that will more than 
                                                 
85 The Africanist and Marxist parties only have a total of four seats out of four hundred in the South African 
parliament (the PAC three, AZAPO one and SOPA none). AZAPO have a certain influence by way of Minister 
of Science and Technology Mosibudi Mangena, although he, as mentioned in chapter 5.2, has implicitly 
accepted the neo-liberal GEAR by joining the government. 
86 Thomson refers to such parties as “vanity parties”, elections being fought “between personalities rather than 
ideas” (Thomson: 237). A clear-cut example hereof is the Kenyan election of 1992 where President Moi won the 
election because of amongst other things the opposition’s refusal to unite behind a single candidate, instead 
forming a multitude of such “vanity parties”. According to Meredith, “the contestants were interested not so 
much in the democratic process or policy issues as the chance to occupy State House” (Meredith: 403). 
87 Some of South Africa’s opposition parties, such as the United Democratic Movement of Bantu Holomisa or 
the Independent Democrats of Patricia de Lille, are essentially “vanity parties” that have “charismatic leaders, 
but no effective party structures” (Gumede: 249), Gumede insisting that “it makes little sense for South Africa to 
have so many splinter groups vying for the opposition vote”, especially given that “their election platform differ 
only marginally from one another” (Gumede: 251). 
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anything determine whether South African citizens will ultimately react positively or 
negatively to post-apartheid democracy in the long run.  
    A decentralisation of politics has already been seen in the growing of single-cause protest 
movements, grass roots initiatives or interest groups such as the Anti-Privatization Forum, the 
Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign and the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee (Butler: 
113-115; Saul, 2005: 253). The growing popular protest movement is presently mostly 
restricted to specific issues and consequently lacks “a clearly articulated ideological 
alternative” to elitist neo-liberalism such as that of Mbeki (Rahman, 2004: 14), but the fact 
that it exists is proof of a desire for a more participatory democratic and less elite-driven 
South Africa.  More worryingly is the increasing use of violence by poor South Africans, or 
of what Greg Ruiters88 calls “collective bargaining by riot” (Zabalaza, 2006: 5), acting out 
their dissatisfaction instead of voting. Both such forms of protest, single-cause and violent or 
aimless, will probably continue unless a viable alternative to the present political set-up 
appears, because where single-cause movements can be a necessary complimentary force to 
formalised democracy, as they are in many Western countries, and an important force where 
democracy is less functional, they are no substitute for actual democratic participation.  
    Any new party that wishes to change these tendencies could be formed by a combination of 
grassroots organisations, as well as from within the ANC’s tripartite organisation by 
disgruntled members of the once syndicalist-orientated COSATU (Bond, 1996: 25; Mbah: 
Chapter 4), the SACP and the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), all of 
whom have recently criticised the neo-liberal policies of Mbeki’s ANC, as well as having 
toyed with the idea of a left-wing party (Gumede: 264, 267-268, 271, 278). Criticism by 
prominent non-aligned South Africans such as liberation veteran Desmond Tutu might make 
the formation of such a party easier by removing this sentimental attachment, although many 
believe that “prospects for multi-partyism appear to dim” (Basedau: 95). This is especially so 
because COSATU and the SACP currently seem intent to work as a sort of internal opposition 
inside the tripartite alliance to try and change the way the alliance operates,89 and move the 
                                                 
88 Greg Ruiters is a local government specialist and Senior Lecturer in Political Studies at Rhodes University. 
89 “Cosatu, SACP eye alliance changes”, Mail & Guardian 29th of March 2007; “Cosatu: Don’t forget the poor”, 
Mail & Guardian 27th of April 2007. 
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ANC towards the left,90 although whether they will succeed in doing this by supporting the 
more populist than leftist Jacob Zuma to become president of the ANC is doubtful.91  
    Mbeki needs COSATU and the SACP as “shock absorbers to contain dissent” with the 
ANC’s neo-liberal policies (Gumede: 260, 272), which is why he uses all means to keep the 
two organisations inside the tripartite alliance. But the need to voice the concerns of the poor 
is important for the country as a whole if the potentially imminent “full-blown and 
devastating uprising of the poor” (Gumede: 289), potentially along ethnic lines, is not to 
happen. In this respect, remarks by supporters of Jacob Zuma that there is an anti-Zulu 
conspiracy to deny him the Presidency92 as well as Zuma’s own alleged “ethnic 
nationalism”93 is not reassuring, especially if such resentment along ethnic lines continues 
during a possible Zuma Presidency. 
    The probability of a credible opposition party being formed or the future success of such a 
party furthermore depends on the level of satisfaction with Mbeki’s ANC-led government. 
There are different views on this, some finding that amongst other things decreasing voter 
turnouts prove that there is “limited trust in the President … [and] parliament” and a growing 
disaffection with the ANC, life being seen by an increasing number as “better under the 
apartheid regime” (Butler: 107; Suzman, 2004; Bond, 2004). Others find that Mbeki’s 
personal performance ratings are high, and that poorer South Africans have “a higher level of 
trust in the president’s ability” than the middle classes or affluent South Africans.94 
 
6.3 Politics and ideology 
Mbeki’s apparent change of ideology and his technocrat approach do not necessarily mean 
that he does not have a consistent ideological outlook. Mbeki’s apparent ideological u-turn in 
for instance the AIDS debate might be said to hide a more coherent ideological outlook that 
Jacobs calls Mbekism (Jacobs: 19). According to Jacobs, Mbekism combines African 
nationalist inclinations, seen in Mbeki’s promotion of the “African Renaissance” with that of 
orthodox economic neo-liberalism and centralist Leninist-derived, top-down leadership. This 
might explain the apparent changes in political outlook, from communist to liberalist and 
                                                 
90 “Cosatu says it wants ANC to move left”, Mail & Guardian 1st of March 2007. 
91 “ANC under pressure to tilt left”, Mail & Guardian 26th of April 2007; “Shape ANC policy, Zuma tells 
workers”, Business Day, 2nd of May 2007. 
92 “Buthelezi warns against ethnic war”, Mail & Guardian 8th of October 2006. 
93 “South Africa: Bad Nationalism a Threat to Freedom of Expression”, Cape Argus 8th of April 2007; “SA’s 
leaders have cynically used nationalism for their own ends”, Business Day 13th of April 2006. 
94 “Poll shows Mbeki trusted by three in five”, Mail and Guardian, 9th of February 2007. 
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Africanist, the change being not a full-scale renouncement of the former standpoint, but rather 
a combination that absorbs certain elements of all three ideologies, although others see 
Mbeki’s policies as based on an entirely pragmatic or strategic outlook (Jacobs: 263; Hadland: 
130).  
    The purpose of chapter 6.3 in its entirety is to discuss the important aspects and 
manifestations of Mbekism and how it helps or inhibits the overturning of South Africa’s 
legacy of apartheid, especially regarding economic inequality and feelings of black inferiority. 
The specific areas that I have seen as being most important in this regard are Mbeki’s 
championing of an African Renaissance, his economic liberalism exemplified by GEAR, his 
attempted redistribution by way of Black Economic Empowerment, his AIDS policy, his 
policies towards Africa exemplified in those against Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, and his non-
racialism. 
 
6.3.1 African Renaissance 
Although Mbeki has toyed with the idea of an African Renaissance since the seventies 
(Hunter-Gault: 62), this idea precedes him. It has been a common theme in colonial Africa 
since the fifties (Meredith: 676), as well as inside South Africa, seen in the establishment of a 
nationwide Black Renaissance Convention95 and Action Committee in 1974 (Maloka: 11) and 
Mandela’s statement in 1994 that blacks had to transform their plight themselves, there being 
“no obstacle big enough to stop us bringing about an African Renaissance” (Meredith: 676). It 
must nevertheless be acknowledged that the credibility the notion of an African Renaissance 
has recently achieved, it having “an almost liturgical status in South African public life” 
(Lodge: 227-230), as well as having been promoted continent-wide, is mostly the work of 
Mbeki. 
    The idea of an African Renaissance is essentially a “neo-pan-Africanist mantra” (Hunter-
Gault: 63) that advocates African self-reliance and self-sufficiency, disapproving of what its 
advocates see as the neo-colonial “begging bowl” policies of the past and present that rely to 
heavily on outside, mainly Western, aid and assistance. It is also an admission of “not 
[having] travelled very far with regard to the projection of frightening images of savagery that 
attend the continent of Africa”, the dogma of (negative) African exceptionalism continuing to 
“weigh down the African mind and spirit” (Mbeki, 1998).  
                                                 
95 Pro Veritate, Vol. 13, No. 12, 1975, p. 18-19. 
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    As Kwame Anthony Appiah argues, all such pan-Africanist arguments imply “the notion, 
whether explicit or implicit, of Africa as a racialized essence” (Brown: 762), the idea of the 
African Renaissance therefore being simultaneously inclusive and exclusive, although others 
such as Ramphele “laud him [Mbeki] for having taken on the challenge of giving Africa a 
face of hope … that initiative [the African Renaissance], if it were to reach its full potential, 
can make a huge difference … to the whole continent” (Ramphele, 2002). 
    The NEPAD programme is an attempt to substantiate as well as facilitate the idea of the 
African Renaissance (Meredith: 679), it having been adopted as the economic development 
programme of the African Union, advocating sustainable growth and development, 
integration into the global economy, poverty eradication and the empowerment of women, as 
well as African integration and ownership. NEPAD’s underlying principles of a commitment 
to Good Governance, democracy, human rights and conflict resolution further recognise that 
such principles are fundamental to the creation of an environment that will promote 
investment and long-term economic growth.96 The attempted unification of Africa that saw 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) replaced with the African Union is equally 
consistent with the ideas of the African Renaissance, as is Mbeki’s attempted mediation in 
African conflicts, some deemed successes, such as those in the Ivory Coast and initially 
Congo (Hunter-Gault: 81, 103), others, such as Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy” in Zimbabwe, 
deemed failures.  
    Critics argue that NEPAD is a form of African sub-imperialism, that it narrows the scope of 
the African Renaissance, foreign donors and investors being more likely to be benefactors of 
the trade liberalisation that NEPAD advocates than the African peoples, and that NEPAD fails 
to address human rights or AIDS or be able to solve crisis situations such as that in Zimbabwe 
(Maloka: 7; Gumede: 212, Saul, 2005: 213). They maintain that although the implicit 
acknowledgement of NEPAD that Africa’s problems are not solely self-inflicted and that 
solutions to them are to be found inside Africa promises a solution that does not necessarily 
look to the West for answers or aid, NEPAD might “just as easily have been framed in the 
offices of the World Bank and IMF” (Saul, 2005: 252).97 The left wing of the ANC sees the 
                                                 
96 www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php 
97 According to the UK Foreign Office, development-wise, “we are dancing to their tune, but at least it is our 
own dance!” (Gumede: 206), and to former United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, right-
wing Republican Walter Kansteiner  (George W. Bush’s “Africa hand”, responsible for U.S. foreign policy in 
Africa, as well as an avowed proponent of privatisation, private sector involvement, free trade and market 
liberalisation) NEPAD is “philosophically spot-on” (Bond, 2004).  
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African Renaissance as being “mostly about words” (Herwitz: 187; Gumede: 203), criticising 
the fact that NEPAD essentially advances an economic liberalism that does not solve the 
concrete problems encountered by the poor masses.  
    Such critics see the features of the African Renaissance as deliberately vague and “high on 
sentiment, low on substance” (Maloka: 2, 36; Jacobs: 125) and meant to distract attention 
from the real problems facing the country, poverty and unemployment, by “inflating words 
with the illusion of political force” (Herwitz: 187). According to such reasoning, any African 
renaissance “must end the economic discrimination the continent faces” (Jacobs: 130) to 
accomplish any real changes, its success being interconnected with that of economic and 
political advancement (Ramphele, 2003).98 Whilst this is recognised by Mbeki, the fact is that 
the economic policies of NEPAD and the GEAR will probably not achieve such 
advancement. The African Renaissance might end up not benefiting those blacks that are 
meant to benefit from it, but instead ironically being “the best thing that has happened to 
South Africa’s (still overwhelmingly white) capital in a long time” (Jacobs: 115-116). One 
can therefore criticise the imitative nature of Mbeki’s economic liberalism for counteracting 
or contradicting the “proud” Africanism of the African Renaissance.  
 
6.3.2 Economic liberalism 
The early nineties, in which the ANC outlined the policies that would move it from liberation 
movement to potential government party, was an era of liberal hegemony, caused by the 
downfall of socialism in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, and the beginning of the globalisation 
era.99 Mbeki had already inherited Tambo’s and Harold Wilson’s social democratic ideology 
and came to adopt the “Third Way” of Tony Blair100 that demanded “less government, 
                                                 
98 According to Ramphele, “the ghost of racism will not be laid to rest unless we actively invest in addressing the 
unseemly socio-economic inequalities. Inequalities perpetuate an inferiority complex amongst the majority of 
black people, and a superiority amongst some white people in our society” (Ramphele, 2003). 
99 According to Amin, the reason neo-liberalism became the prevalent ideology was because of the crisis of 
Keynesian, statist capitalism and socialism, “the void created by this double crisis [leading] to a conservative 
offensive of so-called neo-liberalism” (Amin: 51). The success of East Asian countries such as South Korea 
threatened the logic and hegemony of neo-liberalism (Bond, 2000: 251). 
100 As had Blair, Mbeki professed a certain affinity for Thacherism, as when exclaiming “just call me a 
Thacherite” upon the launch of GEAR in 1996 (Saul, 2005: 249). Mbeki not only copied Blair’s policies but also 
the habit of “talking left” while “acting right” (Gumede: 125; Bond, 2000: 195), as well as employing some of 
Blair’s political advisors (Gumede: 127). 
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market-related delivery, greater distance from unions and close proximity to business”101 and 
the market being the main source of social improvement (Gumede: 39, 64; Jacobs: 258).  
    Mbeki thus sought “a compromise between globalisation and social democracy”, although 
this compromise is increasingly undermined by “dependence on global forces” (Carmody: 
261). As had Blair, the ANC felt they had to prove to the business community that they were 
economically sound. The ANC had to prove that a black-led South Africa would be a secure 
place in which to invest or continue investing (Gumede: 73), as well as having to clean up the 
economic mess left by the Nationalists (Meredith: 649). Adopting stringent macroeconomic 
policies, amongst which an independent South African Reserve Bank (Central Bank) was 
paramount, was part of this, as was IMF loans with conditions of “prudent economic policies” 
such as marked-led policies, wage controls, cutting government spending and trade and 
industrial liberalisation (Gumede: 77; Bond, 2003: 144).  
    The significant change from the developmental Reconstruction and Distribution 
Programme (RDP)102 in 1996 to the neo-liberal Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
strategy (GEAR) further proved that the ANC saw the establishment of macroeconomic 
stability, fiscal discipline, economic growth and foreign investment, as more important than, 
or as a precondition for, redistribution (Gumede: 87; Butler: 50; Basedau: 95). GEAR is in 
effect the RDP on its head, attempting to achieve redistribution through growth and not 
growth through redistribution, as had the RDP.103 GEAR was planned in virtual secrecy 
together with the World Bank and the IMF (Gumede: 90; World Bank: 19; Adelzadeh: 67), 
but in effect the World Bank, IMF and WTO did not impose GEAR’s Structural Adjustment-
like policies (Gumede: 88; Bond, 2000: 189; Saul, 2005: 207) of trade liberalisation, tax-cuts 
and none-progressive tax restructuring, and privatisation (GEAR: 2, appendix 12; Saul, 2005:  
 
                                                 
101 The ANC disavowed “public expenditure driven growth” and “large-scale government spending” because 
they believed it would lead to “poor long term growth and employment prospects” (GEAR: appendix 5).  
102 The RDP was based on a people-driven approach to achieving growth through redistribution (Gumede: 133) 
and was conceived and championed by the left, especially COSATU (Gumede: 257; Basedau: 94). The overall 
ideology of the RDP was built “on the [mixed economy] tradition of the Freedom Charter” (RDP Policy 
Framework: preface, 4.2.1), making “attacking poverty and deprivation  … the first priority of a democratic 
government” (1.2.9), as well as advocating, “increasing the public sector in strategic areas through, for example, 
nationalisation” (4.2.5.1).  
103 The goals of the RDP were nevertheless a compromise between the expectations of the masses and those of 
the ruling classes, vague on how such measures of redistribution were to be financed. GEAR can therefore be 
seen both as building upon the RDP (World Bank: 4), and as a “substantive abandonment of the RDP as 
originally formulated” (Adelzadeh: 67). 
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249; Gumede: 90, 105-111) on South Africa, although some pressure was applied.104 The 
ANC’s claim that its policies were dictated by globalisation (Bond, 2001: 418; Gumede: 89, 
91) and that they were powerless to the influences of the marketplace are countered by such 
“pre-emptive” economic liberalism that often went beyond the demands of the multi-laterals, 
although for the poor who saw no difference in their lives, it probably makes no difference 
whether World Bank or IMF conditionality or ANC non-negotiability (Gumede: 90)105 
instigated such policies. 
    The fact that GEAR was also similar to the economic policy of the National Party outlined 
in a document released in 1993 and that of the Maastricht Treaty does not exactly weaken 
calls of (self-inflicted) neo-colonialism either (Gumede: 88; African Communist, 1996). On 
the other hand, Mbeki says he wants to reform the international system (Bond, 2001: 416) and 
“promote a global financial system more favourable to developing countries”106 to end the 
dominance of what he sees as the North’s lack of “human solidarity” (Bond, 2001: 418). This 
reformism of the ANC in government seems in stark contrast to the radicalism of the ANC as 
a liberation movement, the goal of the latter being to dismantle, not reform, apartheid. Maybe 
this is due to Mbeki seeing globalisation as “an objective outcome” and “technological 
determinism” (Bond, 2001: 419), not a deliberately imposed strategy, therefore seeking only 
to reform it by for instance democratising the IMF and World Bank and allowing the 
developing nations to join the present international system on more equal terms, not 
overturning it (Bond, 2001: 426-427).  
    Even though macroeconomic stability was achieved in some areas107 and productivity has 
risen (Gumede: 99, 111), neither foreign nor local investment in South Africa flourished as 
promised, and nor was growth increase satisfactory (Butler: 48), disproving the logic of trade 
                                                 
104 The ANC was pressurised by the World Bank and IMF, Western governments, as well as by national 
businesses such as Anglo American to adopt market friendly policies in the early and mid-nineties (Gumede: 
72). Although many in the ANC initially “had a strongly negative image” of the World Bank (World Bank: 19), 
several ANC staffers, including present Minister of Finance Trevor Manuel, took part in “abbreviated executive 
training programmes” at amongst other places the World Bank where they were “fed a steady diet of neo-liberal 
ideas” (Gumede: 72, 74). South Africa’s relatively low debt level meant, however, that it had “more freedom to 
pursue a heterodox development strategy” if it had chosen to do so (Carmody: 257). This is especially so since 
“the danger of retribution” from the multi-laterals for non-compliance with neo-liberal policies has waned in 
recent years (Bond, 2003: 275).  
105 “Finance Minister Trevor Manuel immediately declared the Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR) plan ‘non-negotiable’ in its broad outline” (African Communist, 1996).  
106 “Towards Ten Years of Freedom: Summary”, The South African Presidency, 2003, p.9. 
107 Mostly in those areas crucial to big business such as inflation and fiscal deficit, the currency crashes and 
interest rate increases in the mid to late nineties undermining claims of having achieved overall macroeconomic 
stability (Bond, 2004).  
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liberalisation.108 Seen against the background of failure of privatisation, rising unemployment, 
lost job opportunities, deindustrialisation, capital flight, tuition fees that make higher 
education unaffordable for most blacks,109 cuts in welfare,110 user fees that bring about 
disconnecting of electricity and water, and rising income differentials; GEAR must be seen as 
a failure by its own standards, as well as by those of development and redistribution 
(Gumede: 85, 92, 107, 109, 215; Bond, 2000: 193; Saul, 2005: 209; Butler: 65, 67). This is 
perhaps unsurprising as GEAR “provided no targets for reducing inequality”, seeing 
education and job creation combined with “restricting wage increases” and non-universal, 
sector-determined minimum wages “as the main avenue for income redistribution” (Marais: 
171; Adelzadeh: 84; GEAR: 19). The inherent contradictions and non integral nature of 
GEAR is here glaringly obvious, as public expenditure, including educational expenditure, 
was simultaneously to be cut and public sector jobs were to be discarded because of required 
“reductions in the fiscal deficit” (Marais: 172; Adelzadeh: 92; GEAR: appendix 12, 14). 
Besides, the fact that tax cuts were given to the middle classes and corporate South Africa and 
a 43.8 billon Rand arms deal negotiated made arguments that South Africa must retain 
economic stringency because of having to achieve macroeconomic stability prior to being 
able to afford welfare sound rather hollow (Gumede: 111).  
    That the Structural Adjustment-like advice of the World Bank and IMF has been part of the 
reason for South Africa’s relatively poor economic results (Gumede: 100) should not come as 
a surprise to Mbeki, however, as Structural Adjustment policies have often had dire results in 
developing countries (Gumede: 108; Cypher: 518-520; Madeley: 58; Saul, 2005: 207),111 
                                                 
108 “Investment in South Africa has been low … compared with successful developing countries”  (16-17% of 
GDP by 2003/04), little of it being in greenfield projects, and the country has actually suffered “a net outflow” of 
investment in the first ten years of ANC government (Bond, 2003: 141). South Africa has nevertheless achieved 
its highest growth levels during the past couple of years (Mbeki, 2007). South Africa is ranked 122nd by the CIA 
World Factbook’s investment as % of GDP ranking.  
109 GEAR demands “reductions in subsidisation” and “greater private sector involvement in higher education” 
because of a “need to contain [education] expenditure” (GEAR: 15). 
110 That GEAR refers to as “restructuring the welfare system” and “scaling down of activities which cannot be 
provided to all or which could be undertaken effectively by the private sector” (GEAR: 10).  
111 According to Heine Marais, “there exists no example internationally where neo-liberal adjustments of the sort 
championed by GEAR have produced a socially progressive outcome” (Marais: 171). The success of the 
Southeast Asian and East Asian countries such as South Korea and Japan “contradict the efficacy of financial 
liberalization” (Marais: 170) as they were based on “conscious state involvement such as subsidies, tariffs, 
selective construction of infrastructure, labor training and prohibitive trade restrictions”, as well as investment in 
education and health services (Cypher: 85, 208; Lundkvist: 33; Martinussen, 2002: 138) and simultaneous 
growth and decreasing inequality (Adelzadeh: 85). South Korea achieved “tenfold growth of per capita income 
… in three decades” with “heavy doses of government involvement”. According to Joseph Stiglitz the financial 
turmoil of the nineties that left South Korea’s and other East Asian countries’ economy in trouble were “in part 
… the result of departing from the strategies that have served these countries so well” (Chomsky: 32). 
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although Structural Adjustment often turns out to be a good idea for the companies of those 
(Western) countries who advocate the programmes. Liberalisation, privatisation and the 
selling off of state-owned assets that SAP’s entail is problematic for countries such as South 
Africa because of the resulting limited control over resources and social and educational 
services needed by the poor and because these measures only address the symptoms and not 
the underlying reasons for Africa’s socio-economic crisis such as low production capacity. 
    A “GEAR shift” has been announced by the ANC where the focus will be more on the 
social problems of the country, macroeconomic stability having allegedly been achieved and 
foreign investment in South Africa having been disappointing (Gumede: 116). Should this 
happen, it will surely be more than welcome by those many South Africans who have not 
benefited socially and economically from the post-apartheid era, although Mbeki has claimed 
until now that they are to be solved without “tampering with GEAR” (Gumede: 117). If the 
policies of the ANC’s 2007 “Policy Discussion Documents” are implemented as actual policy 
by the ANC government, however, such a “GEAR shift” could indeed be underway. 
    Besides, part of the whole reasoning behind GEAR is more ideological than economic. 
Together with Mbeki’s African Renaissance, the neo-liberalism of GEAR amounts to what 
Xolela Mangcu112 calls a “liberal Africanism” that unwaveringly adheres to individualism 
(Mangcu: 6). Privatisation is thus used as a tool to advance black interests and self-assurance 
by kick-starting the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programme, offloading 
government owned companies cheaply to blacks (Gumede: 107, 109; Carmody: 264). 
 
6.3.3 Black Economic Empowerment 
Given the discriminatory nature of apartheid at all levels of society, some form of affirmative 
action that complements the overall economic strategy is generally deemed necessary to 
enable more social cohesion and to unravel the structural inequities of South African society 
(Butler: 143; Alexander: 5; Arnold: 19), at least as a transitional programme.113 The question 
                                                 
112 Xolela Mangcu was previously a Director of the Steve Biko Foundation and is currently a Visiting Fellow in 
the Public Intellectual Life Project of the University of the Witwatersrand. 
113 The South African Constitution allows affirmative action at a level probably higher than anywhere else in the 
world, both public and private institutions being forced to become more racially representative, in stating that, 
“to promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, 
or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken” (section 9). The affirmative 
action programme in South Africa is not seen as being transitional by everyone, some seeing it as a more 
permanent feature. Labour Minister Membathisi Mdladlana thus claims that, “contrary to Parliamentary calls by 
opposition Democratic Alliance (DA), affirmative action and current employment equity legislation would never 
be repealed but would be intensified instead”, Mail & Guardian 4th of March 2007. 
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is therefore not if some form of affirmative action is necessary, but if the ANC’s particular 
solution to this problem, the Black Economic Empowerment programme (BEE), is helping to 
achieve broad-scale black advancement and social cohesion.  
    While accepting this as a point of departure, there are psychological aspects of affirmative 
action that are problematic, namely that it can “reinforce racial identification” (Zegeye: 340), 
create a culture of black entitlement and be seen as applying lower standards to blacks than to 
whites. Whilst affirmative action and BEE are understandable from a socio-economic point of 
view, they are thus problematic from a psychological, in so far as respective black and white 
inferiority and superiority complexes have not disappeared.  
    Others have criticised BEE as being “reverse racism” (Hunter-Gault: 49) and a “short-
sighted approach” (Melville: 22) that is perpetuating racial identities by its preoccupation with 
racial quotas, whites, and to a lesser degree Coloureds and Indians, feeling discriminated 
against job-wise, and senior jobs sitting “unfilled because no one’s willing to employ a 
white”.114 Still others see it as akin to the self-empowerment drive of the Afrikaners after the 
Boer War, and a “necessary first step toward deracialisation of the economy” (Hunter-Gault: 
53), accusations of “racism” being seen to belittle the severity of the impact of apartheid, as 
well as the white racist affirmative action it pursued. Both sides might have a point; 
affirmative action being necessary, but that the actual effects of the policies of BEE are 
potentially skewed and ineffective without complimentary measures such as education and 
skills training.115 To judge the success of BEE, one must therefore look at its results in 
achieving black empowerment as well as be mindful of potential negative effects hereof. 
    The goals of BEE were to “transform the position of Black people and women in public 
and private sector employment” (Butler: 63) by creating a “sizable middle, entrepreneurial 
and business [class] among the black majority” (Gumede: 222). Disappointingly, BEE has so 
far mostly empowered and enriched a small number of blacks,116 many of whom only “lend 
their faces to white companies so that [these companies] can satisfy the requirements for 
                                                 
114 “Skills shortage”, Business Day, 6th of March 2007; “Shadow of rage - desperate high hopes, South Africa 
has failed to create a racially blind society”, San Francisco Chronicle, 20th of August 2006. 
115 According to Mamphela Ramphele, “there was a thought early in the transition that simply by transferring 
equity to black shareholders you make people wealthy – you don’t. You have to also bear in mind the 
importance of managerial capabilities, the ability to participate in the economy, which doesn’t come by simply 
transferring money” (Ramphele, 2002).  
116 Although this is seen as more or less inevitable by Alec Erwin, Minister for Public Enterprises who claims, 
“you need people to advance in the capitalist system. There’s going to be a limited number of them, and clearly 
there will be a few of them who will probably get a lion’s share of the deal. That is how the system [of Black 
Empowerment] works” (Erwin, 2007). 
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government tenders” (Gumede: 224). Having joined the mainly white middle class, they 
furthermore tend to forget the plight of the struggling masses they used to belong to and claim 
that the poor are responsible for their own predicament (Gumede: 222, 285). 
    Because of its disappointing record, BEE has been criticised for focusing too little on 
blacks or indeed poor people as a whole,117 the enrichment of a few blacks or the creation of a 
buffer against black anger apparently being an end in itself. An illusion is thereby created of 
black inclusiveness, whereby the black middle class is supposedly acting “in the best interests 
of” the masses. This is true, regardless of the positive psychological effect that BEE might 
have on blacks in general in “celebrating the success of a small elite” (Gumede: 230). 
According to Mangcu, Mbeki’s “liberal Africanism” that epitomises BEE and GEAR should 
be replaced by an “African liberalism” that focuses less on an individualistic approach than on 
a “black worldview … that may in fact enrich and sustain liberalism” and “give [it] a more 
human face” (Mangcu: 6), echoing Biko’s sentiments that “the great gift still has to come 
from Africa - giving the world a more human face” (Biko, 1996: 47). 
The fact that the left of the ANC managed to have a broader definition of BEE (the so-called 
Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment) signed into law in early 2004 might rectify 
some of these shortcomings, as well as be part of the reason for its relative success since 
2004.118  
The Broad Based programme claims to be,  
“An integrated and coherent socio-economic process that directly contributes to 
the economic transformation of South Africa and brings about significant 
increases in the number of black people that manage, own and control the 
country’s economy, as well as significant decreases in income inequalities.”119 
    That Finance Minister Trevor Manuel recently conceded that even the Broad Based BEE 
was “flawed and in need of a review”120 indicates that such relative success far from 
outweighs its failures, however. Apart from the alleged abuse and tokenism of the 
programme, the fundamental problem is that BEE and GEAR are functionally antagonistic. 
GEAR works against economic equality and broad based education by advocating an 
                                                 
117 A growing number of ill-educated poor whites are no longer protected by the job security apartheid gave them 
nor the “affirmative action [that] is geared to assist the far larger numbers of poor or disadvantaged blacks” 
(Arnold: 17). 4% of all whites presently live below the poverty line (Zabalaza, 2006: 8). 
118 The proportion of the market owned by blacks increased from 3% in 2004 to 5% in 2007 (Mbeki, 2007). 
119  “Strategy for Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment”, Department of Trade and Industry, page 12.  
120 “Manuel calls for review of BEE”, Mail & Guardian 10th of April 2007. 
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inefficient redistribution programme and cutting expenditure on education, and BEE works 
against overall economic growth because its preferential appointment of lesser-qualified 
labour harms competitiveness (Alexander: 5-6). 
 
6.3.4 AIDS 
Another aspect of South African society that is opposed not just to economic development but 
development in general is that of AIDS. The epidemic proportions of AIDS in South Africa 
present an increasing problem to virtually all areas of South African society, casting “a 
shadow over economy, society, and politics alike” because of, among other things, 
“increasing numbers of sick and dying workers” (Butler: 165; Cole: 605).121 A successful 
socio-economical and developmental outline for the future of South Africa is therefore 
unthinkable without attempting to contain or solve the problem of AIDS, although moral and 
constitutional arguments122 are obviously no less significant. According to Posel, “the lack of 
recognition, compassion and dignity [afforded to AIDS-victims] falls far short of the idea of 
life embodied in the constitutional right to life”, the government thus being obliged to act with 
more vigour (Posel: 314). Nevertheless, the record of the ANC’s AIDS-policy is decidedly 
unsuccessful and doused in remnants of apartheid-like racial animosity and denialism. 
    The first reports of AIDS occurrences in South Africa came in 1983, though the disease 
only assumed epidemic proportions in the mid-nineties (Karim: 371). Where the National 
Party’s strategies to combat AIDS in the eighties and early nineties were “half-hearted” and 
“discriminatory”, the ANC’s pre-1994 analysis was based on it seeing AIDS-treatment as a 
right (Karim: 374-375). Yet as election time drew closer, AIDS was no longer a significant 
political priority for Mandela and the ANC, the AIDS problem being virtually ignored 
publicly on cultural grounds. Mandela had not wished to offend “culturally conservative 
constituencies” during the run-up to the 1994 election that saw sexual matters as an 
inappropriate subject for public discussion (Karim: 376; de Waal: 44).  
    Mbeki’s views on AIDS, on the other hand, were coloured by his African Renaissance-
related views that Africa must solve its own problems. This is exemplified by his dislike of 
                                                 
121 South Africa is ranked as the country with the 5th highest AIDS rate by the CIA’s World Factbook, and as the 
country with the largest number of people (5.3 mil.) living with HIV/AIDS (Karim: 31). According to the South 
African government, “there is currently no clear evidence on the actual economic impact of HIV and AIDS in 
South Africa”, “HIV and AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa, 2007-2011” (p. 42). 
122 According to the South African Constitution, “everyone has the right to have access to … health care 
services” and “no one may be refused emergency medical treatment” (section 27). 
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what he saw as Western cultural and universalistic neo-colonialism, exemplified by AIDS 
being blamed on Africa, as well as expensive Western drug-related solutions. As a result of 
this, AIDS became politicised during Mbeki’s presidency (Gumede: 158-159).  
    Although initially accepting HIV as the cause of AIDS and successfully attempting to 
lower prices on anti-retroviral drugs, Internet research by Mbeki,123 including the works of 
dissident scientists, led him to ask whether not “immune deficiency is also caused by other 
things” (Mbeki, 2001) and if poverty not HIV was the primary cause of AIDS. This arguably 
caused him to “grab defeat from the jaws of victory” in the battle against highly priced 
medicine (Gumede: 158; Bond, 2001: 426). His Health Minister Tsabalala-Msimang’s 
announcement that AIDS should be fought with “a diet of garlic, lemon, olive oil and the 
African potato” not drugs,124 on top of cuts in AIDS funding and unspent budgets, further 
indicated that the members of the Mbeki administration were either pursuing the dissident 
views of their President (Gumede: 160-161; Karim: 541) or that they are generally ignorant 
about AIDS.125 This combination of questionable science and ignorance severely undermined 
any campaigns to advocate caution and condom use as ways of stopping the spread of HIV. 
According to Mamphela Ramphele, medical doctor and managerial director of the World 
Bank at the time, “the policy the [South African] government was pursuing [on Aids] was 
really tantamount to criminal irresponsibility” (Ramphele, 2002). 
    Financial and political cynicism towards the poor, rather than just ideological unsoundness 
or accusations of racism, might also be partially to blame for the Mbeki-administrations 
denialist views on AIDS, an example of which is Mbeki’s Finance Minister Trevor Manuel’s 
announcement that “it doesn’t make financial sense to spend money on people dying [of 
AIDS] anyway” (Gumede: 163).126 The fact that ANC MP’s were taking Anti-Retroviral 
medicine paid by the state (Gumede: 168), however, undermines any of the explanations for 
not providing this medicine to the general public, as well as smacking of hypocrisy. “Mbeki’s 
                                                 
123 Mbeki, amongst other web sites discussing AIDS, studied the virusmyth.net site (Gumede: 158) that claims, 
“there is no proof that HIV causes AIDS” and “that the virus is indeed harmless”. 
124 Tsabalala-Msimang also claimed, “nutrition is one of the integral parts of the government's strategy to combat 
HIV and AIDS” (Tshabalala-Msimang, 2003), although the focus on nutrition was later downplayed. 
125 During his rape-trial, “ex-Deputy President Jacob Zuma said he showered after sex with an HIV-positive 
woman, thinking this … ‘would minimise the risk of contracting the disease’ [HIV]”; “SA’s Zuma ‘showered to 
avoid HIV’”, BBC News 5th of April 2006. 
126 Although the Anti-Retroviral medicine Nevirapine “had … been offered free … to the governments of 
developing countries for use in the public health service in 2000” by its manufacturer, “the South African 
Department of Health refus[ed] the offer”, calling the drug dangerous (Karim: 543, 545). 
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response [in 2001] was merely to warn the ANC MPs that the drugs could be toxic” (Gumede: 
168). 
    The persecution and harassment of those who dared question Mbeki’s line on AIDS, such 
as that of the president of the Medical Research Council Malegapuru Makgoba who was 
threatened and accused of “betraying his race” (Gumede: 294), ensured that most people 
dared not criticise the ANC’s dissident stance, whatever their personal convictions.  
Mbeki’s u-turn on his previous AIDS-policies, approving the distribution of anti-retroviral 
drugs to over 5 million South Africans weeks before the 2004 election (Gumede: 150), may 
prove to be a turning point. But whether this was done to appease poor voters, the increasing 
number of civil society protests and campaigns against his position on AIDS, and the 
increasingly baffled international community, the latter whom might not otherwise see South 
Africa as a suitable investment partner, or because he finally recognised the urgency of the 
AIDS situation is unclear.  
    Having changed his policy on AIDS, there are still indications that Mbeki has not changed 
his mind and still “remains unconvinced that HIV causes AIDS” (Gumede: 172), believes the 
disease to be mainly poverty-related,127 and consequently does not take AIDS as seriously as 
the epidemic proportions of the disease merits, as well as the poverty problem that it 
engenders (de Waal: 45). Such a standpoint by the President will surely undermine the 
attempt of present and future AIDS awareness and prevention campaigns to disavow the 
stigma and discrimination that AIDS still carries in South Africa. Additionally, the promised 
drugs are still inaccessible to many South Africans because of such “lack of political will” and 
government sluggishness (Karim: 567, 569-570).  
 
6.3.5 Mugabe 
Mbeki’s championing of NEPAD and the AU shows his rhetorical commitment to 
democratising Africa and pan-Africanism. Whether it is more than just a rhetorical 
commitment is to be judged by whether democracy and pan-Africanism are actively 
promoted, especially seen in the light of the misuse of the terms by other African presidents 
such as Nkrumah and Mugabe in their attempts to remain in power (Hunter-Gault: 99). If not, 
                                                 
127 The “HIV and AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa, 2007-2011”, released by the ANC government 
on the 12th of march 2007, claims that “whilst the immediate determinant of the spread of AIDS relates to 
behaviours such as unprotected sexual intercourse … the fundamental drivers of this epidemic in South Africa 
are the more deep rooted institutional problems of poverty” (p. 10-11). 
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the AU and programmes such as NEPAD are nothing but continuations, albeit with more 
potential, of the largely self-congratulating OAU that was high on rhetoric and low on 
substance. Mbeki’s handling of the Zimbabwean crisis is a case in point.  
    The Zimbabwean economic and governmental crisis was exacerbated by land invasions of 
mainly white-owned farms by so-called “war veterans”, spurred on by Mugabe128 and ZANU-
PF’s “systematic intimidation” of the recently formed Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC) in connection with the Zimbabwean general election in 2000 and presidential election 
of 2002 (Meredith: 639-42). Mugabe’s ZANU was thus in violation of the principles of 
democracy, Good Governance and human rights spelled out by NEPAD, as well as of those of 
prudent economics. Being faced with the problem of a political and economic crisis on South 
Africa’s doorstep that led to millions of refugees entering South Africa illegally and of 
potential unrest throughout the region, South Africa furthermore had a special interest in 
helping resolve the Zimbabwean crisis.  
    Yet Mbeki did not attempt do this by way of sanctions or other more radical measures, as 
did the West,129 claiming instead that sanctions would hurt poor Zimbabweans the most, 
although Mbeki and others in the ANC had suggested to the same Western countries that 
sanctions were necessary to pressurise the apartheid regime. This is despite the fact that South 
Africa has “a unique ability to bring pressure to bear” on landlocked Zimbabwe because 
South Africa has “transport links, electricity supplies” and other services “vital for 
Zimbabwe’s welfare” (Meredith: 672).  
    Mbeki instead followed a policy of “quiet diplomacy”, attempting to influence Mugabe by 
resolving differences privately whilst not criticising him publicly. An example of this was that 
Mbeki’s deputy Jacob Zuma declared Zimbabwe’s 2002 presidential election “legitimate, 
valid, free and fair”, something that was later qualified by Mbeki, though most other 
observers, including international observers but not some African heads of state, claimed it to 
be unfair (Human Rights Watch: 7, 33).130 Perhaps Mbeki’s reason for “quiet diplomacy” is 
an acknowledgement of the problem of slow land reforms that the two countries share and 
                                                 
128 Mugabe, in 2000, called white landowners “white devils” and vowed, “to take all they owned” (Meredith: 
641).  
129 That the West advocated and enforced sanctions against Zimbabwe might in fact be one of the reasons why 
Mbeki choose not to do so. Mbeki could have reacted against what he saw as a patronising Western intrusion on 
an “African solution” for this particular “African problem”. 
130 “South Africa puts pressure on Mugabe”, BBC News 15th of March 2002. There is however a decreasing 
tendency amongst African leaders to defend Mugabe, Zambian President Mwanawasa for instance comparing 
Zimbabwe to the Titanic;  “Zimbabwe’s crisis ‘like Titanic’”, BBC News 21st of March 2007; “Mbeki to tackle 
Zimbabwe crisis”, BBC News 29th of March 2007. 
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fear of a potential spillover effect of the Zimbabwean crisis, South African land reforms 
having begun at an even slower rate than those instigated during Zimbabwe’s first decade of 
independence, prompting some land invasions inside South Africa (Jacobs: 268). Perhaps it is 
due to an unwillingness to criticise another African head of state, reflecting Mbeki’s African 
Renaissance approach to African politics. It certainly cannot be said that Mbeki is protecting 
Mugabe because of personal affinity nor because of any friendship between the ANC and 
ZANU-PF, relations between the two parties having been tense since the ANC chose to 
support rivals ZAPU because of a common Soviet affinity and backing (ZANU-PF was 
backed by China) (Gumede: 187). 
    Whatever the reason, Mbeki’s “quiet diplomacy” has so far been ineffectual and whereas 
the “megaphone diplomacy” of the Western countries has been equally so, Mbeki and other 
African Union leaders arguably have greater influence that could be brought to bear on 
Mugabe. Mbeki’s lack of decisive action towards Mugabe might have pleased South African 
Africanists “who celebrated Zimbabwe’s example of giving the whites a good kicking”, but it 
won South Africa no friends among the business community that Mbeki depended upon to 
boost his foreign investment-driven neo-liberal policies or elsewhere (Meredith: 673). The 
repeated breaches of agreements by Mugabe and the negative effects Mbeki’s “quiet 
diplomacy” towards him were having on foreign investment temporarily forced Mbeki to 
apply stronger rhetoric towards Mugabe (Gumede: 189-190), although such “strong rhetoric” 
has since been discontinued. Mbeki thus pre-emptively claimed the 2005 Zimbabwean 
general elections would be free and fair despite reports of large-scale intimidation and 
arbitrary arrests of MDC members (Human Rights Watch: 7), and he remains strangely 
uncritical of the general deteriorating political and economic situation in Zimbabwe, in effect 
maintaining his policy of “quiet diplomacy”.131 Mugabe, on the other hand, continues his 
intimidation, systematic abuse and bad-mouthing of members of the opposition and of 
journalists, as well as his “blatant disregard for the basic human rights of [Zimbabwe’s] 
citizens”, unabatedly (Human Rights Watch: 1, 7, 17, 30-31). 
    Mbeki has thereby laid himself open to criticism because of the apparent disparities 
between the rhetoric of a NEPAD that he had an central part in bringing about and his policy 
towards Zimbabwe, which in effect if not in purpose allows Mugabe to continue to violate the 
human rights, democratic values and Good Governance that NEPAD promotes as necessary 
                                                 
131 “Beatings, arrests ‘skyrocket’ in Zim”, Mail & Guardian 2nd of May 2007. 
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for African economic development. Even more damning is the fact that Mbeki and the AU 
have been criticised, rightfully or wrongfully, for following the example of their predecessors 
in the OAU in not being willing to criticise a fellow African head of state for the blatant 
disregard of the rule of law, thereby employing “a typically blind Third World loyalty” and 
“group solidarity” (Woods, 2000: 220; Meredith: 673)132 that has damaged the credibility of 
Mbeki’s notion of “African solutions for African problems”. Democratic Alliance133 and 
opposition leader Tony Leon sees this as ironic because Mbeki, “by refusing to speak out 
against Mugabe … reinforces the Afro-pessimists' worst stereotypes”.134 
 
6.3.6 Non-racialism 
Having been criticised for employing Africanist “group solidarity”, Mbeki is nevertheless an 
avowed non-racialist and globalist who speaks of the necessity of international free markets 
and of an inclusive South Africa. It is sometimes hard to determine whether Mbeki believes 
his own inclusive statements about how white South Africans have an equal claim to being 
African, whether he is being politically opportunistic by playing the “Africanist card when it 
suits him” and beating the “Africanist drum when it’s politically expedient to do so” 
(Gumede: 44, 242; Hadland: 120), whether he is truly an exclusivist Africanist of the 
Lembede mould, or whether his Africanism is more “realistic and assertive” unlike former 
Africanist leaders such as Nkrumah and Nyerere (Hadland: 144), however. Some of this 
confusion comes from Mbeki seemingly having two definitions of “African”. 
    His inclusive definition of “African” identifies Africans as those with an emotional 
attachment to the continent, those “who view the continent as their home” (Lodge: 237), 
“South Africa belong[ing] to all who live in it” (Mbeki, 1996).  In refusing “to accept that our 
Africanness shall be defined by our race, colour, gender or historical origins”, stating that he 
is “formed of the migrants who left Europe to find a home in our native land” and that in his 
“veins courses the blood of the Malay slaves who came from the east” (Mbeki, 1996), Mbeki 
is furthermore stating that South Africanness consists of a multitude of cultural and racial 
components, including those South Africans of European and Asian descent, prompting 
Afrikaner liberal van Zyl Slabbert to state that he was an African “because my president told 
                                                 
132 “African leaders break silence over Mugabe’s human rights abuses”, The Guardian 4th of January 2006. 
133 The Democratic Alliance is the heir to the Progressive Party, having merged several times with other parties 
such and the now defunct New National party since the seventies. 
134 “Leon slams Mbeki’s ‘racial myopia’”, Mail and Guardian, 23rd of March 2007.  
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me so”.135 Mbeki has also claimed that he “sincerely wants to provide a political home for 
Afrikaners and white English-speaking liberals” (Gumede: 243), calling for “a new patriotism 
… which would include … an all-embracing effort to build a sense of common nationhood” 
(Hadland: 187).  
    Mbeki also calls for Africanist solidarity with Africa, however,136 his exclusive definition 
seemingly aiming to Africanise South Africa by “Africanist historical nostalgia” where 
“African culture is equated with black African culture” (Lodge: 240). Whereas Mbeki outlines 
an inclusive concept of Africanness in his “I am an African” speech, he contradicts this in the 
same speech and elsewhere.137 His actions also seem to reveal a much more exclusivist South 
Africa that challenges his inclusivist concept of “African”. Effects of this can be seen in the 
previously mentioned fact that whites, and to a lesser degree Coloureds and Indians, feel 
discriminated against job-wise because the effects of BEE make it difficult for them to be 
considered for senior positions. They can also be seen in the race-orientated accusations made 
to amongst others the president of the Medical Research Council of “betraying his race” and 
“not being a real black person”, because he dared to dispute Mbeki’s policy on AIDS, as well 
as the remark that “we don’t need a white messiah”, made to SACP deputy general secretary 
Jeremy Cronin because he had criticised Mbeki for losing touch with the ANC’s grassroots, 
made by members high up the ANC hierarchy that were not publicly rebutted by Mbeki 
(Gumede: 294). 
    There could be several reasons for the inconsistency of Mbeki’s signals, although the 
notion that Mbeki is an outright racist does not seem to be one of them. The strategy of the 
ANC that preserved the racial terminology of apartheid to address apartheid’s legacy by the 
affirmative action policies of BEE, whilst at the same time attempting to embrace an 
overarching, inclusive South African identity, is certainly one plausible explanation (Zegeye: 
340).  
                                                 
135 “What is wanted is not residence, but solidarity”, Mail and Guardian, 11th of December 2006. 
136 Mbeki states that he is “born of the people’s of the continent of Africa. The pain of the violent conflict that 
the peoples of Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, Burundi and Algeria [suffer] is a pain I also bear. The dismal shame 
of poverty, suffering and human degradation of my continent is a blight that we share.” (Mbeki, 1996).  
137 Mbeki uses the term “African South Africans” (Kunnie: 158), speaks of  “the exclusion [by apartheid] of the 
African mother and child, historically the most disadvantaged section of our population” (Mbeki, 1996), 
concludes that  “[with independence] at last, Africans were governing themselves”, that “61 per cent of Africans 
are poor with the figure among Whites being 1 per cent … the figures for Coloureds and Indians are 38 and 5 per 
cent respectively”, and that “Africans occupied 6,18 per cent of management positions and blacks, as a whole, 
12,57 per cent” (Mbeki speech, 1998, quoted in Hadland: 197, 199). 
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    The previously mentioned strategy of “playing the Africanist card when it suits him” is 
another potential reason, Mbeki’s Africanism being nothing but a cover up and detraction 
from the lack of improvements felt by the majority of South Africa’s population who are 
black Africans. Mbeki is thereby being seen as being playing a game employed by many post-
independence African rulers such as Mugabe, where all Africa’s problems are blamed on 
colonialism or neo-colonialism, Western imperialism and white racism and not on their own 
poor governance (Ayittey: 6, 27; Kunnie 155).138 The ANC government’s “clampdown on 
‘illegal immigration’” that results in the arresting and deportation of thousands of sub-Saharan 
African nationals (Kunnie: 110) further disavows Mbeki’s Africanism. Regardless of this, his 
inclusivist statements do not necessarily defeat this reckoning as they can be seen to serve the 
populist function of making the ANC appear to be a party that represents everyone.  
    A third more sympathetic view could see his inconsistent statements as belonging to 
someone damaged by the legacy of apartheid (Tutu: 154-155) as well as being sincerely angry 
at the continuing manifestations of its Eurocentrism. Mbeki’s exclusivist statements might 
therefore be caused by his experience of apartheid’s racism and denigration, the continuation 
and belittlement of which he still sees represented by whites such as Tony Leon (Gumede: 
155, 249; Hadland: xi; Arnold: 11) and which he abhors. In 2001 he thus declared, “the world 
did not fight against apartheid racism and white domination to create space for them to 
continue to be subjected to dehumanising, demeaning and insulting racism”.139  
    The subtleties of the distinction between hating white notions of superiority and whites in 
general is easily lost in a country with a history of defining most things along racial lines such 
as South Africa. White South Africans tend to “interpret criticism of white domination as 
criticism of white people” (Hadland: 107), and Mbeki is obviously sensitive towards what he 
(rightly or wrongly) sees as instances of racism and Afro-pessimism such as claims that AIDS 
originated in Africa, criticism of the ANC for not doing enough about the high rates of rape or 
that the 2002 Football World Cup went to Germany, not South Africa.140  
    It is likely that Mbeki’s inclusive statements are anchored in a genuine hope for and belief 
in the righteousness of an inclusive South Africa that can only come about when the 
significant remnants of racism that exist in South Africa, even amongst self-proclaimed non-
                                                 
138 Claud Ake claimed as early as 1965 that “instead of contributing to economic development, Pan-Africanism 
retards it by diverting attention from domestic failures” (Ake, 1965: 536). 
139 ANC Today, Volume 4, No. 42, 22-28 October 2004. 
140“Mbeki slammed in rape race row”, BBC News 5th of October 2004; “Mbeki labels World Cup decision 
racist”, CBC Sports 10th of November 2000. 
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racial white liberals (Arnold: 11), have disappeared. Consequently, the criticism of Mbeki is 
not necessarily to be levelled at his sincerity in setting all-inclusive goals that are most likely 
held by many South Africans, but at the way he is trying to reach them, including the 
problematic nature of confusing statements regarding the inclusive or exclusive nature of the 
South Africa he wants to bring about and his tendency towards what Appiah refers to as 
Afrocentrism (Maloka: 90). 
    One stumbling block to such goals is that Mbeki appears to see everything in an “over-
racialised framework”,141 wanting “African solutions to African problems” so badly that he 
seems to have developed a blind spot for African “solutions” that do not solve African 
problems, exemplified by his AIDS policies and his policies towards Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. 
Whereas Biko disavowed both Eurocentric universalism and Negritude, Mbeki, according to 
Ivor Chipkin,142 is promoting “a new kind of [“Afrocentric”] universalism – that the African 
more than any other person in the world embraces the true universal”.143  
    The paradoxical combination of the ANC’s multiculturalist nationalism that sought to build 
a South Africa of different cultures144 and Mbeki’s inclusivism is another stumbling block, 
although the two are not necessarily contradictory notions. As was discussed in chapter 2.3.2, 
equality sought at group level, not at the level of individuals, highlights differences and runs 
the risk of furthering a cultural essentialism not unlike that of apartheid’s separate “races”, as 
does pan-Africanist, Negritude-like notions of “African”. 
    The matter is perhaps more complex than that of psychological factors regarding 
inclusivism and exclusivism, but whatever the answer is; it is obvious that the psychological 
aspects of South African politics are interconnected with the political and economic. In this 
regard, Mbeki only seems to have managed to successfully bring about a narrow political 
liberation. The psychological and social liberation that the BCM saw as necessary for a true 
liberation has not been sufficiently pursued. Whereas the ANC used non-racialism to achieve 
multiculturalism, what the BCM insisted on was practically the opposite, that of initial black 
                                                 
141 “South Africa: Proof that politicians are often the worst enemies of their people”, Business Day 22nd of March 
2007. 
142 Ivor Chipkin is a chief research specialist in the Democracy and Governance research programme and has 
previously worked at the University of the Witwatersrand in the Wits Institute for Social and Economic 
Research. 
143 “Do South Africans really exist?”, Mail & Guardian 26th of April 2007. 
144 The ANC’s 1994 election manifesto called for the building of a nation “by developing our different cultures, 
beliefs and languages as a source of our common strength” (Chipkin, 2003: 27). The constitution furthermore 
asserts the “right of self-determination of any community sharing a common cultural and language heritage, 
within a territorial entity in the Republic or in any other way” in section 235. 
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political exclusivity, necessitated by centuries of colonial and apartheid conditioning, to 
achieve a South African society where race was not supposed to be an issue. People were 
differentiated along the lines of oppressor and oppressed, not along racial or group lines, as 
with the ANC. Xolela Mangcu in suggesting that his “staunch non-racialist background” is 
due to his “black consciousness background”, whereas the present climate favours “a form of 
racial identity and exclusivism tied to essentialism and ultimately tied to power”145 implies 
that Black Consciousness, or a similar psychological inward-looking process, was and is 
necessary to achieve true non-racialism.  
    The fact that Black Consciousness was only partially successful in achieving its goals, and 
that a non-racialism that failed to sufficiently question apartheid racism prevailed in the 
liberation struggle, is therefore partially to blame for the present resurgence of exclusionism. 
It is because of the combination of the ANC’s multiculturalist and non-racialist approach that 
the ANC seemed to give little thought to the problem of getting from the racially and 
economically divided society of post-apartheid to something more inclusive, or indeed to 
problems of inferiority. This in turn seems to have led to a move towards a more exclusive 
Africanism and the danger of black or African inclusiveness and exploitation (Gibson: 164), 
akin to the essentialism that Fanon warned against. Mbeki and others in the ANC accordingly 
still cast their “solutions for South Africa in a racial framework” (Jacobs: 114), even though 
the elimination of the absolute divisiveness of apartheid and creation of a small wealthy black 
elite belies the illusion of absolute solidarity along racial lines.  
    Although the Africanism of Mbeki’s African Renaissance might be a well-meant albeit 
mistaken attempt at belatedly dealing with such unresolved matters, it might also, as 
previously mentioned, be a strategy to stop the poor from defining themselves along more 
income-related or class lines.146 Perhaps the fear of such antics was why Biko advocated a 
common black resistance until apartheid was no more, after which there was to be “no 
reference to race” (Biko, 1996: 123), the psychological problems of affirmative action being 
another potential reason. 
 
 
 
                                                 
145 “ANC needs to revive non-racialism”, Cape Times 30th of November 2006. 
146 Class identity is on the rise in South Africa, however, as is national identity, identity along racial lines 
simultaneously declining  (Netshitenzhe: 85). 
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6.4 The future 
Mbeki’s future goals, mentioned in his State of the Nation Address on the 9th of February 
2007, include amongst other things speeding up land redistribution, identifying defects in 
poverty reduction,147 strengthening national belonging, reducing crime, intensifying the 
campaign against HIV and AIDS and increasing access to education (Mbeki, 2007). Whereas 
these are all necessary steps to improve the lives of poor South Africans, an overarching and 
integral strategy that acknowledges the interdependency of South Africa’s problems is 
necessary to be able to achieve these goals.  
    That such a strategy is not being pursued can be seen in Mbeki dissociating South African 
crime from politics or the legacy of apartheid, implying that crime has nothing to do with the 
poverty or psychological problems of poor South Africans. Hence crime is to be fought with 
“effective organisation, mobilisation and leadership of the mass of law-enforcement, 
intelligence and corrections officers, and functionaries of the justice system”, as well as by 
“modernising … border control”, “further expanding … the South African Police Service”, 
building “more corrections facilities” and generally making “life more difficult for the 
criminals” (Mbeki, 2007).   
    Although Mbeki, by measuring “the success of [South African] democracy” against “the 
quality of life of the most vulnerable in [South African] society” (Mbeki, 2007), at least seems 
intent on finding a solution to important social problems such as crime, it is hard to see how 
this will be possible to a larger degree than presently, especially while he is still following the 
dictates of GEAR and NEPAD (Mbeki, 2007) that are largely to blame for the lack of poverty 
reduction (Van der Walt, 2000: 75) or not sufficiently prioritising AIDS.148 Black 
Consciousness, on the other hand, related crime directly to poverty. Biko insisted that 
although “no-one ever attempts to relate [crime] to poverty, unemployment, overcrowding, 
lack of schooling and migratory labour” although poverty “is the basis of the vandalism, 
                                                 
147 Both relative and absolute poverty has risen in the post-apartheid period according to government statistics 
(Bond, 2004), although there has been a relative decline since 2000 (Netshitenzhe: 12). The South African 
government therefore claims to be changing track and looking at ways to improve the social security system, the 
Minister of Social Development, Zola Skweyiya conceding that “there are many lessons to be learnt from the 
Nordic countries”, “South Africa: Nordic Countries Highlight Importance of Social Welfare”, BuaNews 
(Tshwane), 15th of March 2007.  
148 Mbeki and the ANC have begun reluctantly attending to South Africa’s AIDS problems. In the 2007 State of 
the nation Address, Mbeki thus “commits [the government] to intensify the campaign against HIV and AIDS and 
to improve its implementation of all elements of the comprehensive approach” (Mbeki, 2007), although such an 
important subject of AIDS is only discussed in this one instance, the word “AIDS” only being used twice in the 
entire speech. 
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murder, rape and plunder” (Biko, 1996: 57, 75). Any solution to the problem of crime would 
thus have to go beyond that of the symptoms of crime and deal with its root causes. 
     That South Africa has retained much of apartheid’s socio-economical structure and 
psychological problems confirms that Black Consciousness has not yet served its purpose. 
Instead of the struggle achieving the liberation of both the oppressed and the oppressor, the 
ANC might have simply replaced one elite with another, the possibility of which both Fanon 
and Biko warned about. Where Biko claimed that true liberation needed social change, the 
ANC government ensured “that property rights were respected and orthodox economic 
policies were adopted” (MacDonald: 178). The belief of Black Consciousness that blacks 
must build up their own value systems (Biko, 1996: 49) and that they must participate both 
politically and economically in the power structures of South Africa is therefore belied by 
GEAR, the fact that white businesses was able to retain their power over the economy and the 
tokenism of BEE.  
    But are more left-leaning policies a credible alternative to Mbekism? Anisur Rahman 
suggests that the “romantic collectivism” that much of the left has previously embraced is 
unrealistic, at least in the present conditions of market hegemony, and should be replaced by a 
“pragmatic collectivism” that attempts to progressively change the system, calling “for 
strategies for the people to develop power over the market” (Rahman, 2004: 20). Biko’s Black 
Consciousness and African Communalism can perhaps be seen in this light: as a moderate 
left-leaning alternative to the economic neo-liberalism of Mbeki that bases its practical 
policies on the fact that “Africa is still a communal society” (Ake, 1993: 243), not on 
rhetorical references to a concept of Africanness such as that of Mbeki’s African Renaissance. 
The communalistic notions of solidarity and ubuntu already exist in South African society, in 
the present South African constitution149 and in Mbeki’s world outlook. This does not 
necessarily mean than notions of solidarity and ubuntu are paramount in practical government 
                                                 
149 The present South African constitution “obliges its citizenry, the state and the constitutional court, to take the 
idea [ubuntu] very seriously” (Posel: 313). “The concept "ubuntu" appears for the first time in the post-amble, 
but it is a concept that permeates the Constitution generally and more particularly Chapter Three which 
embodies the entrenched fundamental human rights”, Constitutional Court of South Africa, 6th of June 1995. 
Ubuntu was also promoted as the basis for social welfare in the Department of Welfare’s White Paper for Social 
Welfare, August 1997, and has been acknowledged to be part of the South African “world outlook” by Mbeki in 
his 2006 Nelson Mandela Lecture and by Trevor Manuel in his 2007 Budget Speech (Manuel: 3, 28). The ANC 
Policy Discussion Documents also recently (March 2007) mentioned “the major spiritual component of the 
Continent of Africa … the deep primal human concept of ubuntu” and “liberating values of ubuntu thinking”, 
claiming that “an economy which ensures that most people lack the means to provide enough food, housing, 
clothing, and health care to sustain life … demands the justice of an ubuntu society” (PDD, The RDP of the 
Soul, p. 2, 3, 6). 
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policies or in all parts of South African society, however, according to Mbeki, in fact, “the 
traditional value system of Ubuntu had been greatly eroded”.150 Nor does it mean that they are 
easily achieved in the future, especially if they are counteracted by policies such as GEAR 
and BEE that work against such solidarity. What it does mean is that anyone attempting to use 
a communalistic approach to try and solve South Africa’s problems are on solid ground 
constitutionally, as well as culturally. Ubuntu or Black Communalism should not only be seen 
as an already existing basis of South African cultural heritage on which a future society can 
be built, but as a target that has yet to be reached, however. That Mbeki and other ANC 
members still fail to acknowledge the intellectual contribution of Biko as well as the potential 
positive role of Black Consciousness in contemporary South Africa (Ramphele, 1995: 183-
184)151 is consequently problematic in two ways: Firstly because Biko has a different vision 
of how to achieve a non-racialism in South Africa that has so far been elusive, and secondly 
because he outlines a South Africa that is essentially built around the concept of ubuntu.  
 
7.1 Conclusion 
As with all other former colonies, especially those on the African continent, South Africa still 
has a colonial legacy. Whereas this legacy is believed to be different to that of most if not all 
other postcolonial nations because of apartheid, it is in fact surprisingly similar to that of other 
countries with a history of colonialism. The main difference was that the South African white 
colonisers, especially the Afrikaners, unlike most other colonisers had created an identity that 
was separate from that of the “mother country” and that South African colonial oppression 
increased during the fifties and sixties where most other African colonies gained their 
independence. In doing so, the Afrikaner-dominated National Party instigated a uniquely rigid 
structure of separate development, that of apartheid. As was colonialism, apartheid was built 
on the premise of racism, denigration of black history and culture, white superiority as well as 
on the physical subjugation of its black citizens. Resistance and transcendence of the legacies 
of colonialism and apartheid in contemporary South Africa therefore requires confronting 
both its material and psychological aspects. 
    One of the main objectives of this thesis was to re-evaluate the usefulness of Bikoism and 
Black Consciousness in confronting material and psychological matters that verifiably still 
                                                 
150 ANC Today, Volume 7. No. 7, 23 February - 1 March 2007.  
151 “How Mbeki is hampering the renaissance”, Mail and Guardian, 9th of June 2000; “South Africa: Dream 
behind Biko’s smile will outlive current crop of leaders”, Business Day 5th of April 2007. 
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exist in contemporary South Africa. The analysis in this thesis had shown, however, that any 
exclusive advocacy of Bikoism to the detriment of Mbekism or vice versa is not viable. 
To put it crudely, the ANC focused and focuses overwhelmingly on dismantling the material 
and Black Consciousness primarily the psychological legacy of apartheid, although 
admittedly Mbeki’s African Renaissance attempts to deal with the psychological aspects of 
apartheid that the ANC had largely neglected, and the Black Communalism of the Black 
Consciousness Movement meant to constitute the political second leg of its two-tiered 
approach. Both organisations thus to some extent neglected to take important aspects of 
colonialism and postcolonialism into account. The ANC either ignored psychological 
liberation or believed that it would automatically be brought about by material liberation 
whereas Black Consciousness assumed that integration would automatically follow in a just 
and free society, that a process of consciousness-building would be a large part of bringing 
about such liberation and that the “dirty work” of the armed struggle should be left to the 
ANC. 
    Whilst not disregarding the dissimilarities between the two, there is common ground 
between Mbekism and Bikoism, rhetorically if not in practice. Both speak of the disabling 
effects of colonialism and the need for retaining the best values of South Africa’s indigenous 
culture(s) and society such as ubuntu, although Mbeki’s rhetorical commitment to such 
themes are sometimes in direct opposition to his actual policies of GEAR and NEPAD that 
signify a highly individualistic political approach.  
    There are also significant differences, an example of which is the organisational bottom-up 
approach that Black Consciousness advocated that is contrary to the centralist, top-down 
approach that the ANC have practised under Mbeki. As indicated above, the Black 
Consciousness of Steve Biko further maintained that psychological liberation was a 
precondition for full liberation, and saw proof hereof in the dormant nature of a liberation 
cause that had neglected to take into account the notions of black inferiority and white 
superiority that existed, and still exist, in South Africa. Moreover, Black Consciousness 
adopted a “strategic essentialism” that insisted on a non-racial South Africa that fused the life-
styles of the different groups after apartheid had been dismantled whereas Mbeki and the 
ANC have done virtually the opposite. The latter insisted on non-racialism during the 
liberation struggle but adopted the Africanist approach of the African Renaissance and Black 
Economic Empowerment once political liberation had been achieved, possibly in belatedly 
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attempting to deal with the fact that racialism had not simply “withered away” by itself. That 
these approaches are problematic can be seen in their potential essentialism and reinforcement 
of racial identification, as well as in the culture of black entitlement and furthering of Afro-
pessimism that the latter generates.  
    Black Consciousness can mainly improve or inform present South African politics in 
psychological and organisational matters, although admittedly Black Communalism can be 
seen as an alternative or complementary set of policies that stands in opposition to the 
individualistic neo-liberalism of the Mbeki administration. Insisting that the eradication of the 
complexes of white superiority and black inferiority is a precondition for true non-racialism is 
important if the preoccupation with group and racial identities that continues to exist in South 
Africa is to be transcended, although this should obviously not lead to a neglect of material 
aspects of liberation.  
    A more integral solution to South Africa’s problems than has hitherto been attempted, one 
that accepts the interrelatedness of the political, social, economic and psychological aspects of 
South African politics, is of paramount importance. True liberation needs transformation in all 
four areas if South Africa is not to end up replacing or complementing a white elite with a 
small black one, something that Biko warned against and which is seemingly already 
happening. Even so, the “liberal Africanism” of Mbeki is not necessarily to be wholly 
transformed and replaced for true liberation to happen but must at least be given what Biko 
calls “a more human face” of indigenous cultural traits, although these must encompass 
individualism as well as communalism to avoid the reactionary tendencies of pre-colonial 
societies. Furthermore, if the common humanism that is implied in both Bikoism and 
Mbekism is to be attained, the goals of the universal must be disengaged from the 
particularism of Eurocentrism. What is truly paradoxical is that all countries, including South 
Africa, must nevertheless move through the particular to reach the universal. If South Africa 
is to succeed in bringing about a true non-racial Rainbow Nation where “heterogeneity does 
not preclude harmony”, and not simply a multicultural society of parallel communities, 
however, the dangers of overemphasising black African culture and thereby promoting an 
“Afrocentric” universalism that both Mbekism and Bikoism can easily slip into are to be 
avoided as much as the Eurocentrism that it is meant to replace.  
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